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This thesis proposes that judicial management should commence with a mere
resolution by the directors. This is less cumbersome than the existing procedure to
commence judicial management comprising a court order. Judicial management
triggers a stay of limited duration on legal proceedings that provides an essential
breathing space to devise and implement a rescue plan.
Once judicial management commences the creditors should hold the power to decide
on the future of the company. They can therefore accept or reject a rescue plan
(prepared by the judicial manager) for the restructuring of current rights and
obligations and for the future management of the company.
Summary
Judicial management has been part of South African company law since 1926. Itwas
introduced as a procedure to provide for a corporate rescue. Judicial management has
changed little since its introduction. This is in stark contrast with the position in other
jurisdictions where the need for improved corporate or business rescue procedures has
received considerable attention in the last few decades.
This thesis examines the suitability of judicial management as a business rescue
procedure for the current South African circumstances and compares it to similar
mechanisms in England and Australia.
The modem economy relies on credit. Furthermore the globalisation of markets and
the increase in competition between enterprises add to the unpredictability of an
enterprise's economic circumstances. Thus, one of the important objectives of a
corporate insolvency regime is the preservation of viable economic enterprises. A
business rescue procedure such as judicial management is therefore an essential
component of a corporate insolvency regime.
However, judicial management needs reform. The existing shortcomings of judicial
management include its high cost, the appointment of professional liquidators as
business rescuers, the lack of a business rescue culture, the absence of an approved
rescue plan, the treatment of judicial management as an extraordinary measure in
corporate insolvency and the use of section 311 of the Companies Act as a corporate
rescue mechanism.
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During judicial management and the execution of the rescue plan, control of the
company's assets vests in the judicial manager and directors lose their powers of
management. Judicial managers should be encouraged to make a success of judicial
management by providing that the judicial manager cannot be appointed as the
liquidator in a subsequent liquidation. Furthermore, the burden of the costs of judicial
management could be eased by providing a more flexible system for the remuneration
of the judicial manager.
A statutory business rescue procedure interacts with other components of an
insolvency regime and other areas of law. In order to optimise the positive effects of a
business rescue procedure certain changes are proposed regarding statutory provisions
on insolvent trading, the phenomenon of phoenix companies, section 311 of the
Companies Act and tax legislation. The thesis also proposes a smooth transition from
judicial management to voluntary liquidation.
The thesis has an annexure with draft legislation to give effect to the principal changes
proposed by it for the Companies Act.
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Die tesis stel voor dat geregtelike bestuur met 'n blote direksiebesluit in werking
gestel word. Dit is minder belemmerend as die hofbevel waarmee geregtelike bestuur
tans begin word. Geregtelike bestuur stel'n moratorium van beperkte duur in werking
waartydens geen geregtelike prosesse teen die maatskappyaanhangig gemaak of
voortgesit kan word nie. Dit gee die maatskappy die nodige grasie om 'n reddingsplan
uit te werk en te implementeer.
Opsomming
Geregtelike bestuur is reeds sedert 1926 deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse
maatskappyereg. Dit is ingestel as 'n prosedure om maatskappye van ondergang te red.
Geregtelike bestuur het sedertdien min verander. Dit is in skerp teenstelling met ander
jurisdiksies wat die afgelope paar dekades toegewy gewerk het aan prosedures om
korporasies en besighede te red.
Hierdie tesis ondersoek die toepaslikheid van geregtelike bestuur as 'n prosedure om
in die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse omstandighede besighede van ondergang te red en
vergelyk dit met soortgelyke prosedures in Engeland en Australië.
Moderne ekonomieë se afhanklikheid van krediet, die globalisering van markte en die
toename in mededinging tussen ondernemings dra by tot die wisselvallige ekonomiese
omstandighede van 'n onderneming. Die redding van lewensvatbare ondernemings is
gevolglik 'n belangrike doelstelling van korporatiewe insolvensiereg. Daarom is 'n
prosedure soos geregtelike bestuur om ondernemings te red 'n onontbeerlike element
van korporatiewe insolvensiereg.
Geregtelike bestuur moet egter hervorm word. Geregtelike bestuur het verskeie
tekortkominge waaronder hoë regskoste, die aanstelling van professionele
likwidateurs as persone om ondernemings te red, die gebrek aan 'n kultuur om
ondernemings te red, die afwesigheid van 'n goedgekeurde reddingsplan, die hantering
van geregtelike bestuur as 'n buitengewone remedie in korporatiewe insolvensiereg en
die gebruik van artikel 311 van die Maatskappywet as 'n meganisme om maatskappye
van likwidasie te red.
Nadat geregtelike bestuur in aanvang geneem het behoort die krediteure die mag te hê
om oor die toekoms van die maatskappy te besluit. Krediteure sou 'n reddingsplan
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(voorberei deur die geregtelike bestuurder) wat vir die herstrukturering van die regte
en verpligtinge van die maatskappy en vir sy toekomstige bestuur voorsiening maak
kon aanvaar of verwerp.
Gedurende geregtelike bestuur en die uitvoering van die reddingsplan vestig die
beheer oor die bates van die maatskappy in die geregtelike bestuurder. Die direksie
verloor terselfdertyd alle bestuursbevoegdhede. Geregtelike bestuurders behoort
aangemoedig te word om 'n sukses van die geregtelike bestuur te maak deur te bepaal
dat 'n geregtelike bestuurder nie as likwidateur aangestel kan word indien die
maatskappy uiteindelik gelikwideer word nie. Die las van hoë koste kan verlig word
deur 'n buigsame stelsel van vergoeding vir die geregtelike bestuurder in te stel.
'n Statutêre reddingsprosedure vir ondernemings staan in wisselwerking met ander
elemente van korporatiewe insolvensiereg en ander regsgebiede. Ten einde die
positiewe uitwerking van 'n reddingsprosedure vir ondernemings te optimaliseer word
sekere veranderinge ten opsigte van die wetgewing met betrekking tot handeldryf in
insolvente omstandighede, die verskynsel van "phoenix" maatskappye, artikel 311 van
die Maatskappywet en belastingwetgewing voorgestel. Die tesis stelook 'n gladde
oorskakeling van geregtelike bestuur na vrywillige likwidasie voor.
Die tesis sluit ook 'n aanhangsel met voorgestelde wetgewing in om uitvoering te gee
aan die belangrikste veranderinge aan die Maatskappywet wat in die tesis voorgestel
word.
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Introduction
CHAPTERl
1 1 Judicial management and corporate rescue
Judicial management has been part of South African company law for a long time. It
was first introduced by the Companies Act of 1926.1 At that time it was considered
necessary to assist "factories manufacturing articles". It was widely considered that
these firms helped the country in the circumstances of the day and judicial
management was thought of as a tool to provide a corporate rescue. That meant that
instead of liquidating the company (or factory) some means for the survival of the
company or its business was provided.'
Although judicial management was never extensively used in the South African
context, the idea of a corporate rescue was not abandoned. In fact it has become a
world-wide phenomenon. Considerable thought, effort and legislative energy have
been poured into similar arrangements elsewhere.
It can be said from the outset that there are quite a few indications that the idea of a
corporate rescue is not nearly as unpopular as the use of judicial management might
indicate. An example is the frequent use in South Africa of the scheme of
arrangement in terms of section 311 of the Companies Ace in what has been termed
the "arrangement industry'" to keep companies that are unable to pay their debts alive.
The need for a corporate rescue scheme is echoed by the words of the Australian Law
Reform Commission:
"The Commission IS concerned that apart from conclusions that might be
suggested by statistical evidence, the legislative approach to corporate insolvency
in Australia is largely negative. There is very little emphasis upon or
encouragement of a constructive approach to corporate insolvency, for example,
1 Act 46 of 1926, ss 195-198. See the text at n 8 infra for the definition of judicial management.
2 Hansard "House of Assembly Debates" vol6 25 Feb 1926 col 996-7.
3 Act 61 of 1973. Its frequent use might however be curbed by recent developments. The dictum in
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Datakor Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1998 4 SA 1050 (A), has the effect
that the preserved tax loss of the company may not be utilised by the offeror company in a section 311
scheme of arrangement. Anonymous "Income Tax - Assessed loss - Arrangement under section 311 of
the Companies Act" 1999 The Taxpayer 34; Anonymous "Arrangements under section 311 of the
Companies Act with a view to preserving the company's assessed losses: Are they worthwhile? 1999
The Taxpayer 105. See also 5 4 infra.
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2the possibility of saving a business (as distinct from the company itself) and
preserving employment prospects. ItS
In Singapore a judicial management regime was introduced in 1987. Apparently it
draws on the idea of judicial management in South Africa." It was incorporated into
Singaporean law after a crisis in the local financial markets that followed the financial
failure of important companies.
The object was that creditors should not force companies that are essentially viable
into liquidation before they have first had an opportunity to reorganise their affairs.
This reflected the opinion that had there been a suitable mechanism "fundamentally
sound companies (which have now gone under) would have been saved with the
passage of time and the general improvement of the economy."?
This is part of the evidence that in several parts of the world the need for corporate
rescue mechanisms was recognised and the necessary legislation has indeed been
introduced.
The South African law knows judicial management as a corporate rescue procedure.
A judicial manager may be provisionally appointed when a company is unable to pay
its debts or is probably unable to meet its obligations.'
The provisional judicial manager takes over the management of the company from the
incumbent directors. He then has to do certain investigations and organise meetings
with creditors and members. He then reports back to the court on the prospect of the
company being able to become a successful concern or to pay its debts within a
reasonable time. The meetings of creditors and members are to consider the
desirability of placing the company under final judicial management. There is no
provision that the judicial manager takes any active role in formulating a corporate
rescue plan resembling the deed of company arrangement of Australian law" or the
proposals of the administrator under English law. 10
4 Ex Parte NBSA Centre Ltd 1987 2 SA 783 (T) 796; Ex Parte Kaplan and Others NNO: In Re
Robinson Consolidated Industries Ltd 1987 3 SA 413 (W) 422,424.
S Australia Law Reform Commission General Insolvency Inquiry Discussion Paper no 32 (1987) 20.
6 Tomasic, Little, Francis, Kamarul & Wang "Insolvency Law Administration and Culture in Six Asian
Legal Systems" 1996 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 249 258-259. See however Brown
Corporate Rescue 824 who says that it is closely modelled on the English administration procedure.
7 Tomasic et al1996 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 260.
8 Companies Act 61 of 1973 ss 427-440.
9 See 3 5 3 infra.
10 See 3 5 2 infra.
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3Once the provisional judicial manager has reported to the court and the court decides
to make a final order the judicial manager runs the company under the supervision of
the Master. The aim is to restore the company to a successful concern.
The courts" have treated judicial management as a "special dispensation which can bé
granted to a company only in exceptional circumstances."12 Olver amplifies this view"
when he asks:
"Why should a special system be set up by the Legislature to bailout
shareholders and creditors who may have made unwise investments? There is
surely a further requirement - further special circumstances which should be
present before an order is granted. "14
He submits that the effect on the whole economy and the community should be a
factor to be considered and not only the benefit of a few creditors. In his view it is in
the nature of business for creditors to take commercial risks and he is of the view that
the same argument applies to shareholders.
It appears that this view also underlies the approach of the courts. It is submitted that
this view is too narrow in its understanding of the economy and the community. The
question can rather be posed in answer to Olver's question, "Why should the
legislature not set up a special system to bailout shareholders and creditors?"
There are good reasons for such a question and such a system. An understanding of
modem economic circumstances" and the redefinition of the community as the sum
of small parts and not only as a large organism without regard to the need for small
healthy components sheds a completely different light on judicial management.
1 2 Definition of corporate rescue
The terms "corporate rescue" and "business rescue" are often used interchangeably. It
is a fact that very often businesses are conducted in one or other corporate form.
Therefore references to corporations are often used to mean businesses in a wider
sense than corporations or companies alone. The corporate form is characterised by
II Silverman v Doornhoek Mines Ltd 1935 TPD 349 353; Bahnemann v Fritzmore Exploration (Pty)
Ltd 1963 2 SA 249 (T) 250-1; Tenowitz v Tenny Investments (Pty) Ltd 1979 2 SA 680 (E) 684, see also
the obiter endorsement in Sammei v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 3 SA 629 (A) 663.
12Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 15th ed 923
~ Olver Judicial Management in South Africa LLD thesis UeT (1980).
)A..,OlverJudicial Management in SA 37.
15 ee further I 3 infra.
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4juristic or legal personality and nearly always by limited liability of the members as
well. As a result the insolvency measures for juristic persons were dealt with
separately from those for unincorporated businesses and natural persons.l"
Rescue measures have been introduced for juristic persons that were not available to
unincorporated businesses such as partnerships. South African judicial management is
a prime example. However, there is a world-wide trend towards replacing the
distinction between incorporated and unincorporated businesses by a distinction
between business debtors and consumer debtors." The separate treatment of juristic
persons and non-juristic persons does not correspond exactly with the distinction
between business debtors and consumer debtors. This gives rise to the two terms
"business rescue" and "corporate rescue", which then for obvious reasons are used
interchangeably, whereas the term "business rescue" will however include business
debtors other than corporations or companies. Although judicial management refers to
companies only, "business rescue" will be used henceforth as a more inclusive term
that includes the rescue regimes for companies. This is often the most important
application for such rescue regimes.
Corporate rescue is crisply defined by PaulOmar:
"Corporate rescue is now associated with what is termed the revival of companies
on the brink of economic collapse and the salvage of economically viable units to
restore production capacity, employment and the continued rewarding of capital
and investment." 18
Itmust also be said that the survival of the juristic person is not important as a goal in
itself; it is the survival of the enterprise and the real business carried on by the juristic
person, in whole or in part, which is the actual goal.19
The emphasis on business rescue has come about partly because insolvency law
started to take into account the large-scale rise in corporate insolvencies in the last
16 For example see chapter XIV of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and Part IX of the Close
Corporations Act 69 of 1984.
17 Rajak "Business Rescue for South Africa - A Report Submitted to the Department of Trade and
Industry" (1998) 10 and Rajak & Henning "Business Rescue for South Africa" 1999 SALf 262 270.
18 Omar "Thoughts on the Purpose of Corporate Rescue" 1997 The Company Lawyer 127. See also
Belcher Corporate Rescue 11-13 who defines corporate rescue as: "a major intervention necessary to
avert eventual failure of the company", Brown Corporate Rescue 3 defines it simply as: "the survival
of the company or a substantial part of its business".
19 Belcher Corporate Rescue 24; Brown Corporate Rescue 2 and Goode "Principles of Corporate
Insolvency Law" (1997) 26, 275.
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5few decades. This trend might largely be a result of the increasing interdependence of
all national economies and the effects of the rise and fall of economies in the
international arena.
This development started to change perceptions on insolvency. The idea that fault
should be attributed to those who are responsible for financial failure and that they
should be punished, slowly made room for the idea that fault is not always present and
the realisation that if a company has some breathing space to reorganise before facing
the storm following the public knowledge of its financial difficulties, it would
probably survive the storm. A further development has been that the survival of the
company has become a desirable objective from the perspective of the broader
community. Insolvency and the consequent business failure are not only felt by the
company itself, but also affect society at large." The idea that company failure is
simply a market mechanism to get rid of inefficiency no longer receives unqualified
acceptance."
1 3 Modern economic circumstances
What are the circumstances of modern-day commerce and living to be taken into
account when decisions are to be made as to the insolvency regime that should exist?
One must first realise that the modern world is a world of credit. This is true to an
extent, which was unthinkable in terms of the situation that prevailed a mere 100
years ago. This reality is quite evident from the reports on the inquiries into
insolvency law in the United Kingdom" and Australia." The economy of the world
(including that of South Africa) runs on credit. It is the fuel that keeps economic
activity going in a modern industrialised world. The most significant extenders of
credit are the banks and other similar financial lending institutions. Furthermore
manufacturers extend credit to their customers, trade suppliers extend credit to their
customers and retailers extend credit to their customers, the consumers.
20 In fact, the recognition of this led to the introduction of judicial management in South Africa in the
first place. See the reference to Hansard in n 2 supra.
21 Delaney "Power, Intercorporate Networks and Strategic Bankruptcy" 1989 Law and Society Review
643 663. See also Tomasic Australian Corporate Insolvency Law (1993) 6.
22 Sir Kenneth Cork Insolvency Law and Practice Report of the Review Committee (1982) (hereafter
"Cork Report").
23 Harmer RW (Commissioner in Charge) General Insolvency Inquiry, Report no 45, Summary of
Report 2 (hereafter "Harmer Report").
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6Consumerism, economic growth and the consequent employment opportunities and
social stability are all based on credit. The response to the need for more credit has
been enormous. The credit card, personal loans and large-scale "in house" finance
schemes by manufactures and retailers are just part of the stream of credit supply that
is available today.
.t
It is also true that a mere wage earner can obtain credit on a scale that was
unthinkable in the past. This is evident in such advertising slogans as "buy now pay
later". There are some theologians, who say that the consumer ethic has even crept
into the spirituality of modem humanity to the extent that, the good and virtuous
person is the one who buys and buys." It is easy to predict that in circumstances like
these the risks of the consumer not being able to meet his obligations are greatly
increased and this event might often happen without any fault on his side. What is
even more evident is that the modem economy needs buyers and buyers need credit. It
then becomes in society's interest to give people fresh starts, to let them start over
again because, without buyers, there is no future for the sellers."
The risks of insolvency greatly increase with globalisation and international trade and
increasing competition. It is quite evident that global events and events in foreign
countries can have a severe impact on traders and businesses everywhere. Often
businesses cannot respond in such a short time, or the resultant default in obligations
has a domino effect that leaves many businesses exposed.
A good example of such an event is the economic crisis that hit the Far East in late
1997 and early 1998. This crisis suddenly spilled over into the South African
economy in June 1998. Under pressure from a wave of reported speculative dealing
the South African currency devalued sharply against major foreign currencies. It
caused immediate upward pressure on interest rates that rose sharply at a time when it
24 The Canadian Catholic theologian Gregory Baum says that there are four forms of spirituality
present in the western world. The first is the work ethic which stems from Calvin and which
contributed enormously towards the modem industrialised economies. Knowledge of your calling and
hard work are the best virtues and laziness is the worst of all sins. This led to an overproduction of
goods, which resulted in the second form of spirituality, the consumer ethic. The virtues in this form
are pleasure, comfort, expensive hobbies and luxurious lifestyles. The buyers are the virtuous. "Tweede
Lydensondag, Markus 9: 2 - 9" Smit Woord teen die Lig vol 1(6) 106 115 - 116.
25 Professor Harry Rajak (professor of law, University of Sussex) shares the anecdote about when he
played the game Monopoly with his son. At one stage his son was completely insolvent and the game
was actually over, but both of them wanted to continue. His son asked him: "What now, what do we do
if I still want to play?" At that point he realised that it was in his playing interest to extend his son
further credit and to come to his rescue for the game to continue.
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7was widely expected that interest rates would fall. Such a sharp rise in interest rates
causes a sudden slowdown in the economy and curtails the spending power of the
consumer public. It is easy to understand that such sudden changes can have a
dramatic impact on a business in South Africa and might even catch the prudent
businessman unawares.
In addition, a world-wide trend to lower trade tariffs" leaves businesses open to more
direct competition. These factors explain why virtually all countries with modem
industrialised economies saw a sharp rise in insolvencies in the last two decades. The
response of countries to these circumstances was to' take a look at their insolvency
regimes and many of them introduced new insolvency legislation.
The United Kingdom had a commission of inquiry into their insolvency law and
followed it up with a new Insolvency Act in 1986.27 Australia did likewise with new
insolvency legislation in the 1990's. New legislation was also introduced in Canada,
Singapore and a host of other countries.
In South Africa there is presently research being done by the Law Commission on the
insolvency of individuals. The position with regard to the liquidation of companies is
currently under review by the Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law_28
The response to business failure or insolvency in modem economic circumstances has
been divergent, but many of the countries that revised their insolvency law in the last
few decades included a business rescue system in their insolvency law." To
understand fully the role of a business rescue system one needs to understand
insolvency and its relevance to the modem economic circumstances which currently
exist. Once the problems of insolvency are evident one needs to consider the response
to the problems created by insolvency. Society should respond to these problems by
26 The policy of the World Trade Organisation, which South Africa joined in 1995, prescribes the
lowering of tariffs over a period of 5 years for all signatory states. This organisation replaced the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, more commonly known as GATT.
27 The Act applies to England, Wales and Scotland as far as corporate insolvency is concerned and to
England and Wales as far as the bankruptcy of individuals is concerned. See Sealy & Milman
Annotated Guide to the Insolvency Legislation (1994) 4th ed 5. See 1 4 infra on the Cork Report which
preceded the new Act.
28 Conference on a unified Insolvency Act 6 October 1999 Draft Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill
(1999) Discussion Document vol 1.
29 Countries that introduced business rescue regimes include the United States (1978), Italy (1979),
Luxenborg (1984), France (1985), the· United Kingdom (1986), Singapore (1987), Sweden (1987),
Netherlands (1988), Ireland (1990), Denmark (1991), Portugal (1992), Australia (1992) Switzerland
(1994) and Belgium (1998). See also Rajak, Horrocks, Bannister European Corporate Insolvency
(1995).
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8creating an appropriate business rescue system in the light of the objects of insolvency
law.
1 4 Insolvency and the economy
Insolvency law has received very little attention in the form of in depth research and
an investigation into the principles that should underlie the law in the light of the
practical effect of the measures of existing insolvency law. In England the position
changed when the then English government had to consider the bankruptcy proposals
of the European Economic Union in the early 1970's. At roughly the same time the
English economy suffered an increased incidence of corporate and individual
financial failures because of a prolonged recession and high levels of inflation. The
English public was not satisfied with the results of the insolvency law in those
circumstances. This led the English government to appoint a committee, the Cork
Committee, which was instructed to investigate the English insolvency law and to
make recommendations.i''
The Cork Committee's investigation was the first comprehensive review of the
insolvency law in England for more than a century. The final report of the Cork
Committee that appeared in 1984 has been described as "a voluminous and
epochmaking document, which will continue to provide a major point of reference for
years to come. ,,31 The Cork Report remains an important source of reference also for
the South African scholar, because the South African insolvency law is under the
influence of past English law."
It is possible to regard insolvency as a state of affairs where the debtor can no longer
meet all his obligations. Something has happened to put him in a position where his
assets are at present not enough to pay all his creditors, present and future. There is a
lack of monetary value in the estate of the debtor. This is a very clinical approach that
does not explain the damage that insolvencies inflict on an economy.
Another way of approaching insolvency would be to say that the debtor finds himself
in a position where he has started to dishonour the most important principle in
30 In general on the history and the effect of the Cork Report see Fletcher The Law of Insolvency (1996)
13-21. See also Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 8.
31 Fletcher Law of Insolvency 17.
32 Rajak "Business Rescue for SA" 1 and Rajak & Henning "Business Rescue for South Africa" 1999
SAU262.
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commerce and trade, namely pacta sunt servanda. 33 This principle is the cornerstone
of transactions and the trust that makes it possible for the economy to function.
Without the legitimate and realistic expectation that the other party will keep to his
agreement there would not be sufficient trust to enter into transactions and thus no
economy to speak of.
Without looking at the harm and destruction of a particular insolvency it could be said
that in general insolvency corrupts the trust that oils the wheels of the economy." It
often leads to the removal of a participant from the economy, which has a ripple effect
on the other participants in the economy. Insolvency law should provide a response to
the situations where the trust is adversely affected.
Agreements should be kept, but what happens when it is no longer possible for a party
to comply with its agreements? The response to insolvency situations is rooted in the
culture, including the business culture, of a society. Often insolvency law is guided by
a particular society's perception as to the cause of insolvency and society's wish as to
how to treat the debtor in the future.
As set out in the Cork Report, the response of society in England was for a very long
time rooted in the circumstances that prevailed more than a hundred years ago. The
economy then was largely a cash economy. Goods were paid for in cash. For the
individual, insolvency was unthinkable in a commercial sense and occurred mainly
where an unforeseen event bestowed an unforeseen obligation on the individual.
"Traders, on the other hand, by virtue of their profession needed to give and
receive credit. The capital or available assets of the trader largely consisted of
moveable property of the type 'generally unknown, always uncertain, and
perpetually fluctuating' ".35
In a world where credit exists and is extended for substantial amounts there is always
the possibility of the absconding trader. He was the one who:
"craftily obtaining into their hands great substance of other men's goods, do
suddenly flee to parts unknown, or keep their houses, not minding to payor
33 Agreements must be honoured.
34 See further Tomasic Australian Corporate Insolvency Law 1-19 on the principles underlying
insolvency law.
35 Christian The Origin, Progress and Present Practice of Bankrupt[ cy] Law, 1818 as quoted in the
Cork Report 15 para 33.
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restore to any of their creditors their duties, but at their own wills and pleasures
consume debts and the substance obtained by credit of other men, for their own
pleasure and delicate living, against all reason, equity and good conscience.'?"
The society described above is concerned about the mistakes made that led to
insolvency and its aversion of the absconding trader. Curing these problems was at the
heart of much of the early insolvency legislation. Therefore up to this day there exists
in insolvency law the need to find who was at fault.
The need to establish if someone was at fault speaks for itself. It was however for a
long time, and to some extent still is, an overriding objective of society's response to
situations of insolvency. As a result the insolvent was treated as a virtual criminal, but
without the necessity of a conviction. It was possible to jail one's debtor if his debts
remained unpaid, on account of the debts alone, without any criminal conviction. This
situation gives rise to the following question: What good is it to jail someone for not
paying his debts, thereby preventing him from earning the means to pay his
creditors?"
In South Africa a defaulting debtor could still be sent to jail for not paying his debts
until the Constitutional Court's decision in Coetzee v Government of the Republic of
South Africa:" The reason why the debtor would have found himself in jail was for
contempt of court, but in essence it would have been contempt for not paying while a
court order ordering the debtor to pay was in force. However the Constitutional Court
has now decided that a process which jails a defaulting debtor because of non-
payment is unconstitutional. The court found that although the objective of provisions
for imprisonment of civil debtors is a legitimate and reasonable governmental
objective, the question is whether the means to achieve the goal are reasonable. The
court found the means to achieve the goal are not reasonable. The fundamental reason
why the means are not reasonable is because the provisions are overbroad. The
sanction of imprisonment is clearly aimed at the debtor who will not pay. But it is
unreasonable in that it also strikes at those who cannot pay and simply fail to prove
36 Quotation from the first English Bankruptcy Act passed in 1542 as quoted in the Cork Report 16 para
35.
37 Surely the question attempts a very shallow analysis of the whole aspect as to how to deal with a
defaulting debtor and does not take the unwilling debtor into account. Nevertheless the whole idea is
somewhat paradoxical.
381995 (lO) BCLR 1382 ree), 19954 SA 631 rcci
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this at a hearing, often due to negative circumstances created by the provisions
themselvea."
Even though much of the insolvency law was based on fault it was also soon
recognised that someone could land in financial difficulties through no fault of his
own. A businessman in a world of credit, and especially in a world where great sums
of credit are extended, can, owing to the risks inherent to trade, still be ruined while
acting most diligently and honourably. For someone that found himself in such a
predicament it was considered proper and justified that his creditors should release
him from a strict adherence to all his commitments. That meant he deserved a "fresh
start,,40 if he was honest and frank towards his creditors, made full disclosure and
delivered all of his property to be divided among his creditors in satisfaction of their
claims to the extent that his assets would permit."
The question is whether finding fault, providing for the orderly distribution of
remaining assets and providing for a fresh start are adequate to deal with modem-day
insolvency situations. As explained above, modem economic circumstances are very
different from those prevailing when insolvency law first came to the fore. The idea
of giving someone that was not at fault a chance to start afresh was an innovative idea
that contributed to the solution of complex situations, which could not be allowed to
continue indefinitely. This idea of a fresh start has been refined in the development of
current business rescue regimes. Instead of a fresh start, the business rescue measures,
including those contained in modem insolvency law, are based on a "second chance"
or "further chance". This has been done because it is a remedy that a modem
economic society needs.
On the one hand, the modem economy needs debtors and entrepreneurs to oil its
wheels. Society on the other hand loses much more that a few unpaid debts when a
business is liquidated. The innovation of a fresh start for those who justified it
because of their misfortunes not of their own making and subsequent proper conduct
towards their creditors needs to be extended to a "second chance" for the business
debtor, including corporate debtors, in similar circumstances and with similar proper
conduct.
39 Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa 19954 SA 631 (CC) 643.
40 If the debtor concerned is a corporate debtor a fresh start would mean that the members of the
corporate debtor are not disqualified from starting a new corporation.
41 Cork Report 15 par 34.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
12
As argued above this response is not based on the deserved behaviour of the business
debtor, but it is an answer to the needs of the modem economy and a modem society
that depends on the modem economy. However, the response of a particular society to
insolvency situations depends not only on the needs of the economy and society, but
is influenced to a large extent by the culture of the country, which in this context
includes its business culture. As stated above, a general trend has developed to make a
distinction between business debtors and consumer debtors.42 The procedures and
mechanisms for the treatment of business debtors differ from the measures for
consumer debtors. Business rescue concerns the business debtor.
Regimes classified as pro-debtor have a different cultural response to insolvency from
those classified as pro-creditor." Some countries like France have a predominantly
pro-debtor regime while other countries like the United Kingdom and countries
influenced by the United Kingdom have a predominantly pro-creditor insolvency
regime. South Africa also falls in the pro-creditor category."
The Cork Report maintains that the response of insolvency law to an insolvent debtor,
is guided by four questions:"
"(a) How, in what circumstances and to what extent are the debtor's assets to
be made available for the benefit of his creditors?
(b) Are his creditors to be dealt with on the basis of 'share and share alike' or
in accordance with some other method of distribution?
(c) How is the debtor himself to be treated or, if the debtor is a company, how
should its officers, managers and other agents be treated?
(d) What does society need and demand in these potentially conflicting
situations?"
In an attempt to answer these questions in a meaningful way, one has to consider the
economic circumstances prevailing, the historical background to insolvency law and
the law and practice of the individual country and then provide for different
42 See text at n 17 supra.
43 There are also those countries that make no provision for the treatment of insolvency. These
countries are.some former communist countries and some Muslim countries.
44 A pro-creditor regime is characterised by laws giving creditors maximum security through an
assurance that the contracts they make will be upheld. The courts will thus enforce priorities strictly.
See Belcher Corporate Rescue 87-88.
45 Cork Report 10.
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responses. It is also important to keep in mind that with the rapid integration of the
world economy considerable thought should also be given to international
synchronisation of insolvency law.
1 5 Aims of this thesis
Economic circumstances in South Africa and the world have undergone huge changes
since judicial management was introduced in 1926. This thesis aims to examine
judicial management in the light of these changed economic circumstances and the
development of business rescue regimes elsewhere, especially in England and
Australia, and to suggest changes to judicial management where it is considered
necessary.
For this purpose, the objectives of insolvency law will first be identified. In doing this
special attention will be given to business rescue as an objective of insolvency law.
The components of insolvency law will then be discussed. The components of
insolvency law should lead to the fulfilment of the objectives of insolvency law. The
role of business rescue measures as one of the components of insolvency law will
receive special emphasis. Judicial management will be discussed as one of the
alternative techniques for achieving a business rescue. Judicial management as a
.corporate rescue method" will be compared with similar business rescue regimes in
English and Australian law. This comparison will form the background to suggested
amendments to the legislation on judicial management.
The English and Australian models were a logical choice for comparison for several
reasons. First, both England and Australia have had recent official inquiries into their
insolvency regimes which subsequently led to new legislation. The legislation in both
these instances included a new business rescue regime. Secondly, both of these
countries share the Commonwealth heritage with South Africa. Thirdly, South Africa
shares a long commercial relationship with England and it is beyond doubt that
English law has had an important influence on South African law, especially in the
field of company law. Consequently English law also influenced South African law
regarding the liquidation of companies. Australia on the other hand is also of
46 Judicial management is only available to companies.
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importance because it followed the South African example of judicial management"
by introducing official management in 1961-1962. The recent amendments to its
insolvency regime and the introduction of its new business rescue measure should
logically shed useful light on the South African model of judicial management and the
possible need for amendments.
The thesis will discuss the different aspects of business rescue procedures separately,
starting with the commencement procedures." Thereafter this thesis will discuss the
moratorium associated with business rescues," the effect of business rescues on
company directors and officials, 50 the rescue plan, 51 the transition to voluntary
winding-up.Y the powers and duties of the person who administers the company in a
business rescue.r' his qualifications, 54 remuneration' and his removal. 56
Separate discussion of each aspect makes the comparison of the different jurisdictions
easier and more understandable. The discussion of each aspect of a business rescue
will start with judicial management reflecting the current South African position. This
will be followed by an examination of the English procedure of administration that
was introduced in 1986. The discussion of English law precedes that of Australian
law, because the English position corresponds more closely to the South African
procedure, in that the English procedure of administration also commences with a
court order. It is also older than the Australian procedure. The Australian procedure of
voluntary administration will also be discussed last in each instance as this procedure
was only introduced in the 1990's and had the benefit of an investigation into the
English position before it was implemented. The discussion will thus follow the
chronological order of the statutory implementation of the three business rescue
schemes.
47 There is little doubt that the Australian system followed the South African remedy of judicial
management. See Paterson, Ednie & Ford Australian Company Law 3rd ed par [333/1]; Re Testra
Bros. Consolidated Ltd 1965 VR 18.
48 See 3 3 infra.
49 See 3 4 infra.
50 See 3 4 2 infra.
51 See 3 5 infra.
52 See 3 6 infra.
53 See 4 3 infra.
54 See 4 4 infra.
55 See 4 5 infra.
56 See 4 6 infra.
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At the end of the discussion of each of the aspects an evaluation will be made. This
will be followed, rather boldly perhaps, by suggested changes to the existing South
African legislation to give effect to the proposals.
From the outset it is clear that the provision of an effective statutory business rescue
regime is not a cure-all to the problems of business insolvency. It is merely one of the
components of an insolvency regime. Other crucial components must also be in place.
It is submitted that an insolvency regime that responds well to the needs of a modern
economy and society is one that achieves the right balance between the different
components.
In the last chapter'? specific reference will be made to other aspects of insolvency law
in the wide sense that have an influence on the effective use of judicial management
in the South African context. Certain recommendations will be made for possible
legislative changes to achieve a better balance between the different components of
insolvency law to serve the present needs more effectively.
1 6 The parties affected by an insolvency
As a prelude to the discussion of the objectives of insolvency law, it is first necessary
to consider the interested parties affected by an insolvency. 58
One of the parties is the debtor. There is the honest debtor, the unfortunate character
who at one stage saw Lady Luck turning her back on him. There is also the dishonest
or downright unscrupulous debtor. He is the one described as the absconding debtor. 59
This character appears in varying degrees of honesty and dishonesty. His
blameworthiness may relate to blatantly dishonest dealings or may only be found in
his tardiness in coming to the point where he accepts that he is insolvent and informs
his creditors. The position is more complicated if the debtor is a juristic person. The
managers of such a debtor have some protection against their own folly and failure at
the risk of the creditors.
On the other hand there are the creditors. They are potentially the real victims who
stand to lose a lot because the debtor can no longer perform according to his promises.
Creditors also come in different classes. They vary from the several classes of secured
creditor through to the most unfortunate, the unsecured creditor. A society with a pro-
57 See 5 infra.
58 See Cork Report 53 par 192.
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creditor insolvency regime treats creditors as close family and gives them the most
sympathy and protection.
Society itself is part of the cast. It determines the rules on how to resolve a situation of
broken agreements like insolvency. It wants to give creditors maximum support, but
also wants to treat debtors as somewhat more distant relatives who should be given a
second chance. Society also wants to punish unacceptable behaviour. It acts as moral
guide and judge. However, society cannot afford to cast out failing debtors in all
circumstances. Society needs both creditors and debtors to go on performing their
economic functions in order for society to be healthy (and wealthy).
The rules of society have to deal with totally different aspects. While some rules
punish and restrict blameworthy debtors, other rules aim to admit insolvent debtors
into the mainstream of economic activity once again.
In this process it would be wrong to view creditors as neutral observers whose actions
are predictable. Economic activity is not only a theatre of neutral monetary or
economic relationships. It is also an arena in which persons do not always act
rationally. Creditors often enjoy exercising power over their debtors. This leads to
behaviour that cannot be explained by rational economic and market behaviour. Such
creditors may, for no good economic reason, deliberately cause the sequestration of a
debtor's estate.
A good example of such an event in a South African context is the famous Tollgate
saga." Tollgate Holdings (Tollgate) was a company with diverse interests. It owned
businesses in the textiles, communications, tourism, sport promotions, property and
food sectors of the economy. Besides all these assets it also had enormous debts. Its
debts owed to banks totalled approximately R600 million. These debts were owed
mainly to a single commercial bank. Tollgate was presumably insolvent or at least
commercially insolvent. Tollgate realised its predicament and started to put a plan
together to save itself from financial collapse. By June 1992 the bank debt had been
59 See 1 4 n 36 supra.
60 The whole affair has been described in various issues of Millennium, especially October 1995, Feb-
Mar, Apr, Oct-Nov 1996. See also Noseweek issue 14. The liquidation inquiry under the Companies
Act that has been continuing for more than three years is not conducted publicly and information from
the inquiry is not freely available. In addition to this anecdotal evidence see Belcher Corporate Rescue
95-98 for a discussion on the predictability of corporate decision-making in times of adversity and the
problems attached to such predictability.
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halved." Up to this point it appeared that Tollgate was recovering from its financial
woes. This should have been a great relief to any creditor to see his exposure to a
potential disastrously default diminish.
In spite of this performance from Tollgate the commercial bank became less friendly
towards Tollgate. This less friendly and later hostile attitude to Tollgate was allegedly
motivated by considerations other than pure economic and business motives. Towards
the end of 1992 the bank decided to liquidate Tollgate and was only frustrated in
doing so by Tollgate's application for its own liquidation when it learned of the bank's
imminent court action.
This attitude of the bank is not entirely explicable in terms of commercial and
economic considerations. In the two years up to the decision to liquidate, Tollgate
reduced its bank debts substantially and even paid R160 million in interest payments
as well. It is also alleged that the commercial bank could not have afforded to make a
decision to liquidate without the considerable financial help it received from the
Reserve Bank of South Africa."
This liquidation affair has led to the longest and most expensive liquidation
proceedings in South Africa and furthermore the demise of a huge business which
could still have played an important part in the economy. The example illustrates the
interests of society in the insolvency of a large company. These interests cannot
necessarily be subordinated to the rights of a particular creditor, particularly if that
creditor has an ulterior motive.
It is against the background of debtors, creditors, society and the present economic
realities that one needs to look at the objectives of insolvency law. These objectives
are sometimes opposing with the result that choices have to be made. The objective of
removing delinquent debtors from economic activity requires a different approach to
the objective of preserving viable economic enterprises. The rules that are made
cannot provide for all the subtle differences in situations which arise in practice. The
rules also cannot possibly give equal weight to all the conflicting wishes of creditors
and debtors and society. Some form of voluntary arrangement is notionally the ideal
way to solve insolvency situations, to provide for maximum flexibility, creativity and
61 Millenium Oct (1995) 48-49.
62 This help was apparently given for bad debts in general and not specifically in connection with the
Tollgate account.
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ingenuity. To the South African scholar a system based primarily on a voluntary
arrangement seems impossible. Nevertheless, the rules of insolvency law should
provide for such a possibility to some extent."
1 7 Objectives of insolvency law
In order to identify the objectives of insolvency law in England and Australia, it is
helpful to consider the objectives of insolvency law as formulated by Goode," the
Cork Report'? and the Harmer Report." Goode listed ten objectives of corporate
insolvency in his 1990 edition but reduced the list to four in his 1997 edition. On the
other hand the Cork and Harmer Reports refer to the objectives of insolvency, which
covers both individual and corporate insolvency.
From an analysis of these sources it is suggested that the following are or at least
,I should be the major objectives of a modem insolvency regime.
I 7 1 Recognition of modem economic processes
First, the circumstances and the economic processes of the modem world must be
recognised and insolvency law should align its response to insolvency with the needs
and processes of the modem world.
This objective is mentioned by the Cork Report as its first objective. It is definitely an
indication of the importance of the need to realise that insolvency law is, as far as
practically possible, an instrument to facilitate the commercial and economic
processes of the community. The measures of the insolvency law should thus have a
broader perspective than merely dealing with the defaulting debtor and his creditors.
The Cork Report stresses the importance of recognising that the effects of insolvency
are not only limited to the private interests of the insolvent and his creditors, but it
63 Although it might seem an outrageous idea to propose a voluntary regime to handle insolvency, one
can look at the example of Taiwan. It is said that the Confucian ethic of settling disputes by relying on
personal relationships rather than the law influences the way insolvency is handled in Taiwan.
"The Chinese people have long been accustomed to settle their differences and difficulties in an
amicable manner; and great leniency is generally shown to a bona fide insolvent debtor. Bankruptcy is
not regarded, as it is done in Europe, as a semi-criminal offence. A debtor, be he a merchant or not, is
usually permitted to settle his debts by all manner of means. When he has failed in his own effort, he
will request some third party to mediate." See Tomasic et al 1996 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
258. In practice under this system, a merchant will ask for the assistance of the local chamber of
commerce to bring about an amicable settlement of a debt related dispute. .
64 Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1990) 17-23 and Principles a/Corporate Insolvency
Law (1997) 24 - 29.
65 Cork Report 53-55 para 191-199.
66 Harmer Report no 452 para 5..
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also has a vital effect on other interests of society or groups in society. This is also
among the objectives identified by the Hanner Report."
1 7 2 Preservation of viable economic enterprises
The first objective leads directly to the second, namely the provision of means for the
preservation of viable commercial enterprises that might usefully contribute to the
economic life of a community. It can also be regarded as the business rescue
objective. It is the first objective of Goode (both in 1990 and 1997) and one of the
distinct objectives of the Cork Report.t" However, it is not directly addressed by the
Hanner Report, which presumably sees it as following so logically from the first
objective above that it does not even need further discussion. This one can deduce
from the fact that although it is not stated as a separate objective, the Hanner Report
nevertheless proposed the introduction of a new business rescue measure as part of its
response to insolvency.
In this respect the South African regime of judicial management preceded the modern
wave of business rescue schemes recently introduced in many other jurisdictions by
several decades.
As said before, the viewpoint that insolvency weeds out the inefficient firms and
leaves the economy more healthy and efficient is no longer accepted unequivocally.
Business enterprises are not merely financial units." Businesses may also have wide
networks of contacts and expertise built up over many years. All these cannot be
replaced easily. Furthermore businesses play an essential role in communities and
sometimes the well-being of an entire community depends on a single business
enterprise.
Asan example of such a business one only needs to look at the central role played by
a motor car manufacturer such as Mercedes in the economy of a city like East
London. If such a business should collapse, and not be afforded the chance to
reorganise itself, it would devastate the economy of that region." The Cork Report
stated in this regard:
67 Cfthe Harmer Report objectives six and seven.
68 Cork Report 55 para 198(j).
69 See Tomasic Australian Corporate Insolvency Law 14-17; Warren "Bankruptcy Policy" 1987 vol 54
no 3 The University of Chicago Law Review as cited by Wheeler Company Law (1993) 775.
70 See also Sammei & Others v President Brand Gold Mining Co. Ltd 1969 3 SA 629 (A) 662H where
the trial judge Nicholas, J is quoted as saying "nobody would lightly allow Saaiplaas to go into
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"We believe that a concern for the livelihood and well-being of those
dependent upon an enterprise which may well be the lifeblood of a whole
town or even a region, is a legitimate factor to which a modem law of
insolvency must have regard. The chain reaction consequent upon any given
failure can potentially be so disastrous to creditors, employees and the
community that it must not be overlooked. "71
The circumstances of the restructuring of the John Mansville Corporation in the early
1980's in the United States of America serve as an example. John Mansville applied
for restructuring in terms of Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1978; the
United States' business rescue provision. John Mansville was an "economically
robust" corporation that specialised in asbestos products. At some stage John
Mansville became the defendant in a number of lawsuits in which persons who fell ill
because of contact with asbestos claimed damages. By 1982 an average of 425 new
plaintiffs per month commenced actions against John Mansville.
A study indicated that these claims would escalate in the future. This left the
management of John Mansville with a predicament. They knew that future claims
would devastate the corporation and at the same time it would be improper to go on
doing business without giving proper attention to this inevitable insolvency, although
it was not possible to say exactly when the corporation would become insolvent.
The future claims became the focal point as to why the corporation had to be
reorganised. The other option would have been to liquidate the corporation. Of this
possibility the court said:
"The liquidation of this substantial corporation would be economically
inefficient in not only leaving many asbestos claimants uncompensated, but
also in eliminating needed jobs and the productivity emanating from a going
concern. It fosters the key aims of Chapter 11 to avoid liquidation at all
costs.'"?
liquidation"; "it would be a very painful process and would never be done lightly"; and "it would be
painful to the community of the Orange Free State gold fields, the State, the investing public, the
mining house, all shareholders, creditors, everybody."
However painful liquidation would have been, it was unavoidable in the absence of some alternative.
71 Cork Report 56 para 204.
72 In re: John Mansville Corporation 36 Bankr 743 (SDNY 1984).
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It is thus clear that circumstances may evolve where it is.practically impossible.for a
business enterprise to.ente into a voluntary arrangement with its creditors but where
the survival of the business enterprise is desirable~ It is also abundantly clear that it is
to the benefit of creditors that measures exist where the business .can sometimes be
kept going so as to sell it as a going concern and thus provide for, a bigger dividend
than would be obtained b merely liquidating the business.
It is not difficult to convince oneself of the merits of preserving viable commercial
enterprises. The South African legislature recognised this when judicial management
was introduced. A proper business rescut: measure and culture will _goa [ot to oil the
wheels of the economy and will have beneficial social advantages." The use of
section 311 _of the Companies .Act in the so-called arrangement industry shows that
such a need exists. A proper business rescue measure would also be able to alleviate
some of the problems experienced with standard schemes under section 311.74
However, it is important to keep in mind that statutory business rescue provisions will
not be used merely because they exist. The procedure and its aims need to answer to
the prevailing business realities. The other insolvency provisions should encourage
the use of this measure. The persons implementing the business rescue should be
competent and readily available and the business and legal cultures of the community
should embrace it as a viable remedy.
At the same time it should be acknowledged that it is very difficult to measure the
success of a business rescue regime. Success means different things to different
people. If only apart of the business was rescued it might be a success to the
management and directors, but a failure for the employees who lost their
employment. 75
73 Not everyone agrees. See Robinson "Statutory moratorium on proceedings against a company" 1996
Australian Business Law Review 429 at 430 who states:
"The Cork Report likewise agreed that society has a legitimate concern in the preservation of
the commercial enterprise even if it had no interest in the rehabilitation of the company as
such. It is submitted that this view is fundamentally flawed. In reality it is usually the case that
by the time insolvency surfaces a company is truly in its death throes and well on its way to
liquidation. Any prospect of a rehabilitation at this stage is less than slim. Even if 'successful'
reorganisation eventuates, the presumption is that the creditors will be required to compromise
their debts. The philosophical question that emerges is why corporate rescue is favoured and
how much should be given up to facilitate such a scheme."
74 For a discussion of s 311 and its effect on judicial management see 5 4 infra.
75 For a discussion on what constitutes a successful rescue see Belcher Corporate Rescue 22-24. See
also Brown Corporate Rescue 2-3.
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1 73 Maximising returns to creditors
This third objective is of the utmost importance to insolvency law. Insolvency law
substitutes individual enforcement procedures with a collective procedure. As a trade-
off to the alteration of their rights, the creditors are entitled to expect that their
interests should be served in maximising the returns to creditors.
Goode (1997) mentions this objective as the second of four objectives of corporate
insolvency law." However, it is noteworthy that neither the Cork Report, the Harmer
Report nor Goode (1990) mentioned the maximising of returns to creditors as an
objective of insolvency law. It is submitted that this objective is so trite, given the
pro-creditor bias of traditional insolvency law, that the authors did not think that it
even merited noting.
1 7 4 Orderly, fair and equal process
The fourth objective has to do with the process of insolvency. It is quite clear from the
analysis of the abovementioned sources that this process should be orderly, fair and
equal amongst creditors.77
This is the cornerstone of any insolvency regime. If there is no provision for a fair and
orderly process, few if any of the other objectives of insolvency law will be met. Once
insolvency occurs it is no longer possible or desirable that every creditor engages in
his own enforcement procedure. Such a state of affairs would mean that the bulk of
the assets would go to the creditor who moves fastest and it would open up virtually
unlimited possibilities for improper practices and conflict between creditors. This has
been recognised for a very long time and therefore it has been a long established
procedure to stop individual proceedings once insolvency occurs and to appoint a
liquidator or insolvency practitioner to step in to manage a collective process on
behalf of all creditors.
Orderly insolvency proceedings would not achieve much without the equal treatment
of creditors. Although there are creditors with stronger rights than others, most
notably secured creditors, it should be an objective of insolvency law to strengthen the
76 Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 26.
77 Cork Report 54 para 198(d) & (t), Harmer Report 2 and Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency
Law (1997) 27.
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equality of all creditors as a general principle." In practice there should be little room
for promoting certain creditors above others as preferent creditors." Included in the
equal treatment of creditors is the setting aside of certain transactions that took place
before the commencement of formal insolvency proceedings.
1 7 5 Honest, competent, impartial, efficient and expeditious administration
Fifthly, the administration of the insolvency should be done in a manner that is
honest, competent, impartial, efficient and expeditious. This objective recognises that
the success of an insolvency regime depends on its administration. The administrators
should act in a manner that installs confidence in the insolvency regime. Ways of
encouraging those that stand to gain as administrators or managers of the process to
act in such a manner should receive careful consideration. The administrator does not
carry the risk associated with a business or participation in the economy, therefore the
constraints of normal participation do not apply. Some control needs to be in place to
regulate the actions of insolvency practitioners.
The administration of the insolvency should also be expeditious. The process of law is
notoriously slow. However, the slow enforcement procedures available to a creditor
recognise the creditor's contractual rights. When formal insolvency commences it
changes the rights of the creditor: enforcement, set-off and other remedies are no
longer available. This is all the more reason for the process to be expeditious.
1 7 6 Regulation of behaviour of participants in a credit economy
In the sixth place, the writers on English law believe that the insolvency regime
should also regulate the behaviour of participants in the economy. Goode (1990)
refers to the need for the proper investigation into the causes of the company's failure
and the imposition of responsibility for culpable management by the directors and
officers arid the protection of the public against future improper trading by delinquent
.78 Harmer Report 46 - 48. The report even recommended that the priority over other creditors enjoyed
by the Commissioner of Taxation should no longer apply. This recommendation was accepted by the
Australian legislature in 1993 when the priority of the Commissioner of Taxation in respect of unpaid
taxes was abolished by the Insolvency (Tax Priorities) Legislation Amendment Act 1993.
79 See Bennetts "Inequality is Fairness: Reviewing the decision in Lam Soon Australia Pty Ltd
(administrator appointed) v Mo/it (No 55) Pty Ltd, unreported Federal Court (Full Court), No S632 of
1996, 18 October 1996" 1997 Company and Securities Law Journa/ 52 54. The court approved a deed
of arrangement discriminating between unsecured creditors by paying most in full but paying the lessor
only one cent more than he would have received in liquidation. Bennetts rightly criticises the decision
saying that it might lead to all kinds of discrimination: between old suppliers and continuing suppliers,
or between creditors whose votes are needed and those whose votes are not needed. Discrimination
should not be applied lightly.
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directors. The Cork Report also refers to the desirability of an investigation into the
conduct of officers or agents, which merits criticism or punishment.
The Harmer Report on the other hand largely rejected the idea that insolvency law
should be "the guardian of values that seem appropriate in the conduct of the credit
economy" .80 The Harmer Report nevertheless mentions two instances where
insolvency law should act in a regulatory manner. The provisions for insolvent trading
should regulate the role of directors of private or proprietary companies and should
determine to what extent they should be liable for the unpaid debts and liabilities of
an insolvent company. The other instance where the commission felt that the
insolvency law should play a regulating role is in connection with individuals who
conduct their commercial activities in an "unscrupulous manner" .
•• 1 Thus even the Harmer Report agrees that there should be some regulation of conduct
through insolvency law. Although the insolvent trading provisions can be seen as a
measure to avoid unscrupulous conduct by directors of companies, their value to the
business rescue objective (discussed above) should not be forgotten. If the insolvency
measures strike the optimal balance as to their treatment of insolvency, the insolvent
trading provisions may result in directors seeking timeous relief. The earlier this relief
is sought, the greater the potential for the business being rescued or at least for the
creditors getting a fairer deal on insolvency." Potential future creditors might then be
spared the ordeal of a defaulting debtor. The Cork Report also mentions the early
rather than late diagnosis and treatment of insolvency as one of its objectives. Proper
regulatory measures in insolvency law, where needed, would help the early treatment
of insolvency."
1 7 7 Other objectives
Goode (1990)83 also mentions an objective that is not mentioned by the other two
sources. It concerns the removal of the management powers from the present
management. It has always been part of English, Australian and South African law
that the management of the insolvent's assets should be taken out of the hands of the
80 Harmer Report no 32 at 6.
81 See 5 2 infra.
82 The measures need not be always part of an insolvency statute. Accounting practice can be
influenced to draw the attention of the directors to the possible consideration of a business rescue
option, similar to the requirement of the going concern judgment which accountants have to make
when auditing a business.
83Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1990) 6.
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defaulting debtor. However, it is not unanimously accepted that this approach should
be followed. There are certain insolvency measures that allow for a different
approach. The Chapter 11 procedure of the United States' insolvency law is a business
rescue regime where the debtor stays in control of the assets. On the other hand the
Australian and English regimes for business rescue are different. They do not go as
far as placing creditors in control but put a neutral administrator in control.
Nevertheless, the receiver who is appointed by a creditor who holds a floating charge
over the whole or a substantial part of the property of the company is, de facto, a
creditor in control."
Once it has been decided to vest control in a neutral third party, careful consideration
should be given to the qualifications and remuneration of such party. The desirability
of impartial and expert management of the debtor's assets may in practice conflict
with the desired end result of maximum dividends to the creditors as it often results in
most of the assets in an already depleted estate going to the insolvency practitioner.
Other objectives of insolvency law that are of lesser importance to the present
research, are the international harmonisation of the different national insolvency
regimes as well as their mutual recognition of each other. These objectives are
important where the insolvent debtor has been conducting business and has incurred
debts in more than one jurisdiction.
International harmonisation in this context is the ideal of having a single insolvency
administration "in which the claims of all creditors are marshalled and all the property
of the insolvent, wherever situated, is dealt with and distributed by the one
administrator" .85 This would avoid the cost and inefficiency of two or more
conflicting administrations where the insolvent debtor has assets in more than one
country.
The recognition of different insolvency regimes internationally is the alternative to
international harmonisation. While the ideal of a single insolvency administration
eludes the commercial world, the second best alternative is procedures where
countries recognise each other's insolvency proceedings. This supports the
administration of an insolvency where the insolvent debtor has assets in more than
84 See also 2 3 2 infra.
85 Hanner Report 61.
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one country or where some of the creditors of the debtor are not from the country
where the insolvency proceedings are taking place,"
1 8 Conclusion
Although the above discussion of the objectives of insolvency law referred to the
English and Australian law, the objectives are universal. It is therefore safe to say that
the objectives identified above are applicable in the South African context as well.
From the discussiont' it is clear that the preservation of viable economic enterprises is
an important objective of insolvency law. A business rescue regime should thus be
one of the components of insolvency law which are necessary to achieve the
objectives of insolvency law.
The next chapter will identify and briefly discuss the different components of
insolvency law as found in South Africa, England and Australia.
86 At present the South African Law Commission is contemplating the introduction of the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. See SA Law Commission Interim Report on Review of the
Law of Insolvency: The Enactment in South Africa of UNCITRAL's Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency Project 63 (1999) and Cronje "The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency:
Perspectives from the South African Law Commission" Paper delivered at conference on UNCITRAL
Instruments in Southern Africa May 1999.
87 See 1 7 2 supra.
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CHAPTER2
Components and potential components of an insolvency regime
2 1 Introduction
The objectives of insolvency law are diverse and cannot be achieved without a variety
of measures. It is necessary to identify the different measures or components of
insolvency law and their relation to each other in order to understand their
significance and the role that each could play in meeting the objectives of insolvency
law. The success of an insolvency regime in meeting the objectives of insolvency law
lies not only in providing the necessary components, but also in achieving the correct
balance between them.
This chapter will identify the possible components of a modern insolvency regime
necessary to meet the objectives of insolvency law. It will use the existing measures
found in South Africa, England and Australia as the basis for the discussion. The
possible components will be discussed briefly and those that could be used to rescue
businesses from insolvency will be identified and discussed separately from the other
components.
The discussion aims to facilitate an understanding of the role of each component in
meeting the objectives of insolvency law and the extent of interaction between the
components and objectives. When this is done it will be possible to evaluate judicial
management as a specific measure of insolvency law, in the context of its role in the
present and future insolvency regime of South Africa.
The discussion will focus on the components of modern corporate insolvency law.
The components of insolvency law exclusively for consumer debtors fall outside the
scope of the discussion.
2 2 Components and potential components of insolvency law
The measures that exist in South Africa, England and Australia to achieve the
divergent aims of insolvency law in relation to business debtors are: I
(a) winding-up provisions;
(b) voluntary arrangements with creditors;
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(c) schemes of arrangement;
(d) administration procedures (similar to judicial management);
(e) receiverships;'
(f) avoidance of antecedent transactions;
(g) provisions regarding wrongful or fraudulent trading; and
(h) provisions for the disqualification of directors in certain circumstances.
The different components of an insolvency regime as set out above respond to
different objectives of insolvency. For instance, winding-up responds to the need for
an orderly, fair and equal process and the maximising of returns to creditors.
Avoidance of antecedent transactions aims to promote the equal treatment of creditors
and provisions for wrongful or fraudulent trading and disqualification of creditors aim
to regulate the behaviour of participants in a credit economy. Some of the components
are aimed at helping a business debtor overcome his financial woes without the
business being wound up. They are voluntary arrangements with creditors, schemes of
arrangement, administration procedures (similar to judicial management) and
receiverships. All of the last-mentioned group of components can be used as
alternative techniques to bring about a business rescue.
The different components of the insolvency regime that do not present themselves as
alternative techniques for business rescues will first be discussed briefly and then the
alternative techniques for business rescues will be discussed in more detail. It is
important to understand the components that cannot be seen as business rescue
techniques, as they form part of a comprehensive response to the problems of
insolvency. It is submitted that the success of some of these measures impact directly
on the success of the different business rescue techniques. For example, it is clear that
if the managers of a business debtor have no difficulty in trading unscrupulously
whilst protected by limited liability and are then able to set up a new company to
escape any difficulty in honouring their agreements the unscrupulous managers would
1 See Milman & Durrant Corporate Insolvency: Law and Practice (1994) 2nd ed 3-7 and Goode
Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 14.
2 Receivership is not known in South African law. It flows from the "floating charge" and is a creature
of the principles of equity. Although it is a common-law measure it is included as part of the discussion
of insolvency law because of its widespread use in situations where companies suffer fmancial
difficulties, with the result that in the common law receivership has developed into a corporate rescue
procedure. See further 2 3 2 infra.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
29
have little incentive to make use of any business rescue measure. It would be far
easier to abandon a failed business and start a new or "phoenix" company, instead of
being burdened by having to negotiate some arrangement with creditors in an effort to
escape the possible consequences of failure. 3
2 2 1 Winding-up
Winding-up or liquidation of a company is the statutory process of bringing the
operations of a company to a close. The liquidator collects the assets of the company,
realises them, ascertains the claims of creditors and, only after he has paid the costs of
liquidation, distributes the net proceeds to creditors by way of dividend. This
distribution is in order of priority as laid down by the law of insolvency. 4
Winding-up is not only available in cases of insolvency, but in general it is also the
mechanism to close down a company which has achieved its purposes or which has
outlived its usefulness.i Where the company is wound up because of inability to pay
its debts, the liquidator also has the duty to investigate the causes of the company's
failure and to report on them. Once this has been done and the reports have been
made, the company is dissolved.6 The liquidator has no power to carry on the business
of the company other than to the extent it is necessary for its beneficial winding-up.'
A winding-up can be effected by means of a voluntary or a compulsory winding-up
procedure. Of these two procedures the compulsory winding-up is the one most
resorted to in case of insolvency of the company and it is a process strictly controlled
by the court.t
2 2 2 Setting aside of antecedent transactions
The setting aside of transactions undertaken shortly before formal insolvency that
favour some creditors above others has always been part of insolvency law.9 It serves
to ensure equality between creditors and to avoid scams where assets and value are
3 See Cork Report 391 para 1739-1744 and the discussion of phoenix companies at 5322 infra.
4 Cilliers, Benade, Henning, Du Plessis & Delport Corporate Law (1992) 2nd ed 490; Goode Principles
of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 18 - 20.
5 Cilliers & Benade et al Corporate Law 490.
6 Cilliers & Benade et al Corporate Law 520.
7 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 384(t). see also the (English) Insolvency Act 1986 sch 4 para 5 and
Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 18.
a Cilliers & Benade et al Corporate Law eh 28 and Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law
(1997) 19.
9 See for example regarding South Africa the Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 339 and s 340 applying the
Insolvency Act ss 26, 29-34 to insolvent companies.
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siphoned off from the estate of the company without adequate compensation, shortly
before its insolvency.
The extent to which the liquidator is able to undo transactions entered into before
formal insolvency differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but it is clearly an
important part of any insolvency regime and serves to eliminate the possible abuse of
a system which affords defaulting debtors a fresh start.
If these measures for setting aside antecedent transactions are successful, they prevent
a business debtor from channelling the assets of the business to a friendly or related
creditor so that he will be able to use the assets again while his creditors have to look
to an empty shell in a futile attempt to satisfy their claims. The measures stop schemes
or shams that are merely crude survival schemes and which at the same time defraud
,I the creditors of the business debtor. Although the survival of viable business entities
is an important objective of insolvency law, it does not follow that any method to
achieve this end is acceptable and desirable.1o
2 2 3 Provisions on wrongful trading, insolvent trading and disqualification of
directors
Provisions against fraudulent and wrongful trading (insolvent trading provisions)11
aim to regulate the behaviour of those that conduct the affairs of companies whose
members enjoy limited liability and to curb some -of the ailments and abuses of
limited liability.
The company is undoubtedly the success story of the modem industrialised economy.
In fact, it has made it all possible. The legal structure of the company brought together
managers and entrepreneurs on the one hand and surplus capital without managerial
and entrepreneurial capacity on the other. This provided the engine for economic
growth. Especially in the smaller business limited liability was the catalyst to
stimulate the entrepreneurial culture. However, limited liability presents its own
problems especially as far as creditors are concerned in circumstances where the
company becomes insolvent and is liquidated.
10 In general see Milman "Curbing the phoenix syndrome" 1997 Journal of Business Law 224.
II See for example s 424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 which empowers the court to impose
personal liability for the obligations of the company on those who have been party to conducting its
business in a fraudulent or reckless manner. See also 5 2 infra.
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The community clearly has an interest in insolvency law and insolvency can never be
treated as an exclusively private matter between creditor and debtor. Although the
Greene Committee" described limited liability as "part of the price the community has
to pay" 13the general dissatisfaction about the opportunities it provides for abuse by
the unscrupulous remains.
"The doctrine of limited liability may have its good points, but it also leads to
some indifference and lack of concern when company officials know that if
the company goes down, they will not have any financial liability ....
There are many fraudulent practices concerned with the formation and
liquidation of companies. Companies are formed, debts run up, the assets
milked and the company put into liquidation. Immediately a new company is
formed and the process is repeated ad infinitum. Associated with the basic
fraud is the practice of new companies buying the remaining stock of the old
company [from the liquidator] at give away prices, taking on the premises
complete with fittings which are unpaid for, again at nominal prices."14
The insolvent trading provisions encourage debtor companies to make timeous use of
other insolvency law measures such as winding-up or some business rescue
provision.f If the debtor companies indulge in fraudulent, reckless or wrongful
trading, the directors or persons party to such trading run the risk of personal liability
for the debts of the company. In an attempt to strengthen the impact of the insolvent
trading provisions, some jurisdictions, for example England, make use of "shadow
director" provisions.l"
A person who is not a director can be regarded a shadow director if the company is
accustomed to act on his advice. A shadow director has to comply with all the duties
of a director.
The disqualification of directors is a further attempt to regulate the behaviour of those
that conduct their business affairs through companies.V Persons that abuse the limited
12 The Company Law Amendment Committee chaired by Wilfred Greene (the Greene Committee) held
an inquiry into English company law in 1925 - 1926.
13 Company Law Amendment Committee Report (1925-26) par 8 and 9.
14Written evidence submitted to the Cork Committee by a Divisional Consumer Protection Officer of
the South Yorkshire County Council. See the Cork Report 391 para 1741.
15 Belcher Corporate Rescue 51.
16 See further the discussion at 5 2 infra.
17 See for example the Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 218 and s 219.
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liability of companies are prohibited from serving as directors of companies in the
future. In this way the public is protected from abuse of limited liability by
unscrupulous characters.18
As can be seen the different provisions interact to achieve the objectives of insolvency
law.
2 3 Alternative techniques to rescue businesses
There are different alternatives to deal with insolvency of a company without
resorting to liquidation of the company and a consequent sale of all of its assets.
These alternatives are components of the insolvency regimes of South Africa,
England and Australia.
2 3 1Voluntary arrangements with creditors and schemes of arrangement
It is always possible that a debtor company can come to some voluntary arrangement
with its creditors. Such an arrangement will nearly always provide for the payment of
a portion of the creditors' claims as settlement in full. The arrangement may be
concluded within or outside a statutory framework.l"
The exact structure of such an arrangement differs from situation to situation and it is
this flexibility which makes it an attractive facility to deal with problems of
insolvency. The reason why creditors may be disposed to accept such a procedure lies
in its flexibility and the speed with which matters can be brought to a conclusion once
the arrangement has been accepted.
The South African, English and Australian systems know the informal arrangement
where it is purely a contractual arrangement between the debtor and his creditors. This
arrangement binds only those creditors who consent to the arrangement" The
difficulty is that those creditors who do not consent can always upset the whole
arrangement.
18 In general see the discussion at 5 3 infra.
19 For a discussion of various voluntary arrangements outside a statutory framework see Belcher
Corporate Rescue 24-34. See also Brown Corporate Rescue 545-554.
20 Creditors' claims against a company that arise from contract may be altered by the parties to the
contract, however only those parties that agree to the variation of their contractual rights will be bound
by the variation.
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On the other hand the law also provides for statutory schemes of arrangement where it
is possible to bind dissenting creditors. English law knows such statutory
arrangements in four different forms.
First, section 425 of the Companies Act21 involves the court's approval for a scheme
approved by a prescribed majority of creditors of each class, obtained at separately
convened meetings. It can be used irrespective of whether the company is in
liquidation.
Secondly, there IS the company voluntary arrangement. This is the arrangement
procedure provided by Part I of the Insolvency Act.22 However, this procedure lacks
the possibility of a moratorium while the arrangement is worked out. Furthermore, the
arrangement only binds consenting creditors.
Thirdly, section 110 of the Insolvency Act" operates during a voluntary winding-up
where the liquidator may with the approval of the court dispose of the company's
business to another company in exchange for shares, policies or other like interests in
the transferee company. 24
Finally, sections 165-167 of the Insolvency Act" make it possible for the liquidator in
a winding-up to make compromises or arrangements with creditors.
These different procedures are mutually exclusive with their respective advantages
and disadvantages. Section 425 of the Companies Act is cumbersome and does not
have a moratorium period in which to put the arrangement together." Part I of the
21 1985.
22 1986. Part I "Company voluntary arrangements" comprises ss 1-7.
23 1986.
24 This section deals with a corporate reconstruction where the whole or part of the company in
liquidation is sold by the liquidator to another company in exchange for shares or securities. The
members of the company in liquidation must consent to accept shares or securities in the purchasing
company instead of the cash to which they would normally be entitled. Provided that the required
sanction of the court (s 110(3» is obtained, the scheme is binding on all members except those who
dissent in writing (s 111(1».
25 Insolvency Act 1986.
26 Prentice, Oditah & Segal "Administration: The Insolvency Act 1986, Part II" 1994 Lloyd's Maritime
and Commercial Law Quarterly 487 list the disadvantages of s 425 as the lack of the power to enforce
an informal moratorium during the time needed to put the scheme together; the lack of the power to
prevent legal actions, the seizure of assets, the exercise of various real rights vested in lessors and
security holders or the presentation of a winding-up petition during the time when the scheme is being
discussed; the fact that cooperation of management is essential but may not be forthcoming because of
demoralisation (it was their mismanagement that led to the precarious position) or because of
unwillingness to cooperate; and because of the definition of class in section 425 which leads to the
possibility that a class of creditors can block the whole scheme.
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Insolvency Act only binds consenting creditors and the other two arrangements are
only available where the company is already in liquidation.
Section 411 of the Australian Corporations Law provides a procedure similar to the
one in section 425 of the English Companies Act. The South African counterpart is
section 311 of the Companies Act. In the South African context it is extensively used
to keep the company shell alive once the company has gone into liquidation. The
main purpose for a scheme of arrangement in terms of section 311 is the utilisation of
the tax benefits of the assessed loss of the company in liquidation. It is so widely used
that the whole procedure is carried out according to a "standard scheme" .27
When successful, the section 311 scheme nearly always results in the company being
rescued from liquidation. However, at this point there is usually not much left of the
business of the company. The provision is however a common device to keep the
company alive and it can safely be said that this is presently by far the most popular
measure in South Africa for rescuing companies. However, this method has to be
contrasted with a business rescue where the primary focus is not on saving the
company itself, but rather on keeping its business going.
In the words of the Cork Report:
"In the case of an insolvent company, society has no interest in the
preservation or rehabilitation of the company as such, though it may have a
legitimate concern in the preservation of the commercial enterprise. "28
232 Receiverships
Receivership is actually an enforcement procedure where the holder of a "floating
charge?" over the whole or substantially the whole of a debtor company's property
can appoint a receiver over the property of the company covered by the floating
charge. The receiver concerns himself with the realisation of the company's assets that
are subject to the floating charge and the payment of the proceeds to the holder of the
charge in or towards discharge of his claim. It is a form of security for credit
extended. Receivership was a creation of the English courts, but since 1986 it has
27 See the discussion at 5 3 1 infra.
28 Cork Report 53 para 193.
29 The floating charge is something akin to the South African notarial bond over movable property, but
it originates from equity and has principles of ownership and control totally foreign to South African
law.
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enjoyed statutory recognition. Receivership In this form has no South African
counterpart.
Secured creditors who resort to the appointment of a receiver have the advantage that
the receiver is usually free to realise the assets concerned outside and independently
ofthe winding-up, and without regard to the effect upon the unsecured creditors.
The floating charge is limited to companies in its use. It has three distinct
characteristics. First, it is a charge on both present and future designated assets of the
company. Secondly, the assets are of the kind that in the ordinary course of business
would change from time to time. And, thirdly the company may carry on its business
unhindered by the floating charge and may dispose of all or any of the assets in the
ordinary course of business. This position continues until the creditor takes some step
to set the floating charge in operation."
A floating charge is a creature of equity. It is commonly given over the whole of the
undertaking of the borrowing company. As such it is usually the lender bank which
holds the floating charge on the debtor company's property. The floating charge is
created by contract. Upon the happening of an event set out in the contract, or on the
appointment of a receiver or on the winding-up of the company the floating charge
becomes operative. It is said to "crystallise". The appointment of the receiver can be
either by the court or by the creditor.
Once the floating charge has crystallised the company can no longer freely deal with
the property. The receiver has control over the assets to deal with them as described
above.
"The floating charge possesses great advantages, and it was quickly adopted
by the financial community. It permits the easy creation of security upon the
entire undertaking of the borrowing company, thus conferring the maximum
security upon the lender, while at the same time permitting the borrowing
company complete freedom to deal with and dispose of its assets in the
ordinary course of business. So widespread has the use of the floating charge
become, that today it is thought that the greater part of the loan finance
obtained by the corporate sector, particularly in the case of the fmance
30 Fletcher Law of Insolvency 361. See also Cork Report 31 para 102 and Re Yorkshire Woo/combers
Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 284 at 294.
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obtained from the banking community, is raised upon the security of such
charges; and that the greater part of the materials in course of processing and
of the ordinary stock in trade of the corporate sector is subject to them.'?'
The receivership has evolved to its present form where a receiver and manager will be
appointed in terms of the floating charge. The receiver and manager has extensive
authority to get in the assets, run the company's business and dispose of the assets
either piecemeal or as the sale of a going concern. These extensive powers have led to
receivership evolving into a form of business rescue regime. The receiver can sell the
property of the company as soon as possible or run the business of the company so
that it can produce a better price when it is sold as a going concern.
It is this characteristic of receivership which makes it necessary to include it in a
discussion of insolvency measures, although it is actually a procedure to enforce a
creditor's security. South African law does not know such a measure or its equivalent.
Where receivership serves the purpose of sometimes prolonging the life of the
business of the company, and not necessarily the life of the company itself, it answers
an economic need. South African law is poorer for not having such a procedure and in
fact for not even having such a business rescue culture." At the same time it must be
conceded that it is impossible to conceptualise a floating charge in terms of South
African law.
However, it has to be said that the floating charge and the resultant receivership have
serious disadvantages. The Cork Report" refers to three such disadvantages. First, it
enables a company to obtain credit from suppliers and others on the strength of its
appearance as a company of great wealth. All the while, the semblance of wealth on
which the credit is obtained is falsified by the existence of the charge. And the
floating charge is capable of being enforced at any moment. Secondly, there is scope
for the dishonest director. He is often the principal shareholder in a small trading
company and he is in the best position to determine the true financial position of the
company. This puts him in a position to avoid the loss of the capital invested by him
31 Cork Report 32 para 104.
32 See Tenowitz and Another v Tenny Investments (Ply) Ltd; Spur Steak Ranches (Ply) Ltd v Tenny
Investments (Ply) Ltd 1979 SA 680 (E) 684D, where the court observed that it is not a ground for
judicial management that the proceeds of the company will be more if the business is given more time
to be sold as a going concern.
33 No changes appear to have been made to the law on receiverships, in spite of the criticisms in the
Cork Report 32 para 105.
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in the venture by way of loans. He simply obtains a floating charge in his own favour
and thus gains priority over the unsecured and often unsuspecting trade creditors who
trade with the company. Thirdly, the common practice of giving a floating charge
over the whole undertaking of the company means that in the event of the company
going insolvent, the whole of the assets will be dealt with and realised outside the
winding-up.
Therefore, although South Africa needs to develop a business rescue culture
receivership does not appear to be an appropriate vehicle.
2 3 3 Administration
Administration is the business rescue provision of English law. Voluntary
administration is its Australian counterpart. As such, they correspond to the South
African procedure of judicial management. Administration and voluntary
administration involve the appointment of an administrator to manage the company
for the benefit of the creditors in general with the aim of also securing the survival of
the company or its business as a going concern.
Although business rescue procedures in the three jurisdictions differ in important
aspects they have certain characteristics in common. The procedure commences when
the company is insolvent or on the verge of insolvency. Subsequent to
commencement the company is allowed some breathing space in that a moratorium is~-- -
placed on enforcement procedures by creditors. The administrator or judicial manager
of the company has to use the time provided by the moratorium to formulate a plan to
restore the company to financial success.
The plan has to be accepted as required by the various statutory provisions and if it is
accepted, the company will be managed according to the terms of the plan. If the plan
is rejected the company will often proceed to liquidation.
The following chapters will compare the different procedures in the three jurisdictions
and propose changes to judicial management in South Africa based on the
companson.
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3 3 1 Judicial management (South Africa)
Judicial management is a corporate rescue mechanism, initiated by a court order. In
this respect it is similar to the English administration order.
On application to the high COurt38 a provisional judicial management order may be
made, if it appears just and equitable, when a company by reason of mismanagement
or any other reason:
"(a) is unable to pay its debts or is probably unable to meet its obligations; and
(b) has not become or is prevented from becoming a successful concern,
and there is a reasonable probability that, if it is placed under judicial
management, it will be enabled to pay its debts or to meet its obligations and
become a successful concern" .39
The application may be made by the company, one or more creditors (including
contingent or prospective creditors), one or more members of the company or any or
all of them acting together or, in the case of a company being wound up voluntarily,
the Master." Although there is no statutory provision for this, the liquidator" and the
provisional liquidator" have been allowed to apply for judicial management.
In South African law judicial management is seen as an extraordinary" measure
because a creditor of a company that is unable to pay its debts is primarily entitled to
liquidation as a means of recovering his claims. This right of the creditor has been
referred to as a right ex debito justitiae to liquidate the company.l"
The court normally does not make a final order, but makes a provisional order and
appoints a provisional judicial manager." The provisional judicial manager assumes
38 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 427.
39 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 427.
40 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 427(2) read with s 346.
41 In Re AH Olver NO: Intafine Leasing and Finance (Pty) Ltd unreported case no M 1830/76 CPD
dated 16 Feb 1977, see Olver Judicial Management in SA Annexure IV.
42 Common Fund Investment Soc Ltd v COC Trust Co Ltd 1968 4 SA 137 (C).
43 There is a line of decisions that supports this view. It starts with Silverman v Doornhoek Mines Ltd
1935 TPD 349 at 353, was subsequently echoed by Trollip JA in Sammei & Others v President Brand
Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 3 SA 629 (A) at 663 and followed in Tenowitz v Tenny Investments (Pty) Ltd
1979 2 SA 680 (E) at 683. This is one of the reasons why judicial management is uncommon. Courts
do not view it as a normal measure that might help a company in financial trouble and a natural
alternative to liquidation.
44 Tenowitz v Tenny Investments (Pty) Ltd 1979 2 SA 680 (E) 683.
45 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 428(1).
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the management of the company and takes possession of all assets of the company. 46
Furthermore, the provisional judicial manager has the duty to prepare a report and lay
the report before separate meetings of members, creditors and debenture holders."
The purposes of the meetings are to consider the report of the judicial manager on the
desirability of a final judicial management order, to decide on nominees for
appointment as final judicial manager, to prove the claims of creditors and to consider
the passing of a resolution giving preference to the claims of creditors that arise
during judicial management above those of pre-judicial management creditors."
The meetings should be held before the return day of the provisional order. The return
day must not be more than 60 days after the provisional order unless the court extends
this period on good cause shown."
There is some difference of opinion among both the courts and academics on whether
the test to be satisfied on granting the final order is more stringent than the test to be
satisfied when a provisional order is sought. Although it was held in Tenowitz v Tenny
Investments (Pty) Ltá'° that more than a reasonable probability that the company will
become a successful concern should exist on the return day before a final judicial
management order can be made, the court in Ex Parte Onus" was of the opinion that
the test is exactly the same on the return day as for a provisional order. Judge Steyn
found no reason in the wording of the Companies Act to support a more stringent test
for a final judicial management order. The court found support for its conclusion in
the judgments in Kotzé v Tulryk Bpk en Anderes2 and Ladybrand Hotel (Pty) Ltd v
Segal and Another." It is submitted that the latter opinion is the correct one. This
view is also supported by Meskin," but is opposed by Cilliers and Benade" and Olver
who hold the view that a stricter test is intended." However, considering that Cilliers
and Benade do not refer to Ex Parte Onus at all and that Olver submitted his thesis
46 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 430(a).
47 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 430( c).
48 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 431.
49 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 432.
50 Supra 683E.
51 19804 SA 63 (0) 66C-D.
52 1977 3 SA 118 (T).
53 19752 SA 357 (0).
54 Meskin Henochsberg I 926.
55 Cilliers & Benade et al Corporate Law 477.
56 Olver Judicial Management in SA 43.
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before this judgment, it can be safely assumed that their views on the stringency of the
test on the return day will not be followed by the courts in future.
It is implicit in the requirement that there must be a reasonable probability that the
company will again become a successful concern that the company will be able to
meet all its debts and obligations in full. 57 This requirement of a reasonable
probability that the company will recover to the extent that it is able to repay its debts
in full is criticised by Rajak as being outdated, unrealistic and often contrary to the
wishes of creditors. 58
3 3 2 Administration (England)
This procedure starts with a petition to the court for a court order to place the
company under administration. 59 The company, its directors, a creditor or creditors,
including any contingent or prospective creditor or creditors may lodge the petition."
The supervisor under a company voluntary arrangement may also lodge a petition to
place the company under administration."
Where the applicant is the company, Pennington" argues that a petition should be
presented in the name of the company only if a general meeting of members or
shareholders has so resolved. Alternatively, the company's articles of association
should expressly delegate the power to petition in the company's name to its board of
directors and the board should then resolve to do so. According to his view, which
finds support in the wording of the relevant provision of the Insolvency Act,
individual members or shareholders cannot petition for an administration order in that
capacity, irrespective of their shareholding.
The "directors" as applicants for the order means the board of directors acting
unanimously or by a resolution duly approved by a majority, taken at a properly
constituted board meeting.
57 CfCompanies Act 61 of 1973 s 427(1) and (3).
58 The debtor is seen more and more as a potential business unit that should be nursed back to financial
health. As such the debtor would once more resume his place in the market for the benefit of both past
and future creditors. A reduction in the amount received in satisfaction of his claim is the price a
modem creditor is willing to pay for the debtor to be restored to commercial effectiveness. See Rajak
"BusinessRescueforSA" 7; Rajak & Henning 1999 SALJ267.
59 Insolvency Act 1986, s 9(1).
60 Insolvency Act 1986, s 9( 1).
61 Insolvency Act 1986, s 7(4)(b). In special cases a self-regulating organisation or professional body or
the Secretary of State may also lodge the petition. Financial Services Act s 74.
62 Pennington Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 2nd ed 336.
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Creditors are defined as including contingent or prospective creditors. Contingent
creditors are those whose claims give rise to a contingent liability for the company. A
contingent liability is a liability that may arise out of a legal commitment that exists
already, such as possible liability as surety or the possible liability of an insurer under
a policy of indemnity insurance." A prospective liability is one that will certainly
arise, but it is not due at the present moment and is not yet finally established or
quantified such as a liability for work in progress."
There are five conditions to be satisfied before the court order can be made. Two can
be seen as the main conditions, whereas the other three are disqualifying rather than
qualifying conditions.
First the court needs to be satisfied that the company is or is likely to become unable
to pay its debts. Inability to pay its debts is to be read within the meaning of section
123 of the Insolvency ACt.65Section 123(1) is the equivalent of section 345 of the
South African Companies Act, the section that provides when a company will be
deemed unable to pay its debts." The standard of proof to be applied to the
requirement that the company is unable to pay its debts or is likely to become unable
to do so, is the normal standard of proof in civil cases. It must therefore be more
probable than not that the company is or is likely to become insolvent." Brown
nevertheless suggests that this standard of proof is too high and that an even chance of
the company becoming unable to pay its debts should suffice.68
If the presumptions created in section 123(1) cannot be used to prove inability to pay
debts, the section also provides for the "cash flow,,69 test and the "balance sheet,,70
test. The cash flow test enables the applicant to prove that factually the company
63 Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1990) 35.
64 Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1990) 36.
65 See Insolvency Act 1986, s 8(1)(a).
66 These grounds include a written demand by a creditor for an amount in excess of £750 which amount
remained unpaid for three weeks and no security to the satisfaction of the creditor was given in that
time; a wholly or partially unsatisfied judgment debt on which execution or some other court process
was issued; if some other evidence satisfies the court that the company is unable to pay its debts; and
where the court is satisfied that the value of the assets is less than that of the liabilities, taking into
account contingent and prospective liabilities.
67 Pennington Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 342. See also the remarks of Hoffman J in Re Harris
Simons Construction Ltd (1988) 5 Bee Il and Brown Corporate Rescue 58.
68 Brown Corporate Rescue 59.
69 Insolvency Act 1986, s 123(I)(e).
70 Insolvency Act 1986, s 123(3).
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cannot now meet its existing debts. The company is thus commercially insolvent.Ï'
The balance sheet test is an alternative test of insolvency. The company will be
deemed to be insolvent if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the value of
the company's assets is less than the amount of its liabilities, taking into account
contingent and prospective liabilities.f
Secondly the court has to consider whether the making of an order would be likely to
achieve one of the following purposes:"
"(a) the survival of the company, and the whole or any part of its undertaking,
as a going concern;
(b) the approval of a voluntary arrangement under Part 1;
(c) the sanctioning under section 425 of the Companies Act of a compromise
or arrangement between the company and any such persons as are mentioned
in that section; and
(d) a more advantageous realisation of the company's assets than would be
effected on a winding-up.':"
The court order has to specify the purpose or purposes for which the order is made.
The four purposes of administration are not susceptible to proof as a matter of fact.
The second requirement therefore involves a forecast as to the company's prospects in
the light of what is already known. The meaning of "likely" in the second requirement
has been held to mean that it must be more probable than noes that the purposes of
administration will be achieved by the making of the administration order. However
in other instances it was held that "likely" in this context means that the probability
that the purpose will be achieved need not be higher than an even chance and that a
probability of an even chance is therefore enough." This is slightly less stringent than
71 Brown Corporate Rescue 55; Fletcher Law of Insolvency 422 and Goode Principles of Corporate
Insolvency Law (1997) 68.
72 Brown Corporate Rescue 56; Fletcher Law of Insolvency 422 and Goode Principles of Corporate
Insolvency Law (1997) 69.
73 Insolvency Act 1986, s 8(1)(b) and (3).
74 It seems that the purpose referred to in subpar (d) is met by the Australian deed of arrangement
procedure. It is estimated that unsecured creditors in the deed of arrangement procedure receive on
average 21.5 cents/dollar compared with 7.32 cents/dollar in a liquidation. Lessing & Corkey
Corporate Insolvency Law (1995) 52.
75 Re Consumer & Industrial Press (1988) 4 Bee 68.
76 Re Harris Simons Construction Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 368, [1989] sci.c 202; RE SCL Building
Services LTD [1990] scr,c 98, 5 Bee 746 and Re Rowbotham Baxter Ltd [1990] act,c 397, [1990]
Bee 133.
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the "more probable than not" test. The "even chance" test has now been accepted as
the governing test. 77
Several writers perceive the main entry conditions of the administration procedure as
being generally too strict. As such they impede the usefulness of the administration
procedure as they discourage early use of the procedure which would result in a
higher likelihood of success. 78
The three disqualifying conditions are that the company must not have gone into
liquidation; an administrative receiver must not have been appointed or if he has, his
appointer must consent to the order; 79 and the company must not be an insurance
company within the meaning of the Insurance Companies Act 1982 or a recognised
bank or licensed institution within the meaning of the Banking Act 1979. so
The making of the order remains in the discretion of the court even if all the
conditions are met. The court may take into consideration any additional factors it
considers to be relevant. These include the consequences of making an administration
order instead of a winding-up order. The court will usually also give more weight to
the position of unsecured creditors because secured creditors have less to lose."
Notice of the petition must be given. Because the English law favours the
administrative receiver" appointed under a crystallised floating charge, the Insolvency
Act requires that prior notice be given to any person who has appointed, or is or may
be entitled to appoint, an administrative receiver of the company." As soon as
practicable after filing the petition, the petitioner must also give notice of its
presentation to any sheriff or other officer who, to his knowledge, is charged with an
execution or other legal process against the company or its property. 84
77 Brown Corporate Rescue 68; Fletcher Law of Insolvency 424; Goode Principles of Corporate
Insolvency Law (1997) 285-287 and Belcher Corporate Rescue 100-101.
7S Brown Corporate Rescue 657; Fletcher Law of Insolvency 479; Goode Principles of Corporate
Insolvency Law (1997) 323.
79 Insolvency Act 1986, s 9(3). Or the charge under which he was appointed is vulnerable under ss 238-
240 or 245 of the Insolvency Act.
so Insolvency Act 1986, s 8 (4).
SI Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 284.
S2 See the Insolvency Act 1986, s 9(2)(a). The administrative receiver is the person appointed to give
effect to the floating charge. The name "administrative receiver" was introduced by the 1986
Insolvency Act.
83 Insolvency Act 1986, s 9(2)(a).
84 Insolvency Rule 1986, r 2.6A.
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3 3 3 Voluntary administration (Australia)
The Australian procedure does not start with a court order. Under the voluntary
administration procedure an administrator may be appointed by the directors of the
company, its liquidator or by a chargee."
The board of directors may resolve to appoint an administrator, except where the
company is already being wound up, if they are of the opinion that the company is
insolvent or likely to become insolvent and that an administrator should be appointed.
The appointment should be in writing using the common seal of the company."
The liquidator or provisional liquidator may appoint an administrator in writing,
where he is of the opinion that the company is insolvent or likely" to become
insolvent. Where the liquidator or the provisional liquidator is appointed as
administrator, the court must approve the appointment. 88
Lastly, a chargee who holds a charge over all or a substantial part of the company's
property may appoint an administrator where the charge has become enforceable and
remains enforceable." This appointment cannot be made if the company is already
being wound up. The appointment should, as in the other instances, be in writing.
Only one appointment of an administrator can be made. Thus, if an administrator has
already been appointed by the directors neither the liquidator nor the chargee can
appoint an administrator." This means that he who acts first can appoint the
administrator of his choice. It is however possible to appoint more than one
administrator when the decision is made to appoint. The functions and powers may
then be exercised by anyone acting alone or by two or more of them acting together
unless the instrument of appointment otherwise provides."
85 Corporations Law, ss 436A-436C. A chargee is the holder of a charge over the property of the
company. It may be over the immovable or movable property or both. A charge is a form of security
for the repayment of debts owed to the chargee. It can be in the form of a charge or a floating charge.
See Corporations Law, s 9.
86 Corporations Law s 436A.
87 As to the meaning of likely there has not been any Australian judgment on this, but the word was
considered in similar circumstances in the English courts. See discussion at 3 3 2, n 75 supra.
88 Corporations Law, s 436B. See Crutchfield Corporate Voluntary Administration Law 2ed (1997) 69
for a discussion on when the court will approve the appointment of the liquidator of an insolvent
company by himself as its administrator.
89 Corporations Law, s 436C.
90 Corporations Law, s 436D.
91 Corporations Law, s 451A(2).
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Upon appointment the administrator must act quickly, extremely quickly when
measured by South African standards.f He must lodge a notice of appointment with
the Australian Securities Commission ("ASC") before the end of the next business
day. Notice of such appointment must also be published within three business days
after appointment in a national newspaper or in a newspaper in each jurisdiction in
which the company has its registered office or carries on business. Notice of
appointment should be given by the administrator, to the company and to holders of
charges over all or a substantial part ofthe property of the company. Notice need not
however be given to the person who made the appointment."
Failure to give the required notice does not invalidate what was done in terms of the
administration. However the court may order otherwise."
3 3 4 Evaluation
All three jurisdictions described above have a business rescue procedure exclusively
for juristic persons in the form of companies. If such a procedure is only available to
companies it is a major shortcoming in terms of the role that business rescue
procedures could play in the economy of a country." If the business rescue procedure
is intended to play -a significant role in the economy there is no logical reason to
restrict its application to companies."
The distinction to be drawn should be that between business debtors and consumer
debtors. Thus the business rescue scheme should be available for partnerships, close
corporations, individual businesspersons and business trusts." The treatment of close
corporations is a case in point. It is a legal person to the same extent as a company.
However, there is no measure similar to judicial management to restore a financially
ailing close corporation. If an all-inclusive business rescue system is to be introduced
it should be included as part of an Insolvency Act dealing with trade or business
92 See 3 5 3 4 infra.
93 Corporations Law, s 450A.
94 Corporations Law, s 450F.
9S Rajak "Business RescueforSA" 10-13; Rajak & Henning 1999 SALJ270-273.
96 In South Africa it was for a long time uncertain whether s 311 of the Companies Act as a procedure
to accomplish a scheme of arrangement was also available for close corporations. This was settled
when a revised compromise procedure was introduced by means of s 72 of the Close Corporations Act
69 of 1984. See also s 66{l) of the Close Corporations Act which now makes it clear that s 311 of the
Companies Act cannot be applied to a close corporation.
97 Although the rescue procedure should be available to all businesses there are certain businesses such
as banking institutions and insurance companies that could have special requirements for a business
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debtors as a group. It would be inappropriate to deal with such a business rescue
procedure in the Companies Act.98
The Chapter 11 scheme of the USA Bankruptcy Code makes no distinction between
debtors who may use it. There is thus no artificial distinction drawn between
companies as business debtors and other business debtors. However the system is so
completely foreign to the South African experience, that it is almost impossible to
envisage such an all-inclusive business rescue scheme in South Africa.
It is nevertheless possible to have different business rescue provisions that could
apply to different business debtors. The distinction should recognise that some trade
debtors are bigger than others. A scheme that involves high costs will not be suitable
for smaller business debtors. Rajak, in his report," suggests a different business
rescue procedure for different business debtors in South Africa, based on the
difference in size of business debtors.i'" This is a very sensible suggestion that should
be implemented if at all possible. Possible bases for such distinction are the number of
members of the business entity or the size of the business in monetary terms.
There are existing distinctions between the different forms of business debtors based
on the number of participants in the different forms. The close corporation is limited
to ten natural persons, the partnership to twenty persons (natural or legal), the private
company to fifty members and the individual business debtor is of course a single
person. On the other hand the public company requires at least seven members, but
that is no restriction on the maximum number of members that a public company may
have. A proposal for some distinction in terms of size based on the number of
participants in the business entity may be meaningless because the type of entity is not
necessarily an accurate indication of size.
rescue. See their exclusion from the administration procedure of the English Insolvency Act 1986 by s
8(4)(a) and (b). A discussion of this aspect is however beyond the scope of this thesis.
98 See however the critisism of the fact that business rescue procedures are included in an insolvency
statute in Brown Corporate Rescue 654. See also Olver "Judicial Management - a Case for Law
Reform" 1986 THRHR 84 who regards the inclusion of judicial management in the chapter on winding-
up of the company under the previous Companies Act 46 of 1926 as a reason why the judicial
management procedure never achieved much success.
99 Rajak "Business Rescuefor SA" 9; Rajak & Henning 1999 SAL/269.
100 Cfthe remarks of Olver 1986 THRHR 86 submitting that it is unlikely that any small company can
bear the burden of a judicial manager's fees under the present judicial management procedure and
become a successful concern.
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A distinction could more sensibly be made on the basis of the size of business
transactions. lOl Such a distinction is already made in the Income Tax Act!" where
some small businesses are allowed to be taxed on a cash flow basis.!" The Value
Added Tax Ad04 also distinguishes between businesses that are obliged to register as
registered vendors and those that do not. At present the distinction is drawn between
businesses with a turnover ofR150 000 or more per year and those with a turnover of
less than that. The same Act also draws distinctions between businesses that have to
report to the tax authorities on either a six monthly or two monthly basis, and this
distinction is also based on the size of the business's yearly turnover. It will therefore
not be something completely new to distinguish between business debtors on the basis
of size in monetary terms.
The point of distinguishing between big and small business debtors would be to
devise a more flexible and less costly business rescue scheme for the smaller business
regardless of the business form. For example, the Close Corporations Act'" contains a
provision that aims to achieve much the same as the Companies Act, but which is
more flexible and involves less costs. The composition'" available to close
corporations under liquidation enables close corporations to form schemes of
arrangement similar to the section 311 schemes of the Companies Act without
approaching the court once,107 whereas a section 311 procedure needs two court
applications.l'"
Having pointed out the need for a two-tier business rescue scheme, one for small and
one for bigger businesses and the desirability of including all business debtors, this
thesis will concentrate on a scheme suitable for the needs of bigger business debtors.
Bigger businesses traditionally find themselves in the form of companies and judicial
lOl A distinction based on the size of business transactions is supported by Goldin J in Tobacco
Auctioneers Ltd v A W Hamilton (Pvt) Ltd 1966 2 SA 451 (R) and Olver Judicial Management in SA
36-37. However their distinction is not to differentiate between different business rescue schemes, but
to determine whether the company is sizeable enough to qualify for judicial management. Both are of
the opinion judicial management was not intended for smaller companies.
102 Act 58 of 1962.
103 Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962, s 37G.
104 Act 89 of 1991 s 23.
lOS Act 69 of 1984.
106 Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 s 72.
107 It will however be necessary to approach the court if the composition involves the setting aside of
the winding-up order. See the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 s 72(11).
108 However if the company was placed under final liquidation and thereafter a scheme of arrangement
in terms of s 311 resulted in the setting aside of the winding-up order it will take five court applications
to effect the scheme of arrangement.
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management itself is a mechanism only available to companies, as is voluntary
administration in Australia and administration of companies in the England.
One of the important factors to consider at the outset is the costs involved in a
business rescue scheme. The rescue is necessary because of a lack of funds. The
creditors and the courts will not be persuaded to embrace a scheme where it will only
result in the available assets being depleted and another "creditor" being introduced in
the form of the administration costs of the business rescue scheme.
On the one hand, voluntary administration in Australia is initiated merely by decision
..______ -
of the relevant party. This method is virtually without cost and extremely quick. It
only needs a decision in writing under the common seal of the company where the
administrator is appointed by the directors and notice of administration in the
prescribed manner. On the other hand, the English scheme is initiated by petition to
the court and by court order. Likewise, judicial management in South Africa requires
a court order, but needs applications for both a provisional order and a final order. It is
clear that the English and South African schemes are comparatively cumbersome and
much more expensive to set in motion. They require much greater involvement and
preparation by legal practitioners.
The high costs involved in the implementation of administration schemes are arguably
the Achilles heel of the English system. One of the five reasons advanced by the
Insolvency Service for the lack of enthusiasm in practice for the administration order
procedure is the time and costs involved.!" Grier and Floyd note this as one of the two
main reasons why administration orders lack popularity.'!" Goode agrees that the high
costs is one of the important factors impeding the use of the administration
procedure. III At the same time he also identifies the inevitable delay involved with
court applications as a further shortcoming of the procedure.i'f
109 Consultative Document Company Voluntary Arrangements and Administration Orders Insolvency
Service publication 1993.
110 Grier and Floyd Corporate Recovery; Administrations and Voluntary Arrangements (1995) 215.
III Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 323 is supported by Fletcher Law of
Insolvency 479. Milman Corporate Insolvency: Law and Practice 2nd ed (1994) 46 agrees that it is
prohibitively expensive for the small private company and says £2000 has been cited as a minimum
starting cost. Brown Corporate Rescue 655 says that a figure of between £1500 - £2000 is more
realistic for smaller companies, but agrees that the costs of administration orders is the overwhelming
reason cited for their relatively low use.
112 Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 323. See also Rajak "Business Rescue for
SA" 8 who identifies the heavy reliance of judicial management on court procedures as one of the
shortcomings of judicial management. See also Rajak & Henning 1999 SALJ268.
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On the basis of costs and ease of implementation the Australian system is clearly
----------~.113 However, to balance the ease of initiation, an extremely short period is
allowed for the implementation of a deed of arrangement to safeguard the interests of
the creditors, who are only subjected to a moratorium for a very short period. }~a
of the application to court is to obtain an independent and impartial decision after any
possible objections have been heard. The creditors would be more satisfied and have-more trust in the whole process if they were given the opportunity to be heard and if a
court made the order. However, this consideration is counterbalanced by the cost and
delay inherent in court applications.
The choice between the two approaches involves more than a business decision on the
costs. There is a policy decision to be taken. Does the legislature want to encourage
the entrepreneurial spirit and to what extent is it prepared to encourage such a spirit in
the national economy? The greater the emphasis on an entrepreneurial culture, the
greater the desirability that the decision-making power should lie in the hands of the
business debtor. If the power to initiate a business rescue is placed in the hands of the
business debtor, possible abuses can be countered by a stricter monitoring of the
process that followS.114
The existing requirement of a court application for both provisional and final judicial
management appears to be a legacy of indecisiveness stemming from the adversarial
nature of our courts and the role of the judge as a neutral adjudicator without any prior
knowledge of the issues for decision. There is a lot to be said for simplifying the
commencement of judicial management.
Another aspect of the commencement process that needs amplification in the
legislation is the grounds on which the business rescue scheme can be implemented
and its purpose. There have been concerns in the past that judicial management was
abused. The response of the Van Wyk de Vries Commission was to recommend that a
judicial management order should only be granted if there is a reasonable probability
lIJ Before the voluntary administration procedure became operational it was generally thought that the
procedure would only be employed in relation to small to medium size companies. See Keay
"Corporate Governance during Administration and Reconstruction under part 5.3A of the Corporations
Law" 1997 Company and Securities Law Journal 145 146. Routledge "An exploratory empirical
analysis of part 5.3A of the Corporations law" 1998 Company and Securities Law Journal 4 11
concludes however that size does matter and that the larger companies might have a better chance to
succeed with a business rescue under the Australian procedure, due to the costs of voluntary
administrations.
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that all debts will be paid and that the company will become a successful concern. The
legislature agreed and retained this requirement for judicial management.lf With
hindsight, this is the wrong approach. Virtually nowhere in other business rescue
schemes is this seen as a qualifying requirement. In the prevalent credit economies of
today it is widely accepted that the creditors would usually accept a reduction of their
claims and rather reap the longer term benefits of having a viable debtor to do
business with.'!"
The English system is a good example in this respect: it specifies a variety of
purposes for which administration is available.117 The emphasis may be on the
survival of the business or any part of it; the opportunity to effect some voluntary
arrangement between those concerned or even the more beneficial realisation of the
assets of the company.
The more beneficial realisation of assets as a purpose of administration is in stark
contrast to the judgment in Tenny v Tenowitz'" which declares that judicial
management is not available in circumstances where it is sought to achieve a more
beneficial realisation of the business assets as a going concern as opposed to the
survival of the company itself.
Whereas both the South African and English systems emphasise the desired outcome,
the Australian system is less specific in this respect, but focuses instead on the process
that it initiates. The Australian system only defines the circumstances in which the
business rescue scheme is available, and the process to be followed. It is left to the
participants to decide what the process should deliver. There is thus neither a judicial
discretion involved in the implementation, nor an expression by the legislature of the
aims of every specific administration.!" It is nevertheless a question of the trust
present in debtors' and creditors' relations. It is beyond doubt that creditors would be
wary of the implementation of a business rescue scheme without a stated aim. This is
especially so given the powerful position creditors particularly the big lending
114 See Crutchfield Corporate Voluntary Administration Law 26-27 for a discussion of the safeguards
against abuse of voluntary administration in Australian law.
115 See the Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 427 and s 432 and compare the Companies Act 96 of 1926 s
195.
116 Rajak "Business Rescuefor SA" 7; Rajak & Henning 1999 SAU267.
117 Insolvency Act 1986, s 8(3).
118 Supra 684. See also Van Wyk De Vries Commission of enquiry into the Companies Act Main
Report 145-147.
119 The court in the English scheme has to state the purposes for which the administration is given.
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institutions are in vis-a-vis debtors. If business debtors can easily implement the
business rescue scheme and a resultant moratorium on enforcement follows, that will
lead to a loss of power by the creditors. It is suggested however that this problem of a
loss of power by the creditors, leading to distrust of and a resultant lack of faith in a
business rescue system should receive attention elsewhere in the business rescue
mechanism, and not in the context of the procedure for commencement.
Itwould be beneficial for judicial management to ease its requirement of full payment
of all the debtor's debts'" and to adopt a mechanism less formal than the applications
for provisional and final judicial management that are currently required. It must be
remembered that the appointment of a receiver'" or administrative receiver'" is a very
simple procedure that needs no application to a court and is only a decision taken by
the person entitled to make the appointment. In that sense a completely informal
.,1
mechanism for commencement is widely accepted in Australia and England. It must,
however, be said that this is a power exercised by the secured creditor to strengthen its
own position and is as such far less controversial than an easy mechanism for
implementing judicial management in the hands of the debtor, or for that matter, a
smaller less powerful, or even friendly creditor.
The question also remains as to whether a company should be insolvent before it
should be able to apply for judicial management. It is submitted that it should not be a-_
strict requirement that a company is unable to pay its debts.123 The earlier a company
recognises that it should reorganise itself because of looming financial disaster the
better the chances of avoiding eventual liquidation and the greater the possibility of
successful reorganisation.!"
It is noted above that some writers regard the criteria for the commencement of the
administration procedure in England as a barrier to the use of administration.l'"
120 Rajak "Business Rescue for SA" 7 states: "[t]he requirement that to be eligible for protection a
debtor must be seen to be one capable of recovery to the point where it is able to repay all its debts in
full is outdated, unrealistic and often contrary to the wishes and interests of both debtor and creditors."
See also Rajak & Henning 1999 SALf 268.
121 For the appointment of a receiver in Australia see Tomasic Australian Corporate Insolvency Law 25
sUf,ra.
12 Insolvency Act 1986, s 29.
123 Compare s 427(1)(a) of the Companies Act with the less stringent requirement ofs 8 of the English
Insolvency Act and s 436A of the Australian Corporations Law.
124 The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading
(1996) 27 submits that likely insolvency should not be a precondition. See also Belcher Corporate
Rescue 19.
125 Cfthe text at 3 32 n 78 supra.
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Making insolvency or near insolvency a condition for the commencement of the
administration procedure is in sharp contrast with the Chapter 11 process in the
United States. In terms of the Chapter 11 process no conditions for entry are set and
the management ofthe company is entitled to use the business rescue provisions as "a
matter of right". 126
It is submitted that Australian approach is a good example to follow. Although
conditions for entry are required, the directors of the company may commence the
business rescue procedure without the intervention of the court. Where however the
procedure is to be initiated without the consent of the directors the intervention of the
court is still necessary.
If the directors were given the opportunity to place a company under judicial
management without the intervention of the court, it would encourage them to do so
when the need arises although the company might still b'ê solvent. If their actions are
disputed the court will have to determine whether the company was likely to become
unable to pay its debts. In this regard the court would not easily reject the opinion of
the directors especially where the conditions for commencement do not require an
imminent probability of inability to pay debts. In this way the company would still be
able to enter the business rescue procedure early and the court would not apply
"unduly exacting standards,,127and impede the use of judicial management.
It is further submitted that it could be useful to add a technical ground when a
company may be placed under judicial management. Where a company's financial
statements are not up to date128 it should be possible for one of the members or a
creditor to place the company under judicial management. It is a serious problem that
a company on its way to insolvency often neglects to comply with the necessary
requirement of having up to date financial statements. When such a company finally
goes into judicial management or liquidation it is very difficult for the judicial
manager or liquidator to establish the reasons for insolvency without proper financial
records. It is thus submitted that failure to provide audited financial statements
timeously should be a ground for placing a company under judicial management. One
possibility would be to deem a company likely to become unable to pay its debts
126 Belcher Corporate Rescue 17.
127 Fletcher Law of Insolvency 479. See also Crutchfield Corporate Voluntary Administration Law 68.
128 Cfproposed s 1(5) at 33 5 infra.
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where audited financial statements are in arrears for more than fifteen months from
the end of the financial year of the company.129 It could however alternatively be
treated as a separate ground for placing a company under judicial management.
The purpose of judicial management could be amplified to include the survival of the
compány, its business or any part of it and the possibility of a more advantageous
realisation of the company's assets than would be effected on a winding-up.
The Hong Kong Law Reform Commission identifies purposes to be achieved in a
judicial management as an extension of time for the payment of debts; the variation or
the re-ordering of the ranking for payment of the company's debts or any class of its
debts or the conversion of its debts in whole or in part into shares or other securities to
be issued by the company. 130
All the purposes mentioned above could be achieved under a deed of company
arrangement as conceived by the Australian procedure. However it is still desirable to
state the more common and important purposes in legislation. On the other hand it is
also advisable not to limit the purposes to be achieved by judicial management
unnecessarily. This balance could be achieved by incorporating a purpose similar to
that of the deed of company arrangement as one of the purposes of judicial
management, namely the approval of a plan of future conduct.F" The legislation
would thus provide important guidelines as to the purposes for which judicial
management is intended and at the same time the legislation would not restrict the
application of judicial management.
An aspect that restricts the use of judicial management as a measure to rescue
companies is the attitude of the South African courts of treating judicial management
as a remedy that should only be allowed in exceptional circumstances.P'' The courts
are also of the view that it would seldom, if ever, be just and equitable to grant a
judicial management order against the wishes of a creditor unless the court is
129 Ss 179 and 286 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 read together require a company to lay its audited
fmancial statements before the annual general meeting at a time not exceeding nine months after the
end of the fmancial year. Fifteen months would extend a further grace period of six months in which
audited fmancial statements should be produced before the possibility to place a company under
judicial management for this reason arises. See text at 5 2 4 at n 55 infra.
130 Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading (1996)
26.
131 See proposed s 1(3)(b) at 3 3 5 supra.
132 See 1 I, n Il and 12 supra.
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persuaded that it will probably be in the interests of all creditors and of the
shareholders to grant the order. 133
It is submitted that there is no compelling reason why the courts should view judicial
management as an extraordinary measure. There is certainly nothing in the legislation
that merits its treatment as such. It would however be more difficult for the courts to
treat judicial management as an equally appropriate alternative to liquidation in the
light of past decisions and it will probably need a change in legislation before they
will do so.
The creation of a business rescue culture in South Africa also requires a change of
attitude from the banks. Banks have a lot of power in insolvency situations. Even
where the other creditors may be willing to extend some leniency towards a business
in order to sell it as a going concern it would be in the hands of the major creditor,
with the overwhelming majority of votes, to decide between the possibility of a
business rescue and the otherwise inevitable liquidation. Sometimes banks can be
rather merciless in their attempt to recover their loans even in situations where there is
no actual insolvency but only commercial insolvency:
"Mr Hodes submitted, in the second place, that this was a case where the
Court ought to exercise its discretion against the grant of a final order. In this
regard he referred to the manner in which ABSA had conducted its
relationship with Key and with the company and in the light thereof contended
that it would not be fair nor just nor equitable to grant ABSA a final winding-
up order. Mr Hodes' criticism of ABSA's conduct is perhaps not without some
justification - it was an exercise in cynicism on its part to expect repayment of
several million rand over little 'more than a week-end, but its right to have
done so is beyond dispute." 134
It is strongly arguable that the change in attitudes necessary to foster a culture of
business rescue will best be achieved by using the Australian model to commence a
business rescue.
133 De Jager v Karoo Koeldranke & Roomys (Edms) Bpk 1956 3 SA 594 (C) 602D-E; Guttman v
Sunlands Township (Pty) Ltd (In Liq) 1962 2 SA 348 (C) 351-352 and 354-355; Tobacco Auctions Ltd
v AW Hamilton (Pvt) Ltd 19662 SA 451 (R) 4538.
134 ABSA Bank Ltd v Rhebokskloof (Pty) Ltd and Others 1993 4 SA 436 (C) 44 IF-G.
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33 5 Draft legislation to give effect to the proposals
Draft legislation to give effect to these proposals III South Africa could read as
follows:
Section 113\Circumstances III which company may be placed under judicial
management)
(1) When any company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts and there is a
probability that if it is placed under judicial management it would achieve one or
more of the purposes referred to in subsection (3), it may be placed under judicial
management.
(2)(a) The company may be placed under judicial management by:
(i) a special resolution of the company or a resolution of its directors. This
resolution must be lodged by the end of the next business day with the Master,
who must approve the appointment of the judicial manager nominated by the
company, its directors or its members.
(ii) an application to court by a member or a creditor or creditors or any
prospective or contingent creditor or creditors or the provisional liquidator.!"
2(b) Before an application for judicial management is presented to the Court, a copy
of the application and of every affidavit confirming the facts stated therein shall be
lodged with the Master at the seat of the Court.
2(c) Despite the provisions of section 203(1) of the Companies Act a special
resolution referred to in subsection 2(a)(i) takes effect when it is lodged with the
Master.
(3) The purposes for which a company may be placed under judicial management are:
(a) the survival of the company, and the whole or any part of its undertaking,
as a going concern;
(b) the approval of a plan of future conduct; 137
135 Based on the Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 427; the English Insolvency Act 1986, s 8(3) and the
Australian Corporations Law, s 436 A.
136 Cf3 3 1 supra.
137 See 3 5 5 infra.
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(c) the sanctioning under section 311 of the Companies Act of a compromise
or arrangement; and
(d) a more advantageous realisation of the company's assets than would be
effected by a winding-up.
(4) Judicial management commences when the Master approves the appointment of
the judicial manager after the resolution referred to in subsection 2(a)(i) is lodged
with the Master or when the court makes an order for judicial management in terms of
subsection 2(a)(ii).
(5) A company is deemed to be likely to become unable to pay its debts if it fails to
provide audited financial statements as required by section 286 of the Companies Act
within fifteen months after the end of its financial year.
(6) The fact that an application for judicial management is opposed by a creditor
seeking winding-up on one of the grounds in section 344 of the Companies Act will
not by itself justify the refusal of a judicial management order if one or more of the
purposes in subsection (3) are proved.
3 4 Consequence .of commencement of business rescue procedure
\.;~~
The two most important consequences of the commencement of a business rescue
procedure is that it is usually accompanied by a moratorium on existing debts and its
effect on the management powers of the incumbent directors.
3 4 1 Moratorium on payment of existing debts
The most important effect of the commencement of a business rescue regime is that it
provides some breathing space where the debtor is protected from enforcement
procedures from creditors to enable him to reorganise his affairs. This breathing space
is created by a placing a moratorium on all enforcement procedures.
"A judicial manager is appointed because the Court thinks that the company, if
it has a sort of moratorium - that is what a judicial management amounts to -
will pull through and will be able to go on." 138
The extent and the effect of this stay of enforcement procedures as it is applied in the
different jurisdictions will now be discussed.
138 Estate Laack v Graaf-Reinet Board of Executors 1935 CPD 117. See also Belcher Corporate Rescue
17 and Lessing & Corkery Corporate Insolvency Law 79.
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3 4 1 1 Judicial management (South Africa)
3 4 1 lIThe general effect of the moratorium
Where the court grants a provisional judicial management order it does not
automatically result in a moratorium on any legal proceedings. The granting of a
moratorium is in the discretion of the court. The provisional judicial management
order must contain certain directions!" with regard to the directors of the company
and its management and the appointment of a provisional judicial manager.
Furthermore, the order may include a possible moratorium on all actions, proceedings,
the execution of all writs, summonses and other processes against the company.!"
Most provisional judicial management orders contain such a provision in practice.l'"
The effect of the moratorium is that the company enjoys a reprieve from actions
against the company, but it does not mean that a company is free to delay
performance of its contractual obligations.'? A creditor would thus be able to refuse
performance that is tendered after the due date by a debtor company under judicial
management and would not be under legal obligation to carry on with the contract if
the debtor company under judicial management does not perform as agreed.
The moratorium lasts for a period determined by the court. It is important to note that
the moratorium only extends to procedural measures and the court cannot prevent set-
off from operating.'?
Upon the making of the provisional order the property of the company is deemed to
be in the custody of the Master, but as soon as the provisional judicial manager is
appointed he becomes custodian of the property.!"
Even if the judicial management order does not provide for a moratorium, Olver'"
submits that the effect of section 434(2)146 in reality results in a factual moratorium.
This section requires the judicial manager to pay the costs of judicial management and
debts incurred by him in the conduct of the company's business first and only if
139 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 428(2)(a).
140 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 428(2). It must also contain the directions referred to in s 428(c).
141 Olver Judicial management in SA 66 and Meskin Henochsberg I 931.
142 New Union Goldfields Ltdv Cohen and Others 19542 SA 397 (A) 403.
143 Transkei Development Corporation Ltd v Oshkosh Africa (Pty) Ltd 1986 1 SA 150 (C) 153J-154A
and 154D.
144 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 429(a).
145 Olver Judicial management in SA 109.
146 Companies Act 61 of 1973.
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circumstances permit, to pay the claims of pre-judicial management creditors.
However, section 434(2) by itself does not prevent pre-judicial management creditors
from instituting actions and leving execution to enforce their claims. Nevertheless, the
provisional judicial management order normally includes a moratorium and judicial
managers do not have to resort to section 434(2).
3 4 1 1 2 The effect on secured creditors
If a moratorium is granted, the secured creditors enjoy no privilege in comparison to
unsecured creditors. They are also subject to the same restrictions as the unsecured
creditors with regard to the stay of actions and enforcement procedures. There is
nothing in the Companies Act which makes any distinction between the treatment of
secured or unsecured creditors in judicial management. Thus if they want to realise
their security the secured creditors would require the leave of the court to institute
proceedings.
3 4 1 1 3 The effect on owners and lessors of property
In New Union Goldfields Ltd v Cohen and Others'" it was decided that even though a
creditor is not entitled by action to enforce a right because the debtor is under judicial
management, it does not follow that the debtor is lawfully entitled to delay
performance of the corresponding obligation. It would mean for example that a lessee
company under judicial management is not entitled to withhold payments in terms of
a lease agreement. If the lease provides for forfeiture on breach by the lessee, the
lessor would be entitled to cancel the lease on breach by the lessee. Even though the
lessor needs the permission of the court to proceed with eviction proceedings the
lessee will nevertheless be a trespasser.
However, in Western Bank Ltd v Laurie Fossati Plant Hire (under judicial
management) 148 the court was reluctant to grant permission for an action to cancel a
lease, as it would have destroyed the whole purpose of judicial management.
3 4 1 I 4 The court's discretion
The moratorium can only be breached with the permission of the COurt.149 In order to
obtain permission of the court the creditor will need to make an application to court.
In this regard the court may give leave to sue, but refuse leave to enforce.!"
147 19542 SA 397 (A) 403A.
148 1974 4 SA 607 (E) 613B.
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The exercise of the court's discretion in permitting an action against the company in
judicial management was considered in Western Bank Ltd v Laurie Fossati Plant Hire
(under judicial management). 15I The court resolved that its discretion to allow an
action to proceed or an interdict to issue must be exercised judicially and not
arbitrarily or capriciously. The court must have regard to all the salient and material
features of the case in the light of the tenor and policy of judicial management in the
Companies Act. The court then found that the tenor and policy of judicial
management is to preserve and not to destroy a company that is capable of
rehabilitation.
,.1
Consequently the court refused to grant leave to Western Bank to institute action
against Laurie Fossati Plant Hire for the confirmation of the cancellation of certain
agreements of lease of road-making machinery. The court came to the conclusion that
Western Bank might well suffer no prejudice and that the granting of such leave
would assist in the destruction of Laurie Fossati Plant Hire. Such destruction would
deny some 150 creditors any possibility of a dividend or perhaps even eventual
payment in full.
Another material consideration which the court will consider when deciding if it
should give leave to institute action is whether the court in doing so would be
countenancing or aiding illegality. 152
3 4 1 2 Administration (England)
In the English procedure there are two important moments with regard to the effect of
the moratorium that applies to the administration order procedure.U" The first moment
is when the petition is presented to the court. The second is when the administration
order is made by the court.
149 See further the discussion in Meskin Henochsberg I 932-933.
150 Ross v Northen Machinery and Irrigation (Pty) Ltd 1940 TPD 119 120. The court gave two reasons.
It would create a preference in favour of the applicant and it would embarrass the judicial manager and
might prove prejudicial to the conduct of the business of the company under judicial management.
151 19744 SA 607 (E) 611A. Western Bank entered into certain agreements of lease ofroad making
machinery with the respondent company. The rentals had to be paid on the first day of each month in
terms of the agreement. The rentals were paid monthly, but rarely on due date. After the respondent
company was placed under judicial management Western Bank sought leave from the court to cancel
the lease agreements because the payment of rentals were late. Western bank had to apply for leave to
cancel as the judicial management order made provision for the stay of all proceedings against the
respondent company.
152 Samuel Osborn (SA) (Pty) Ltd v United Stone Crushing Co (Pty) Ltd 1938 WLD 229 236.
153 For a general discussion see Brown Corporate Rescue 99-176; Fletcher Law of Insolvency 443-460
and Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 295-309.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
65
3 4 1 2 1 The general effect of the moratorium
The moratorium affects the unsecured and secured creditors as well as the owners and
lessors of property.
The moratorium comes into effect immediately on the presentation of the petition.
Once the presentation of the petition for an administration order is made all
proceedings leading to a winding-up are stayed. No resolution may be passed or order
made for the winding-up of the company.!"
This precludes a voluntary winding-up, but it does not prevent the presentation of an
application for winding-up of the company. However, such an application will not be
dealt with until the administration petition is dismissed or the administration order
discharged. The court may restrict any advertisement of the winding-up order for the
time being. This prevents adverse publicity that might jeopardise the very purpose of
the administration sought. 155
Once the administration order is made any petition for the winding-up of the company
must be dismissed.!"
On the presentation of the petition for an administration order no other proceedings
and no execution or other legal process may be commenced or continued, and no
distress may be levied,ls7 against the company or its property except with the leave of
the court and only subject to such terms as the court may impose.!"
On the administration order being granted this moratorium is confirmed.!" However
although the court may still consent to the commencement or continuation of other
proceedings, execution or to distress being levied, this consent may now also be given
by the administrator once he is appointed.
It is suggested that the term "proceedings" IS limited to legal or quasi-legal
proceedings. Among the latter would be arbitration and proceedings before an
154 Insolvency Act, 1986 s 10(1)(a).
155 Brown Corporate Rescue 79.
156 Insolvency Act, 1986 s II(l)(a).
157 "A distress is one of the most ancient and effectual remedies for the recovery of rent. It is the taking,
without legal process, cattle or goods as a pledge to compel the satisfaction of a demand, the
performance of a duty, or the redress of an injury." James Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and
Phrases 5th ed (1986) 749.
158 Insolvency Act, 1986 s lO(1)(c).
159 Insolvency Act, 1986 s 11(3)(d).
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industrial tribunal. 160 An example of proceedings which are excluded is the revocation
of a license, as happened in Air Ecosse Ltd v Civil Aviation Authority'" where British
Airways applied to the Civil Aviation Authority for the revocation of the air transport
license of Air Ecosse Ltd once it went into administration. It was decided that the
application for a revocation of the air transport license does not fall under the
moratorium.
The Insolvency Act does not specifically exclude criminal proceedings from the
moratorium as does its Australian counterpart. According to Fletcher'" the legislature
intends to include in this context only proceedings which are: "similar to those which
bring about the winding-up of a company, the appointment of an administrative
receiver, or the enforcement of a security."!"
It should be noted that there is no provision in the Insolvency Act to the effect that all
dispositions of property of the company which were made after the date when the
petition was presented, shall be void unless approved by the court.!" Thus between
the time that the petition is presented and the administration order is made, the
creditors are subject to a moratorium with no reciprocal limitation on the powers of
the directors. During this time the directors are therefore free to exercise their powers
and they may dispose of the company's property by selling, leasing, mortgaging or
charging it or by dealing with it in any other way. Normally the time span between the
presentation of the petition and the hearing is short.!" There is thus no great danger
that the directors may dissipate the assets.!"
The moratorium also applies to other legal process. The meanmg of "other legal
process" in this context is unclear. Following the Australian example it would most
160 Robinson Australian Business Law Review (1996) 429 436.
161 [1987] 3 Bee 492.
162 Fletcher Law of Insolvency 436. See also Milman & Durrant Corporate Insolvency 34-35 and
Brown Corporate Rescue 141-154.
163 For a judicial analysis of proceedings that are not affected see Re Paramount Airways Ltd, Bristol
Airport v Powdri/l [1990] 2 WLR 1362 (the exercise of a lien by an unpaid creditor), Re Atlantic
Computers pic [1992] 2 WLR 367 (a head lease allowed to be cancelled and the head lessor allowed to
repossess goods from the sub-lessees) and Royal Bank v Buchler [1989] BeLe 130 (where a creditor
wanted to sell an office block over which it had a security and the court effectively put a deadline on
the administration).
164 There is such a provision when a petition to liquidate a company is granted. See the Insolvency Act
1986, s 127.
165 A minimum of 5 days according to the Insolvency Rules, 1986 r 2.7.
166 Where directors' actions threatened to diminish the value of fishing vessels by selling the fishing
licences separately, the court abridged the period for service of the petition. This will mainly happen
where a creditor presents the petition. Cf Re Gallidoro Trawlers Ltd [1991] BeLe 856.
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probably mean a process involving the COurt.167 Thus it would not affect a notice
given to make time of the essence.
The "property" of the company which is subject to the moratorium is statutorily
defined.!" Property is widely defined. It includes: "money, goods, things in action,
land and every description of property wherever situated and also obligations and
every description of interest, whether present or future or vested or contingent, arising
out of, or incidental to, property."
3 4 1 2 2 The effect on secured creditors
The moratorium also affects secured creditors as it is provided that upon presentation
of the petition and upon the making of the final order, no other steps may be taken to
enforce any security over the company's property.!" However, the administrator, once
he is appointed, may consent and the court may grant leave to take such steps, subject
to the terms that the court may impose.
Security is defined'" as any mortgage, charge, lien or other security. This is a
definition that leaves less doubt than the Australian Act which uses the word
charge.!"
The meaning of "taking steps" is somewhat uncertain. It is submitted that it should be
limited to those actions that would have the legal effect of preventing the
administrator from doing something with the property subject to the security that he
would otherwise have been entitled to do. This would not include giving notice of a
kind that does not interfere with the administrator's ability to deal with the property.
In Re Olympia & York Canary Wharf Ltd172 it was held that the moratorium applicable
to secured creditors is not intended to interfere with the rights of creditors any more
than is required to enable the administrators to carry out their functions.
The holder of a floating charge, however, receives preferential treatment. Before the
administration order may be made the holder of the floating charge has the
opportunity to appoint an administrative receiver. Such an appointment may be made
167 See the discussion at 3 4 I 3 I infra.
168 Insolvency Act, 1986 s 436.
169 Insolvency Act, 1986 s 1O(l)(c) and s I I(3)(c). The only difference between the two sections is that
slO, which operates from the presentation of the petition, refers to "no steps" and s Il, which operates
once the order is made, refers to "no other steps".
170 Insolvency Act, 1986 s 248(b)(i).
171 See 3 4 I 32 infra.
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without the need for leave from the court and once made, the appointment would
prevent the court from making an administration order without the consent of the
person who appointed the administrative receiver.!" This preference is accomplished
by the requirement that the holder of the floating charge is entitled to at least five
days' notice before the administration order is made.!" He thus has five days in which
to decide to appoint an administrative receiver. 175
3 4 1 2 3 The effect on owners and lessors of property
The Insolvency Act also makes it clear that no steps may be taken to repossess goods
in the company's possession under any hire-purchase agreement'" while the
moratorium is in force except with the consent of the administrator or the leave of the
court subject to such terms as the court may impose. It is thus clear that the English
law makes no special arrangement for the lessors of property. They are treated the
same as all other creditors.
The moratorium does not affect the rights of the parties concerned; it merely suspends
the enforcement procedure. Thus if an application is made to the court for leave to
enforce and it is granted, the rights have remained vested in the party concerned and
he may act to enforce them.
Goods will still be considered to be in a company's possession even though they were
handed over for repair to someone else or sublet to someone else.!"
3 4 1 2 4 The exercise of the court's discretion
The court in Atlantic Computers'" gave guidance on the exercise of the court's power
to grant leave for the moratorium to be lifted. The principles laid down by the court
include:
172 [1993] BeLe 453457. See also Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 301 - 303.
173lnsolvency Act, 1986 s 9(3). .
174Insolvency Act, 1986 s 9(2)(a) and Insolvency Rules, 1986 r 2.7.
175Fletcher The Law of Insolvency (1996) 438; Re A Company (No. 00175 of 1987) [1987] nete 467.
176Hire purchase agreements include conditional sale agreements, chattel leasing agreements, and
retention of title agreements. See s 10(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986. A chattel leasing agreement is an
agreement for the bailment, or in Scotland, the hiring of goods, which is capable of subsisting for more
than three months. See s 251 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
177Re Atlantic Computer Systems pIc [1992] 1 All ER 476 at 492d-g. See Goode Principles of
Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 308 - 309 and also Brown Corporate Rescue 158 - 163. Although
the guidance was given in the context of leased equipment it is capable of general application.
178[1992] 1 All ER 476 at 500-503.
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The person who applies for leave for the lifting of the moratorium should make out a
case for leave to be given.
When an owner of land or goods who, as lessor, wants to repossess his property,
applies for leave from the court or consent from the administrator for the lifting of the
moratorium, it should normally be given if it is unlikely to impede the achievement of
the purpose of administration.
In other cases where a lessor wants to repossess, the court should weigh the interests
of the lessor against those of the other creditors.
In the weighing of interests great weight should be given to a lessor's ownership
rights. An administration for the benefit of unsecured creditors should not be
conducted at the expense of those with ownership rights. The court needs to weigh the
loss that would be caused to either party.
The result of the weighing of the different interests might lead the court to impose
certain terms on which leave is granted. Alternatively the court may decide to refuse
leave to repossess but at the same time give directions to the administrator on how to
treat the property.
The court will apply broadly the same principles upon granting leave to enforce
security.
When the court hears an application to grant leave to enforce security the court will
normally not seek to resolve disputes over the existence, validity or nature of the
security.
34 1 3 Voluntary administration (Australi-a,J,
\
The moratorium on proceedings against the company's property that takes effect upon
the commencement of voluntary administration!" is of vital importance to the whole
procedure. This moratorium lasts for the duration of the administration. ISO
Similar to the position in English law, the moratorium affects unsecured and secured
creditors and the owners or lessors of property being used by or in possession of the
company. In general, the moratorium purports to stay all.z_4:gfllJmd enforcement
proceedings against the company. A person would, however be able to escape the
179 Corporations Law, s 440D.
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effects of the moratorium, either with the written permission of the administrator or
with leave from the court. The court may impose such restrictions, as it deems fit,
when it grants leave to a person to escape from the effect ofthe moratorium.i'"
3 4 I 3 I The general effect of the moratorium
The moratorium prevents the company from being wound up whilst under
administration. The company cannot be wound up voluntarily and where an
application has been made for the winding-up of the company, the court will adjourn
the hearing of the application for winding-up if the court is satisfied that the
continuation of administration, rather than winding-up is in the interests of the
company's creditors.!"
Similarly the court will not appoint a provisional liquidator where it is satisfied that it
,I is in the interests of the company's creditors for the company to continue under
administration.Y' Any application to wind-up the company under administration is
deemed to be a pending suit while the company is under administration.!"
Another important element of the moratorium is the stay of proceedings against the
company or its property!" and the suspension of any enforcement process in relation
to the company's property.!"
"Proceedings" in this context must be restrictively interpreted as the prohibition refers
expressly to court proceedings. Other proceedings for example the revocation of a
license without resort to the court, as happened in the Air Ecosse Ltd case'" would
therefore clearly fall outside the moratorium. The Act further specifically excludes
criminal and prescribed proceedings against the company or its property.l'" The
reason why criminal proceedings are allowed to go ahead is perfectly clear. It would
be against public policy for a company to be able to stay criminal proceedings against
itself by appointing an administrator. Regarding prescribed proceedings it seems that
180 For a general discussion see Lessing & Corkery Corporate Insolvency Law 79 - 83; Tomasic
Australian Corporate Insolvency Law 147 - 151 and Brown Corporate Rescue 799 - 805.
181 See Lessing & Corkery Corporate Insolvency Law 79.
182 Corporations Law, s 440A(1) and (2). See Crutchfield Corporate Voluntary Administration Law
106.
183 Corporations Law, s 440A(3).
184 Corporations Law, s 440H.
185 Corporations Law, s 440D.
186 Corporations Law, s 440F.
187 [1987] 3 BCC 492.
188 Corporations Law, s 440D(2). In general see also Tomasic Australian Corporate Insolvency Law
147.
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the legislature also had public policy considerations in mind. The Explanatory
Memorandum to the 1992 Reform Act189 refers to an action to prevent imminent
environmental damage as a possible example of prescribed proceedings.i'"
The moratorium on court proceedings can only be overcome with the written consent
of the administrator or with leave from the court.!" The moratorium on enforcement
processes, however, may only be lifted by the court on such conditions as it may
impose.192 It is somewhat strange that the administrator cannot consent to the lifting
of the moratorium in this case as well.
The administrator is further protected against any claim for damages resulting from a
refusal by him to grant permission for the lifting of the stay of legal proceedings.!"
As stated above, no enforcement process'" may be commenced or proceeded with
except with the leave of the court on such terms as it may impose. Where a court
officer such as a sheriff or a registrar receives written notice of the administration, he
cannot proceed and sell any property of the company in a process of execution or pay
any monetary proceeds from such an action to anyone other than the administrator.!"
The court officer must also return all property of the company that is in his possession
under a process of execution.l'" Where someone bought the property in good faith
when it was sold in execution in contravention of the above provisions he will
nevertheless become and remain the owner with good title against the administrator.!"
As in the English statute "property" is statutorily defined, and means "any legal or
equitable estate or interest (whether present or future and whether vested or
189 Para 521.
190 Crutchfield Corporate Voluntary Administration Law 111 states that no proceedings have yet been
~rescribed under Corporations Law s 440D(2)(b).
91 Corporations Law, s 440D(1). In Foxcroft v The Ink Group Pty Ltd (1994) 15 ACSR 203 a former
employee was not granted leave by the court to continue with proceedings for reinstatement or
compensatory or exemplary damages against the company in administration in the Industrial Relations
Court. The proceedings were commenced before the commencement of administration and were fixed
to be heard after the administrator was appointed. See also Crutchfield Corporate Voluntary
Administration Law 111.
192 Corporations Law, s 440F.
193 Corporations Law, s 440E.
194 Defined by s 9 of Corporations Law as execution against any property, or any other enforcement
process in relation to that property that involves a court or a sheriff.
195 Corporations Law, s 440G(I), (2) and (4). The costs of the execution are deemed to be a first charge
on the property or money delivered by the Court officer to the administrator. That means that the court
officer may retain part of the proceeds of a sale to cover costs of the execution or attachment.
196 Corporations Law, s 440G(3).
197 Corporations Law, s 440G(8).
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contingent) in real or personal property of any description and includes a thing in
action." 198
The moratorium does not prevent the creditor from taking those steps that do not
involve the court, such as giving notice of the acceptance of repudiation of a contract
on the strength of non-compliance with its terms by the company under
administration.
The moratorium might seem severe from a creditor's perspective. However there are
clear exceptions to the moratorium. As in the case of the English law and unlike the
South African law it is the secured creditor that is exempted from the strict application
of the moratorium, as appears from the discussion below.
3 4 1 3 2 The effect on secured creditors
In general the moratorium also affects the rights of secured creditors.i'" During
administration a person cannot enforce a charge on property of the company unless
the administrator gives his written consent or the court grants leave_2°oHowever there
are three important exceptions:
First, the holder of a charge over all or a substantial part of the property of the
company may enforce his charge and appoint a receiver to control the property under
the charge or enter into possession of the property of the company. Such a creditor
may do so at any time before the appointment of the administrator and within a period
often business days after the appointment of the administrator.?"
The Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Reform Act202 states the reason for this
exception is that a person who has security over the whole, or substantially the whole,
of the property of the company deserves special consideration when solvency
problems need to be resolved.
198 Corporations Law, s 9.
199 Lessing & Corkery Corporate Insolvency Law 99 are of the opinion that the moratorium can also
work to the advantage of secured creditors in certain circumstances. The moratorium prevents the
repossession of goods to which retention of title clauses apply. This ensures that the company can
continue with its business. In comparison a company in receivership would not be able to stop
repossession of similar goods, which would cripple the business. For a secured creditor with a fixed or
floating charge the continuation of the business may be helpful.
200 Corporations Law, s 440B.
201 Corporations Law, s 441A read with the definition of "decision period" in s 9 as ten business days.
See also Lessing & Corkery Corporate Insolvency Law 80.
202 Para 532 and 533.
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Secondly, creditors, who have enforced other charges (other than the one referred to
in the first exception), before the beginning of administration are not subject to the
moratorium. However the court may on application of the administrator order the
chargee not to perform certain functions or exercise specified powers except to the
extent that the court permits.?" The court may only make such order if it is satisfied
that what the administrator proposes to do during administration will "adequately
protect'?" the chargee's interest.
Thirdly, creditors who have charges over perishable property are not affected by the
moratorium and may act on those charges.?" This exception is also subject to
restriction by the court on application of the administrator to the same extent as the
second exception mentioned above. The reason for this provision is quite clear. In the
case of perishable property any delay would severely affect the value of the charge.ê"
However, there is no statutory definition of "perishable property" which may cause
difficulties in the application of this section in practice.
Creditors secured by a personal guarantee from the directors for the debts of the
company are also affected. Any action on a guarantee given by a director that will
become enforceable on the appointment of an administrator is also stayed."? The term
"guarantee" has a wide interpretation. It includes any agreement whereby a director or
relative incurred or may incur a liability in respect of a debt, liability or other
obligation of the company.i'"
The Explanatory Memorandum explains that directors who are subject to such
guarantees will be discouraged from appointing an administrator to the company if,
on appointment, the guarantee would immediately become enforceable. A creditor
can, however, apply to the court for leave to enforce the guarantee.
3 4 1 3 3 The effect on owners and lessors of property
The moratorium also applies to the owner or lessor of property that is used or
occupied by or in the possession of the company. The owner or lessor may not, during
203 Corporations Law, s 441B and D.
204 Corporations Law, s 441D(3). This concept is not defined and it is left to the court to decide what
constitutes adequate protection.
205 Corporations Law, s 441G.
206 "[I]t is hard to conceive of a situation where the retention of title claims will apply to perishable
property" (Mansueto "Retention of Title claims in the context of Voluntary Administration" 1996
Company and Securities Law Journal Vol 14 36 at 41).
207 Corporations Law, s 440J.
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administration, take possession of the property or otherwise recover it, unless the
administrator gives his written consent or the lessor or owner obtains leave from the
court to do SO.209
Subject to these two exceptions, the moratorium prevents suppliers from repossessing
their property. However it does not prevent an owner or lessor from giving relevant
notices during the administration to the company under administration. This would
allow all contractual steps to be taken so that when administration is lifted, the owner
would be able to repossess the property immediately.
It should however be noticed that the administrator has a personal liability for the rent
of property in the possession or occupancy of the company unless the court otherwise
directs. This liability commences from the eighth day of the administration if the
company stays in possession or occupation of the property.?"
Where, before the commencement of administration, the owner or lessor entered into
possession, assumed control of the property, or exercised any other power in relation
to the property for the purpose of enforcing a right as owner or lessor, the continuance
of that action will not be affected by the moratorium.i" Thus by way of explanation, if
the applicant in Western Bank v Laurie Fossati Plant Hire (under judicial
212 .management) cancelled the lease agreement before the company was put under
administration, the repossession of the road-making equipment pursuant to the
cancellation would have proceeded uninterrupted by the administration.
In these circumstances the court may however, on application from the administrator,
restrict the owner or lessor from performing certain functions or exercising specified
powers in relation to the property. The court must however be satisfied that the owner
or lessor will be adequately protected by the proposals of the administrator.i" Thus,
again by way of explanation, if the applicant in Western Bank v Laurie Fossati took
steps to cancel the lease and repossess the road-making equipment before the
company was placed in administration, the administrator may after his appointment
apply to the court to stop the repossession. The administrator must, however, satisfy
208 Corporations Law, s 440J(4) read with the definition of "relevant agreement" in s 9.
209 Corporations Law, s 440C.
210 Corporations Law, s 443B(I), (2) and (8). See also s 443A regarding the personal liability of the
administrator.
211 Corporations Law, s 441F.
212 See 3 4 I 14 n 151 for the facts of the case.
213 Corporations Law, s 441H.
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the court that Western Bank will be adequately protected. The administrator may for
instance offer Western Bank security over some asset or set aside certain income for
the specific purpose of paying Western Bank_214
3 4 1 3 4 Exercise of the court's discretion to grant exemption from the moratorium
The court in Australia has in general been reluctant to use its power to grant
exemption from the moratorium. In Foxcroft v The Ink Group Pty Ltd'" the judge
remarked:
"To allow one creditor or potential creditor to proceed would not only take the
administrator's attention from what he needs to do under the division in a
relatively short period of time, but it would also involve cost in running the
legal action on behalf of the administration, as well as perhaps giving the
claimant some advantage over the other creditors or potential creditors. ,,216
Not only has the court been reluctant to grant exemption from the moratorium in cases
where a creditor wanted to institute action against the company, but it has also been
reluctant to give leave to a creditor who sought to repossess his property pursuant to a
retention of title clause. The court generally refuses leave to repossess goods until the
creditors have had time to vote on the proposed deed of company arrangement at least
in cases where the administrator takes care to arrange the business in such a way that
the owner of the goods is adequately protected. In Osborne Computer Corporation
Pty Ltd v Riddell" the administrator wanted to continue manufacturing which
involved including in the end product goods belonging to a creditor under a retention
of title clause. The administrator undertook to keep the proceeds of the eventual sale
separate from other assets for the purpose of paying the debts of the creditor owner.
The creditor sought leave to repossess. The court refused saying that it was the
purpose of voluntary administration to promote the continuance of the company's
business and furthermore the creditor's interest was protected to the satisfaction of the
COurt.218
214 See also para 543 of the Explanatory memorandum of the Reform Act 1992.
215 (1994) 12 ACLC 1063.
216 At 1065. See also Crutchfield Corporate Voluntary Administration Law 111.
217 (1995) 17 ACSR 606.
218 For a full discussion of the effect of voluntary administration on the position of creditors with
retention of title clauses see Mansueto 1996 Company and Securities Law Journal 36. Note that the
situation changes when the deed of company arrangement is executed and that administrators need to
take this seriously as they may find themselves personally liable if they refuse repossession without
good cause once the deed of company arrangement has been executed.
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3 4 1 4 Evaluation
The moratorium granted to the company under administration is undoubtedly the most
important instrument in making any business rescue scheme possible. It aims to
preserve the assets of the company and to suspend the rights of the creditors to
enforce their claims, providing the necessary breathing space for the debtor company
and its creditors to reorganise their rights and interests. In the moratorium period the
law should strive to balance the rights, duties and obligations of the various interested
parties.
The importance of the moratorium is illustrated by the lack of use of the company
voluntary arrangement?" in England, the counterpart of the far more popular
individual voluntary arrangemenr'" in the same country. The Insolvency Service?"
regards the lack of a moratorium as one of the important shortcomings of the
~..~J
company voluntary arrangement.222
However the effectiveness of the moratorium granted by the Australian system seems
to be considerably diluted by the exceptions.r''' The best way to go about the
procedure would be to give a blanket moratorium with no general exceptions to either
secured or unsecured creditors, but to move the process along to a speedy conclusion.
Any exceptions to the moratorium should be agreed to by the administrator/judicial
manager or upon his refusal should be sought from the court by application.
The success of the business rescue mechanism depends on the one hand upon the
application of the moratorium without exceptions and on the other hand upon the
limitation of possible damage that might accrue to creditors who are delayed in the
enforcement of their claims. The shorter the period of the moratorium the better the
chances of limiting possible damage that may accrue to the creditors.
In this regard the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong224 initially favoured a finite
availability of the moratorium, for a maximum period of six months. However, the
commission ultimately decided not to recommend a limit of six months to the
219 The company voluntary arrangement is an alternative business rescue procedure governed by part I
of the Insolvency Act of 1986.
220 Governed by Part VIII of the Insolvency Act of 1986 and available to both individual business
debtors and individual consumer debtors. S 252 of the Insolvency Act 1986 extends a moratorium to
the individual debtor.
221 Consultative Document (1993) supra. See also Brown Corporate Rescue 653.
222 See also the same criticism from Brown Corporate Rescue 653.
223 See the discussion in 3 4 1 3 supra.
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moratorium. It was feared that such an approach would lead to a situation where a
success in the business rescue could be imminent, but is then prevented by the expiry
of the six month time-limit. It would mean that all the hard work of the previous six
months would be futile just when it was about to achieve its object.
Instead, the commission proposed an initial moratorium of 30 days which, based on
the Canadian example.i" could be extended by the court on good cause shown for
further periods of 30 days each. The court's powers to extend will expire after six
months and any further extensions must be approved by the creditors in a creditors'
meeting. This approach of limiting the duration of the moratorium is in keeping with
the Australian example, which strives to limit the period of administration to a period
of not more than four months.
The limitation of the period that the moratorium is in force is an important factor in
the South African context. A short duration for the moratorium will be necessary to
win the trust of creditors and to safeguard their interests. This is especially important
because secured creditors in South Africa do not have the option of appointing a
receiver and thus do not have the chance to opt out of judicial management. In
contrast, the Australian or English creditor who respectively holds a charge or a
floating charge over the whole or substantially the whole of the property of the
company does have the option of opting out of administration.
The possibility of abusing of the moratorium needs to be considered as well. The
repeated use of the moratorium could be prevented by a stipulation in the Act
prohibiting the application of the moratorium if it has been used by the company
concerned in the preceding twelve months. The abuse of the moratorium to delay
enforcement measures or to defraud creditors could be countered by making directors
personally liable for damages wrongfully caused by the delay.
Itwould also be useful to require the directors to lodge an affidavit together with their
written resolution with the master when they place the company ~ judicial
management. In the affidavit they should at least state the reasons why the company is
in the position where it needs to be placed in judicial management and the purposes
for which it is placed in judicial management. This would ensure better information
224 Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading (1996) 34-35 para 5.7 - 5.16.
225 See Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act 1985, s Il.
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from the start and untruthful statements could activate the disqualification provisions
of the Companies Act. 226
3 4 1 4 1 The general effect of the moratorium
It is notable that judicial management does not grant an automatic stay of enforcement
proceedings but leaves it up to the court to determine its applicability and its extent. It
is submitted that the moratorium should be dealt with in detail in the legislation, for
two reasons. First, detailed treatment promotes legal certainty for members of the
business community. Secondly, commencement without a court order is proposed so
it cannot simply be left to the court to regulate the moratorium in its order.
In the first place, the moratorium provided by judicial management should normally
prevent any winding-up proceedings from continuing or being instituted. A company
should therefore not be able to take any steps for its voluntary winding-up while it is
under judicial management. It might be advisable however to have an exception by
allowing a creditor to proceed with the initial steps for a winding-up which would in
the end save some time when the judicial management order is discharged. This will
balance interests in so far a creditor loses less time should the judicial management
fail to achieve its purpose.
It is understood that the practice in the Western Cape227 is that nearly all applications
for a provisional winding-up of a company are heard by the court within a day or two
of the filing of the petition. This amounts to treating such applications as urgent. If the
application is defended, it is then set down for a date some three to four months in the
future.
The practice in the courts of Gauteng, however, is somewhat different. There the
applicant for the winding-up of a company has to make out a strong case for urgency
before the court will hear the application on the same short notice as the courts in the
Western Cape. In the Gauteng courts it may take up to six weeks for a defended
winding-up application to be heard by the court. However, thereafter the procedure is
much faster that the procedure in the Western Cape.
The moratorium should have the consequence that once judicial management has
commenced an application for the winding-up of a company should not be treated as
226 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 218.
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urgent. The creditor should, however, be allowed to proceed in such a manner that
upon judicial management being unsuccessful and terminated, he should be able to
enforce his rights with minimum delay. As such the detrimental effect of the
moratorium on the rights of creditors will be limited.
If legislation provides for such a course its only function may be a symbolic
appeasement of creditors, because judicial management should in any event provide
for a transition from judicial management to a creditors' voluntary winding-up. This
would then offset the time lost in intiating the winding-up of a company in the event
of judicial management being unsuccessful.
Allowing a creditor to take some steps towards the winding-up of the company should
naturally not jeopardise the chances of success of the judicial management. The
legislation could therefore provide that the application for the winding-up should not
be published in any way.
Secondly, the moratorium should entail that no enforcement proceedings against the
company or its property are possible. Without such a provision there would in effect
be no moratorium. The court and the judicial manager should have the power to give
leave to continue with proceedings. The continiuation of the proceedings may be
required in certain circumstances, for example where concerns regarding the outcome
of a pending court case were the reason for the company being placed under judicial
management.
Proceedings of a criminal nature should as a matter of public policy not be stayed by
the commencement of judicial management. This reduces the danger of abuse of
judicial management.
Initially, at least, it does not appear to be necessary to provide that proceedings similar
to the prescribed proceedings of the Australian voluntary administration procedure
should escape the moratorium.F" The courts would be able to deal with these
situations under their discretionary power to give leave to sue a company under
judicial management. If this approach does not work satisfactorily in practice, the
legislature can easily amend the procedure at a later stage to provide for the exclusion
of specified proceedings from the moratorium.
227 The information about the practice in the Western Cape and Gauteng was obtained from an
interview with an attorney Robert Brieout of a prominent legal firm, Hofmeyers.
228 See the text at 3 4 1 3 1 n 190 supra.
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Thirdly, the limitation on the rights of creditors should at least mean that the
completion of prescription be delayed for the duration of the moratorium. This would
be contrary to the decision in Union Goldfields (Ltd) 229 which was decided before the
present Prescription Act 230 It is submitted that under the present law judicial
management would be seen as "any order of court" delaying the completion of
prescription where the creditor is prevented by a court order from instituting court
proceedings to interrupt the running of prescription.P' If as suggested however,
judicial management commences with a resolution by the company or its directors
then the effect on the running of prescription is at best uncertain. It is submitted that
judicial management can hardly be regarded as an order of court preventing the
creditor from interrupting the running of prescription when judicial management
commences with a resolution of the company or its directors. It would be desirable to
,
clarify the position in legislation. It should also be made clear that set-off should still
be allowed to operate even though the company is under judicial management.V'
Fourthly, the variation or termination of contracts should also be considered. It is to
be expected that upon the implementation of a new judicial management procedure,
future contracts with companies will continue to provide for their termination should
the company go into judicial management. This reflects the current position. The
question is whether the moratorium should extend to the point where contracts may
not be terminated or varied because of the company being placed in judicial
management. On the one hand, the termination of contracts could, in certain
circumstances, lead to the purpose of judicial management being thwarted. If a
franchise agreement were to end in the event of the franchise holder, if a company,
being placed under judicial management, there would be little sense in placing that
company under judicial management. On the other hand, anomalies might arise if
contracts should remain unchanged. For instance, should a bank not be able to cancel
the unused portion of an agreed overdraft facility?
The solution to this lies in giving the judicial manager an election whether or not to
continue with contracts that have variation or termination clauses when the company
229 See 3 4 I I 3 supra.
230 Act 68 of 1969 which replaced the Prescription Act 18 of 1943.
231 Prescription Act 68 of 1969 s 13(l)(a). See also Meskin Henochsberg /932; LAWSA IV part 3 472
at n19.
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is placed under judicial management. Should the judicial manager elect to continue,
the "fresh debts" should either be an expense of the judicial management or should
have a preference upon liquidation. For example, a company could have been granted
an overdraft facility before it was placed under judicial management. If the company
is placed under judicial management before the overdraft facility has been used to its
maximum and the judicial manager elects to make use of the full overdraft facility,
the previously unused portion of the overdraft facility would have a preference.
Fifthly, the Canadian law makes provision for "eligible financial contracts" to be
exempted from the moratorium.?" These contracts occur in certain closed markets.
The imposition of a moratorium on such contracts would result in the unravelling of
numerous other contracts that could cause severe disruption in those markets.
Transactions on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and related markets are examples
of such contracts. Contracts envisaged by the Canadian legislature include futures,
derivatives and forward foreign exchange agreements.i" The moratorium should in no
way restrict their operation or the possibility of proceedings to enforce the rights
flowing from these contracts. In such a case the judicial manager or his counterpart
would have to allow those contracts to continue until their stipulated termination date
and then to accept their "net termination value" (the final outcome, whether a gain or
a loss) at the end of the period. Such a procedure is worth considering. It would not
cause much disruption of judicial management in general as such contracts will not be
encountered all that often in judicial management.
In the sixth place, the state and the tax authorities should also be bound by the
moratorium and by the eventual plan of future conduct. This is in keeping with the
decision in Namex (Edms) Bpk v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste'" where the
232 This is the present position in South Africa. See Transkei Development Corporation Ltd v Oshkosh
Africa (Pty) Ltd 1986 1 SA 150 (C) 153-155. Ruskin NO v Amalgamated Minerals Ltd 1951 1 PH E15
W; re Trans-African Insurance Co Ltd 1958 4 SA 324 (W).
233 Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act 1985, s 11.1(1).
234 The Canadian legislation lists the following: a currency or interest rate swap agreement; a basis
swap agreement; a spot, future, forward or other foreign exchange agreement; a cap, collar or floor
transaction; a commodity swap; a forward rate agreement; a repurchase or reverse repurchase
agreement; a spot, future, forward or other commodity agreement; an agreement to buy, sell, borrow or
lend securities, to clear or settle securities transactions or to act as a depository for securities; any
derivative, combination or option in respect of, or agreement similar to a currency or interest rate swap
agreement; any master agreement in respect of any of the above agreements or contracts; a guarantee of
the liabilities under any of the above agreements; or any prescribed agreement. See the Companies'
Creditors Arrangement Act 1985, s 11.1(1). See Brown Corporate Rescue 516-526 for the treatment of
similar contracts in England.
235 19942 SA 265 (A) 286A-E.
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court decided that the tax authorities are also bound by a section 311 scheme of
arrangement.
3 4 1 4 2 The effect on secured creditors
_.r
A much criticised aspect of the English and Australian business rescue procedures is
that they notably favour secured creditors over unsecured creditors, especially those
secured creditors entitled to appoint a receiver.236 The Australian measure allows the
secured creditor the opportunity to appoint a receiver for ten business days after the
decision to appoint the administrator. The English measure entitles the relevant
creditor to make the appointment at any time prior to the granting of the
administration order. In both instances the receiver, once appointed, gets preference
over the administrator. It gives a de facto veto right to the creditor entitled to appoint
a receiver and it enables the big lending institutions to protect their interests.237 They
would have no problem in accepting the administration regime if they still have a veto
right on its implementation.
However, the South African secured creditor has no option comparable to the
appointment of a receiver. There is no doubt that the secured creditors should also be
restrained by the moratorium. As secured creditors in South Africa never had the
remedy of receivership, no exception from the moratorium on the same grounds as in
Australian or English law is required. However to limit the adverse effect of the
moratorium on secured creditors it is suggested that the process of judicial
management leading to the acceptance of a plan of future conduct should be as swift
as possible. When a plan of future conduct is accepted judicial management will cease
and the company will be managed according to the plan of future conduct. The
discharge of judicial management will free the secured creditor from the moratorium.
Naturally, one would expect that the secured creditors will be consulted on the
composition of a plan of future conduct and if they give their approval to the
formulated plan, they should be bound by it. Thus a secured creditor will be free to act
upon his security immediately after the termination of judicial management to the
extent that he is not curtailed by the plan of future conduct.
236 Brown Corporate Rescue 656, 801; Lessing & Corkery Corporate Insolvency Law 99; Goode
Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 337; Fletcher Law of Insolvency 479 and Grier & Floyd
Corporate Recovery 213.
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If the period of the moratorium is limited in order to expedite the judicial management
process, the moratorium will not affect the secured creditors' position very much.
Their position would be even less affected if they are allowed to take all preparatory
steps for enforcing their security during judicial management. Such steps would
include the issuing and serving of a summons and the pleadings stage. But
enforcement of the security should be stayed in that the court should not be allowed to
make a judgment. In that way the secured creditors would lose less time once the
period of the moratorium has expired on the termination of an unsuccessful judicial
management process. The secured creditors should be able to place themselves in a
position enabling them to obtain judgment with minimum delay once the moratorium
is lifted.
3 4 1 4 3 The effect on owners and lessors of property
Owners and lessors of property should be bound by the moratorium and prevented
from repossessing property used or occupied by the company or in the company's
possession. This would of course be subject to the contractual remedies such as set-off
and combination of accounts.238 If the owner or lessor of property seeks a remedy
enforceable in a court of law such as an order for eviction the owner or lessor must
seek consent from the judicial manager or the COurt.239Thus the lessor would be able
to give notice of acceptance of repudiation of a contract. What should not be possible
is for the company to be able to use the property of the owner or lessor without due
performance on behalf of the company. Once again this problem can be overcome by
giving the judicial manager an election similar to the liquidator or provisional
liquidator and for the "fresh debts" to have a preference over pre-judicial management
debts and treated as part of the costs of judicial management. For example it would
result in the protection of post judicial management rental. The rentals in arrears
would be governed by the plan of future conduct.
3 4 1 4 4 The discretion to grant exemption from moratorium
The judicial manager should have the power to consent to the exemption of a creditor
from the moratorium and if he refuses, the creditor, owner or lessor should be able to
237 The Cork Report in para 437-439 on 105 notes that an important criticism against receivers is that
they do not have a lot of concern for the interests of creditors other than the creditor who appointed
them.
238 CjCrutchfield Corporate Voluntary Administration Law 109.
239 See 3 4 1 4 4 infra.
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approach the court. It is a fundamental principle that any creditor, owner or lessor
should be able to seek redress from the court if the judicial manager does not consent
to an exemption from the moratorium.
The court in Atiantic240 has shown that judicial precedent can be very helpful in these
circumstances. However, litigation in the High Court is always excessively expensive,
more so where the company is under judicial management.
There are other possibilities for resolving this kind of dispute. It could be left to the
High Court to formulate suitable principles or conditions when it will exercise its
discretion to lift the moratorium. Judicial managers would be well advised to heed
those principles and conditions.i'" Another possibility would be to follow the example
of the Income Tax Act in creating a special tribunal or a special court where the
parties pay their own costs, appear in person and accept the ruling of the special court.
If they appeal to the High Court the loser will be faced by a costs order.
Such special courts would follow the example of the bankruptcy courts in the United
States. The expertise in the field of insolvency built up by these courts would be an
asset for the business environment as a whole. Such a special court would have the
advantage of the appointment of persons specially suited for this role. However, it
might not be practical to implement it on a national scale as it might prove to be a
costly exercise. This solution is therefore unlikely to be affordable given the demands
currently made on the budget of the Department of Justice.
Another possibility would be to allow the Master to issue policy statements as to
when, in his opinion, judicial managers should grant exemption from the moratorium
and to allow for an application for leave to be heard by the Master himself. In such a
way a body of practical solutions will become available quite quickly. Guidelines
when it will be appropriate for the judicial manager to exercise his discretion to lift
the moratorium could also be laid down in the Act or regulations to the Act.
Another possibility would be the availability of arbitration upon the judicial manager
refusing consent to the lifting of the moratorium and the creditor, owner or lessor not
being satisfied. In such a case the powers of the judicial manager should expressly
include the power to consent to arbitration. Unless the parties agree on an arbitrator,
240 See the discussion at 3 4 1 2 4 supra.
241 Judicial managers run the risk of a de bonis propriis costs order if they do not follow the principles
laid down by the court.
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the arbitrator should be appointed by the Master and both parties should consent to the
arbitrator's decision being final. However, arbitration also often involves high costs
and thus such a procedure would not necessarily add economic benefits to the
corporate rescue procedure.
It is therefore submitted that the judicial manager should in the appropriate
circumstances be able to consent to exemption from the moratorium always upon the
written application of a creditor, owner or lessor. If the judicial manager refuses the
application, the creditor should be free to seek relief from the court. However the
judicial manager should have the power to refer such a matter to arbitration as this
might it some cases be beneficial to the corporate rescue procedure. The Master
should also be required by legislation to give guidelines to judicial managers. The
guidelines of the Master should, however, not bind the judicial managers in the
exercise of their discretion.
If such an approach is followed there would be no need for exceptions to the
moratorium akin to the Australian charge on perishable products242 or the "significant
financial hardship" exception proposed by the Law Reform Commission of Hong
Kong.243
3 4 1 5 Draft legislation to give effect to the proposals
Section 2244 (Effect of judicial management)
(1) While the company is under judicial management all actions, proceedings the
execution of all writs, summonses and other processes against the company are stayed
and must not be proceeded with without the written consent of the judicial manager,
or without the leave of the Court and on such terms and conditions as the Court may
Impose.
(2) Other processes in subsection (1) include the repossession without court
intervention of or other steps by the owner or lessor of property to take control of
property used by, in possession of or occupied by the company.
242 See 3 4 1 3 2 n 205 supra.
243 Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent trading (1996) 40 para 5.36. "If the court was satisfied
that the moratorium was causing significant financial hardship to the creditor, the court could exempt
that creditor from the moratorium... we cannot justify a company finding sanctuary in [judicial
management] that would result in significant hardship to another person or business and may even put
that business in jeopardy."
244 Based on Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 428 (2) and Corporations Law s 440C.
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(3) Nothing in subsection (1) requires the leave of the court for the initial steps to
bring an application for the winding-up of the company or the initial steps to obtain a
judgment to enforce a security over the property of the company.
(4) Subject to subsection (5), if a contract to which the company is a party contains a
clause that purports to vary the terms of the contract or to terminate the contract upon
the company being placed under judicial management, such. clause has no effect on
the commencement of judicial management.
(5) The judicial manager has an election to continue with a contract referred to in
subsection (4) without the clause becoming operative or to accept the variation or
termination of the contract, provided that if the judicial manager elects to continue
with the contract without the clause becoming operative the further obligations
flowing from that contract must be complied with and must be treated as part of the
costs of judicial management.
(6) Subsection (1) does not apply to prescribed financial contracts.t"
(7) The Master must issue guidelines to judicial managers how to exercise their
discretion in subsection (1).246
3 4 2 Directors and company officials
The placing of a company under judicial management is bound to affect the directors
of the company, as the persons responsible for its management. This is particularly so
in jurisdictions that are pro-creditor in their approach to insolvency matters.
3 4 2 1 Judicial management (South Africa)
Under South African law the directors are, as is to be expected, divested of their
powers from the date of the provisional order for judicial management and the
company is placed under the management of the provisional judicial manager. The
legislation is quite clear on this point: it provides that the provisional judicial
management order shall contain directions that the company is henceforth under the
management of a provisional judicial manager and that all those vested with
management powers are divested of those powers_247 The provisional manager
245 For a definition of prescribed financial contracts see section 0 in the annexure.
246 Alternatively basic guidelines could be provided in the statute and the Master must then issue
sUfplementary guidelines.
24 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 428(2)(a).
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operates under the supervision of the COurt.248 This position is confirmed when the
final judicial management order is made?"
In Alpha Bank v Registrateur van Banke'" it was decided that the management
powers of the company are transferred to the judicial manager'" and no residual
management powers or powers of control remain with the directors.
There is no express provision that the directors will also be removed from their office
of directors. However it is provided that in cancelling a judicial management order the
court must, among other things, give directions "for the convening of a general
meeting of members for the purpose of electing directors of the company". This
suggests that the directors cease to hold office when a final judicial management order•is made.252This is unfortunate as it leaves the directors with less reason to cooperate
towards effecting a successful rescue and without any continuing fiduciary duty
towards the company.
The position on provisional judicial management is however uncertain. It is submitted
that directors do not lose office when a provisional judicial management order is
made. In this case section 432 is applicable to the discharge of the provisional judicial
management order253and the section does not contain a similar provision for the court
to give directions for the election of directors.
3 4 2 2 Administration (England)
Under English law the creditors are faced with a moratorium on enforcing their rights
from the moment of presentation of the petition for an administration order to the
COurt_254However, there are no restrictions on the directors until the administration
order is actually granted by the court. The directors continue to exercise their
powers255 and may dispose of the company's property by selling, leasing, mortgaging
or charging it or by dealing with it in any other way.?" In this respect the English law
248 The court that made the provisional order is the court with jurisdiction. See Ex Parte Pan-African
Tanneries Ltd (Under Judicial Management) 1950 4 SA 321 (0).
249 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 432(3)(a).
2501996 I SA 330 (A) 352.
251 The case dealt with the appointment of a curator of a bank, but on this point there is no material
distinction between a curator of the bank and a judicial manager of a company.
252 Meskin Henochsberg 1957.
253 Meskin Henochsberg I 957.
254 Insolvency Act 1986, s 1O(I), see also the discussion at 3 4 1 2 4.
255 Goode Principles of Corpor ate Insolvency Law (1997) 290.
256 Compare the Insolvency Act 1986, s 10 and s 14. It is exactly this feature which has made a
presentation to the court for an administration order a valuable tool to buy time to enter into some
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differs from the South African law because the English law does not provide for a
provisional order.
Once the order is made and an administrator is appointed the power to manage the
company's affairs, business and property rests with the administrator.t" Any other
powers conferred on the company or its officers in terms of the company's
constitution or the Companies Act which could be exercised in such a way as to
interfere with the administrator's powers are not exercisable without the
administrator's consent. 258
The directors still hold office, although the administrator may remove any director
and may appoint new directors."? They cannot exercise any of their powers to deal
with company assets. However, they must still exercise their statutory duties. The
directors may without the consent of the administrator exercise powers conferred on
them that cannot be exercised in such a way as to interfere with administrator
exercising his powers. The directors may, for example, call and hold meetings, such
as the annual general meeting, and they are still responsible for the filing of proper
financial statements.i'"
3423 Voluntary administration (Australia)
The Australian law makes more provision for the co-operation between the directors
and the administrator than South African and English law. This is perhaps no surprise
considering that voluntary administration commences with a resolution by the
directors. Although voluntary administration may commence by other methods they
are less common.i'"
The powers of the directors and company officers are suspended for the duration of
administration and the administrator is able to exercise all the powers previously
arrangement with creditors. This was not possible before because once the company started to seek an
arrangement it led to a uncontrollable situation where creditors moved in to be first to secure a benefit
for themselves. Millman & Durrant Corporate Insolvency: Law and Practice 2nd ed 47.
257Insolvency Act 1986, s 14(1)(a). This divesting of the directors of their management powers is
criticised. It contrasts with the Chapter Il model which leaves the "debtor-in-possession". The
directors thus remains in control of day to day management.
258lnsolvency Act 1986, s 14(4).
259Insolvency Act 1986, s 14(2)(a). When read with s 14(4) it also means that the company's power to
remove directors by resolution ceases. Where the director has a service contract the contract determines
the conditions of employment. Consequently removal of such director may expose the company to a
claim for damages for a breach of contract. Brown Corporate Rescue 365 - 366.
260Brown Corporate Rescue 370 - 371.
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exercisable by them. Company officers include directors, a receiver, a receiver and
manager and the liquidator. They will only be able to exercise any of their pre-
administration powers with written permission from the administrator.i"
The power to deal with the property of the company is expressly conferred on the
administrator. 263If the directors purport to deal with the property the transaction is
void,264 the directors are guilty of an offence and they may be liable to pay
compensation.t"
The administrator furthermore, has the power to remove a director of the company
from office and to appoint a person as director.ê" In practice the administrator would
try to distance himself from day to day control of the business. He would most
probably refrain from taking "shop floor" decisions in a business in relation to which
he has no general expertise. The day to day control of the business would usually be
handed back to the directors now acting under the supervision of the administrator.
However the administrator may decide to hand the control to a particular director or
group of directors, especially where his investigations show that the involvement of
certain directors led to the company's financial troubles. In larger companies the
administrator would often need to establish new or reaffirm old lines of authority.?"
The outcome of administration relies on the continued cooperation of directors in
providing necessary information to the administrator. This includes the current
financial information of the company as well as personal financial information of the
directors. The quality of this information will often help to win the confidence of the
creditors who must eventually approve the deed of company arrangement. The loss of
power by the directors does not make them passive participants in the administration.
It is the directors who appoint the administrator and this leaves the possibility that he
may be manipulated by the directors. To prevent the directors from manipulating the
administrator, the legislation makes provision that once an appointment of the
administrator has been made it cannot be revoked.ê"
261Lessing & Corkery Corporate Insolvency Law 54 found that 92% of administrations commences
with a resolution by directors.
262Corporations Law, s 437C.
263Corporations Law, s 437D.
264Corporations Law, s 437D(2).
265Corporations Law, s 437D(5) and 437E(1).
266Corporations Law, s 442A.
267Lessing & Corkey Corporate Insolvency Law 98.
268Corporations Law, s 449A. See also Tomasic Australian Corporate Insolvency law 159.
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The directors' powers are restored upon the acceptance and execution of the deed of
company arrangement, but their powers are then defined and controlled by the deed of
company arrangement. Once the deed of company arrangement is in place and
operating the administrator will still play a role as the administrator of the deed of
company arrangement. His role will then also be defined by the deed of company
arrangement. In general, the deed of company arrangement should strive to ascribe a
mere supervisory role to the administrator. This makes his participation more
affordable by keeping costs down?"
3 4 2 4 Evaluation
From the discussion of the three jurisdictions above it is clear that the Australian
example provides and expects cooperation between the administrator and the directors
of the company. As stated above, this is not surprising given the fact that the process
is such that the company is usually placed under administration by a mere directors'
resolution. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the administrator is in full control and
that the directors play a secondary role from the commencement of voluntary
administration.
The English procedure makes prOVISIon for the necessary powers to pass to the
administrator while the directors still remain responsible for certain statutory duties.
The legislation clearly sets out the relation between the administrator and the
directors. It is clear that despite the administration order, the directors will still be in
office, may exercise certain powers, are still responsible for certain statutory duties
and carry the responsibilities accompanying the office of director such as fiduciary
duties.
This divesting of directors of their management powers has received some
criticism.i" It contrasts with the Chapter 11 model in the United States that leaves the
"debtor-in-possession", thus leaving the directors in control of the day-to-day
management. The early passing of control of the company to an outsider, albeit a
professional, leads to a stigma being attached to the company. In addition, it leads to
unnecessary costs of outside professionals, whilst the directors with inside knowledge
of the company are on the side-lines. It arguably deters directors from seeking an
early administration order as they not only lose their function and powers, but are also
269 Keay 1997 Company and Securities Law Journal vol 15 145 154.
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faced with a report on their prior conduct filed with the Department of Trade and
Industry.i"
The present South African position is even less satisfactory and the decision in Alpha
Bank is of no great help. It is now clear that the directors do not have any
management powers or other powers of control whilst the company is under judicial
management. In fact they lose office altogether when the company is placed under
final judicial management. However, there is no clarity on matters such as the
directors' common-law duties when the company is under provisional judicial
management. The purpose of judicial management is the eventual return to a
successful business and that is all the more reason why the directors should still be
obliged to comply with their duties and able to perform those functions which do not
interfere in any way with the judicial manager exercising his powers. The legislation
should make it clear that it is possible for the judicial manager to delegate some of his
management powers to the directors. It should also be made clear that the directors
are still in office and subject to their statutory and common-law duties.
There exists an anomaly in South African law between the position of directors of a
company under judicial management and their position where the company is in
liquidation. In the latter instance the position of directors is determined by whether the
winding-up of the company is voluntary or compulsory. In the case of a voluntary
winding-up by creditors, the directors' powers cease except insofar as the liquidator or
the creditors sanction their retention.?" In a voluntary winding-up by members the
powers of the directors also cease, but their continuation may be sanctioned by the
liquidator or a general meeting of members.i" In a compulsory winding-up however
"the directors cease to be directors functionally, officially and nominally and their
powers and duties cease, and they are deprived of their control of the company's
property.'?"
Surely in a judicial management which has the eventual rescue of the business as its
aim the position of the directors should be more akin to their present position in a
voluntary winding-up and not more similar to that in a compulsory winding-up. It is
270 Brown Corporate Rescue 364 and Goode Principles of Corporate insolvency Law (1997) 323.
271 Brown Corporate Rescue 364. .
272 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 353(2)(a).
273 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 353(2)(b).
274 LA WSA IV part 3 260.
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submitted that judicial management needs a structure where there is more cooperation
between the directors and the judicial manager.
The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong has concluded275 that as far as the
relationship between the judicial manager and the directors is concerned it will be
very beneficial to the judicial manager if the directors participate in a spirit of
cooperation with the judicial manager and if the relationship between the judicial
manager and the directors is clearly understood. This spirit of cooperation will usually
be facilitated where the directors appointed the judicial manager.
It is thus submitted, along the lines of the recommendations by the Law Reform
Commission of Hong Kong276 that directors should be involved in the running of the
company, but only to the extent that the judicial manager delegates powers to them,
remembering that all powers of control should now vest in the judicial manager?"
The involvement of directors has the advantage of using their knowledge of the
business and their drive and commitment to save the company. This advantage comes
without involving the costs of outsiders to do the same work. The directors often have
a vested interest in the company and they would often stand to lose much more than
anybody else does.
On the other hand it might be because of the lack of skill and experience of the
directors that the company is in its present difficulties. Then it would be up to the
judicial manager to use his envisaged powers to dismiss a director or all the directors.
The judicial manager should not only have the power to dismiss, but he should also
have the power to renegotiate the directors' remuneration, as directors. After all, they
do not have the same powers as before. It is submitted that he would be able to this in
any event if he has the power to dismiss. It is submitted further that in the case of
dismissal of a director by the judicial manager, the director should not have the
normal contractual remedy of damages for breach of contract by the company. 278
Although this would be the ideal position it is unlikely that it will be attainable under
the present labour-law regime in South Africa. Although removal from office as
275 Hong Kong Law Reform Commission Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading 54 para
8.9.
276 Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading (1996) 56.
277 See also the discussion at 4 I 4 infra.
278Nor should it be possible to use the provisions of labour law to prevent the judicial manager from
dismissing a director.
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director would present no problems any termination of employment in terms of a
service contract would have to answer to the provisions of labour law.
3 4 2 5 Draft legislation to give effect to the proposals
Section 3279
(1) While a company is under judicial management, a person (other than the judicial
manager) cannot perform or exercise, and must not purport to perform or exercise, a
function or power as an officer or director of the company, except with the written
approval of the judicial manager. 280
(2) Subsection (1) does not remove an officer or director of the company from office.
(3) The judicial manager has the power to remove any director of the company and/or
to appoint any person not disqualified in terms of the Companies Act to be a director
of it, whether to fill a vacancy or otherwise.
(4) A director removed from office in terms of subsection (3) will have not have any
claims against the company or the judicial manager because of his removal.
3 5 Proposals, deed of company arrangement and procedures
In order to rescue a business which is performing badly and to restore it to success a
new strategy needs to be devised. The responsibility to take such an initiative lies with
the directors and management of the company. If no such plan is devised and
implemented the only hope for the company is a sudden change of fortune which lies
beyond the control of anyone involved with the company. Therefore statutory
business rescue regimes normally provide the procedures for the formulation of a
rescue plan.
However, when the company has entered the business rescue procedure the
responsibility for the formulation of a business rescue plan may no longer be the
responsibility of the directors. In jurisdictions with a pro-creditor orientation towards
279 Based on Insolvency Act 1986, s 14 and Corporations Law, s 437C.
280 An alternative to subsection 1 could read:
(1) Any power conferred on the company or its directors, whether by the Companies Act or by the
memorandum or articles of association or the common law, which could be exercised in such a way as
to interfere with the exercise by the judicial manager of his powers is not exercisable except with the
written consent of the judicial manager, which may be given either generally or in relation to particular
cases.
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insolvency matters one would expect the responsibility to be transferred from those
controlling the debtor company to some person primarily concerned with looking
after the interests of creditors. The creditors would most probably play an important
role in such a process.
At the stage where the company finds itself engaged in a business rescue procedure,
the plan to lead the company to becoming a successful business or to some other goal
will need to be something more formal than a corporate business strategy formulated
by the directors, if the plan is to win the trust and support of creditors who were
denied the enforcement of their creditor rights by the commencement of the business
rescue procedure.
This part of the thesis will discuss the formulation and acceptance of such a business
rescue plan .
. ,i
3 5 1 Judicial management (South Africa)
Bearing in mind that any business in trouble needs to establish a plan or strategy to
emerge from its troubles it is surprising that the existing judicial management
procedure does not provide expressly for the formulation of a plan or blueprint for
future conduct of the company. This is in contrast with its Australian and English
counterparts. However, it is not possible for the court to make a final judicial
management order if on the return day there is nothing before the court to suggest that
the company will, if placed under judicial management, be enabled to become a
successful concern.ê" The court thus has to be satisfied that the future operations of
the company will result in it being successful. 282It is submitted that the court will
only be in a position to reach this conclusion if the provisional judicial manager gives
an indication as to how the company's future operations will be conducted_283
This implied requirement represents judicial management's comparatively nebulous
equivalent to a plan of future conduct.
The alternative subsection leaves less certainty as to the functions and powers of the directors, because
the written consent of the judicial manager will be necessary for only some of the powers and functions
that a director can exercise.
281 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 432(2).
282 See Tenowitz v Tenny Investments (Ply) Ltd supra 685H.
283 See also Meskin Henochsberg I 937.
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3 5 1 1 The process leading to the fOrmulation of a possible plan offuture conduct
The first indication that such a plan has to be formulated comes from the duties of the
provisional judicial manager. The provisional judicial manager must prepare and lay
before separate meetings'" of the creditors, members and debenture-holders a report
dealing with the following matters: an account of the general state of affairs of the
company; a statement of reasons why the company is in financial difficulties and the
reasons preventing it from becoming a successful concern; a statement of the assets
and liabilities of the company; a complete list of the creditors of the company;
particulars as to the source or sources from which money has been or is to be raised
for purposes of carrying on the business of the company; and the considered opinion
of the provisional judicial manager as to the prospects of the company becoming a
successful concern and of the removal of the facts or circumstances which prevent the
company from becoming a successful concern.?"
The provisional judicial manager must form his considered opmion on the best
information which he can reasonably obtain and then formulate some future course
for the company. If this opinion turns out to be that the provisional judicial
management order should be made final he should be able to defend it from the
searching questions of creditors, members and debenture-holders at the different
meetings. The reason for laying before the meetings an account of the general state of
affairs of the company and the statement of reasons why the company has failed is
obviously to enable the different meetings to enlighten the provisional judicial
manager on shortcomings in the information that he used in coming to his considered
opinion and to enable them to evaluate his recommendations.i'"
At the meetings referred to above the provisional judicial manager IS not the
chairperson.ê" This removes any possible control over the proceedings that the
provisional judicial manager could have as a means of imposing his opinion on the
meetings. He thus has to convince the meetings on the strength of an objective
assessment of the company's present problems and a realistic plan of future conduct.
284 These meetings must be convened by the Master. (See the Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 429(b)(ii).)
285 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 430(c) read with s 429(b)(ii).
286 See also Meskin Henochsberg /937.
287 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 431 (1).
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The purpose of the meetings referred to above is to consider the report of the
provisional judicial manager and the desirability of placing the company under [mal
judicial management, taking into account the prospects of the company becoming a
successful concem.?" The meeting of creditors should also consider the passing of a
resolution conferring preference for payment for liabilities incurred or to be incurred
by the provisional judicial manager or judicial manager."? (This preference will be in
relation to all the other unsecured liabilities not already discharged, excluding the
costs of judicial management.)
The chairperson of the meeting then prepares a report on the meeting that must be laid
before the court on the return day when the court decides whether to make a final
judicial management order or whether to discharge the provisional judicial
management order. This report should include the chairperson's own summary of the
reasons for any conclusion reached at the meeting on the desirability of pla~ing the
company under final judicial management.ê"
Upon conclusion of the meetings of creditors, members and debenture-holders the
plan regarding the envisaged future conduct of the company has been proposed by the
provisional judicial manager, considered and commented upon by the creditors, the
members and the debenture-holders and a coriclusion noted by the chairperson of the
meetings. This however does not give this plan of future conduct any legal status. The
court still has to decide whether to make a final judicial management order, thereby
indirectly approving the "plan".
The court makes its decision on the return day of the provisional judicial management
order after consideration of the opinion and wishes of creditors and members of the
company; the report of the provisional judicial manager;": the number of creditors
who did not prove claims at the first meeting of creditors and the amounts and
nature'" of their claims; the report of the Master; and the report of the Registrar."?
The court also considers the report of the chairperson of the meetings of creditors,
members and debenture holders.
288 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 431(2)(a).
289 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 431(2)(d) and s 435(1)(a).
290 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 431 (3); Meskin Henochsberg I 938.
291 The report laid before the meetings of the creditors, members and debenture holders convened in
terms of Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 429(b)(ii).
292 The nature of the claim probably refers to whether it is secured, unsecured, liquidated, unliquidated,
disputed, undisputed, due and payable, due but not yet payable, contingent or prospective.
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The court then makes a decision on whether a final order should be made. The plan
regarding future conduct has been considered by various parties by this stage, but
nobody is bound by any decision taken at any meetings and opposing views as to the
possibility of the company becoming a successful concern may be submitted to the
court. Once the court has made the final judicial management order it represents the
court's view on the prospects of the company becoming a successful concern and thus
indirectly endorses the plan. It does not however necessarily confirm the plan of
future conduct, in a way which binds the judicial manager and the company to a
specific course of action in the future.
As part of the final judicial management order the court gives directions for the
vesting of the management of the company in the final judicial manager, subject to
the supervision of the court.?" The court, as part of the final judicial management
order, may also make such other directions as to the management of the company, or
any matter incidental thereto, including the power to raise money in any way without
the authority of the shareholders, as the court may consider necessary. In exercising
this power the court may elevate the status of the plan of future conduct to something
more formal and binding.?"
It is the process described above, together with the powers of the court on granting a
final judicial management order that lead to the formulation and acceptance of judicial
management's comparatively nebulous equivalent to a plan of future conduct found in
the other jurisdictions considered.
From a survey of decided cases it is obvious that a compromise with creditors and a
reorganisation of rights may form part of the process of steering a company through
judicial management. In a majority of the reported cases such a scheme of
arrangement was ventured upon only once the company was in final judicial
management. This is the reason why the application for the meetings of creditors in
the equivalent of the current section 311 scheme was done by the judicial manager.?"
Thus it does not constitute a true plan of future conduct to establish whether judicial
293 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 432(2).
294 The final judicial management order must also contain provisions for the handing over of all matters
and the accounting to the final judicial manager by the provisional judicial manager and the discharge
of the provisional judicial manager where necessary. See the Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 432(3)(a).
295 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 432(3)(c).
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management IS the right course for the company to follow. The scheme of
arrangement follows once the order to put the company in final judicial management
was already made. It therefore seems that the scheme of arrangement was not part of a
definite plan for future conduct presented to the court on the return day of the
provisional judicial management order.
However in Williams v Sandy's Confectionery (Pty)Ltd; Ex Parte Mul/er N(jl97 it was
decided that the section 311 scheme meetings should be held first and that the
decision whether or not to put the company into final judicial management would be
deferred until the date when the court was asked to sanction the anticipated
compromise in terms of the section 311 scheme proposed by the provisional judicial
manager. This represents a formulation of a plan where the creditors contributed to
the process. It is not clear from the judgment whether the scheme aimed to reach a
compromise with creditors whereby they would not be paid in full. If this were indeed
the case, it would serve as an indication that the judicial management process can still
be useful even though the aim of full payment as envisaged by the Companies Act298
is not possible.
The court in the Williams case however decided that a section 311 scheme does not
fall under the provisions of section 428(2)(c) of the Companies Act regarding the
management of the company under provisional judicial management. The subsection
provides that the court may make such directions as to the management of the
company or any other matters incidental thereto, as the court may consider necessary.
The court reasoned that a compromise scheme has nothing whatsoever to do with the
management of the company.?" This attitude highlights the difficulty that a company
has in restructuring itself with a plan of future conduct under the present provisions
for judicial management. The court nevertheless resolved the difficulty by deciding
that the reference in section 311(1) of the Companies Act to a "judicial manager" as
an applicant for a section 311 scheme must of necessity include a provisional judicial
manager.3DD
296See Ex Parte Botha: In re Public Utility Transport Corporation Ltd 1952 4 SA 244 (W); Ex Parte
Cornell. N.o.: In re Khadaan Drive-in Cinema (Pty) Ltd 1959 1 SA 13 (D); Ex Parte Power and
Others. NN.o.:In re Natal Oil Products Ltd 1959 1 SA 7 (D).
29719762 SA 355 (D) 355H.
298Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 427(1).
299 Williams v Sandy's Confectionery (Pty) Ltd 1976 (2) SA 355 (D) 3568.
300 At 356H.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
99
3 5 1 2 Variation and termination ofthe judicial management order
The court which granted the final judicial management order may vary the terms of
the order at any time and in any manner on application of the Master; the final judicial
manager or a representative of the body of creditors of the company concerned. The
representative of the creditors should be mandated by a resolution passed by the
majority in value and number of the creditors at a meeting of the creditors?"
The judicial manager302 or any person having an interest in the company may at any
time apply to the court for the cancellation of the judicial management order. The
court may do so if it appears to the court that the purpose of the judicial management
order has been fulfilled or that it has failed to fulfil its purpose or that for any reason it
is undesirable that the order should remain in force.?"
3 5 1 3 The role of creditors and members
The creditors and members pronounce their VIews on the future conduct of the
company under provisional judicial management at the meetings convened to consider
the report of the provisional judicial manager. There their views are noted by the
chairperson of the meeting and laid before the court in his report.304
Upon the return day of the provisional judicial management order the creditors are
also able to address the court on grounds supporting or opposing the making of a final
judicial management order.
As stated above, once the final judicial management order is made the creditors may
approach the court in order to vary the terms of the order?" A creditor or member as a
person having an interest in the company may at any time apply to the court for the
cancellation of the judicial management order.?"
3 5 1 4 Liabilities incurred by the judicial manager
One aspect that will definitely be considered as part of a possible plan of future
conduct is the decision by creditors whose claims arose before the granting of a
judicial management order whether or not to give preference for the payment of
301 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 432(4).
302 The judicial manager is under a duty to do so if he is of the opinion that the judicial management
will not achieve its purpose. (See the Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 433(1)).
303 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 440(1).
304 LAWSA IV part 3467-468.
305 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 432(4).
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liabilities incurred or to be incurred by the provisional judicial manager or judicial
manager over all unsecured claims against the company. 307
This may be problematic for the judicial manager. He has to keep the business of the
company running at least until the meeting of the creditors where this matter is
decided without knowing whether the creditors will grant such a preference. He might
find himself incurring necessary and reasonable liabilities that might not be paid in
full.30S
3 5 2 Administration (England)
Unlike the South African judicial management procedure, the English administration
order has the acceptance of a plan of future conduct, referred to in the legislation as
"administrator's proposals", at the heart of its process. The administrator's proposals
•• 1 need to be approved even though the purposes of the administration order do not
include a business rescue as such.309
352 1Acceptance ofthe administrator's proposals
The aim of the administration order is the approval by the company's creditors of the
administrator's proposals for achieving the purposes specified in the administration
order. A copy of these proposals must be sent to the Registrar of Companies and to all
the creditors (insofar as the administrator is aware of their addresses) and it must be
laid before a meeting of creditors of the company for approval. This the administrator
must do within three months from the granting of the order or within such longer
period as the court allows."?
In order to prepare his proposals, the administrator will need to assess the affairs of
the company. In helping him to do so he has certain powers to investigate and to
require persons to cooperate in submitting statements as to the affairs of the company
to him in the prescribed form. In fact the administrator has a statutory duty to do the
investigations."!
306 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 440(1).
307 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 435(1). See also LAWSA IV part 3 479.
308 Meskin Henochsberg I 953.
309 One of the purposes for which an administration order may be granted is a more advantageous
realisation of the company's assets than would be effected on a winding-up. See the Insolvency Act
1986, s 8(d).
310 Insolvency Act 1986, s 23( I); Insolvency Rules, r 2.17.
311 Insolvency Act 1986 s 22(1) and (3); Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.11. For a discussion of the
administrator's investigative powers and duties see 4323 infra.
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The administrator's proposals should set out the way in which the administrator
proposes to conduct the administration to achieve the purpose or purposes for which
the administration order was made.312 According to Pennington the proposal should
include details such as the assets to be sold and those to be retained; the parts of the
business undertaking that will continue, if any; the way in which the future
undertaking will be financed; and how creditors will be treated. Pennington is also of
the opinion that the proposals may specify that debts may be deferred and only
become due and payable at a later date; that the creditors might compromise to forfeit
some or part of their claims; and that securities may be released?"
The nature of the proposals may vary from trading to success or deferment of
payment of debts to the winding-up of the company's business over a lengthy period
and even the dividing of the company's business activities and the transfer of viable
parts to newly formed subsidiary companies and the selling of the viable parts in
newly formed subsidiary companies and the winding-up of the rest.314
If the proposals involve the alteration or modification of rights of shareholders or
secured creditors, the administrator will prepare a scheme of arrangement. Where it is
only the creditors' rights which are affected the administrator may proceed with a
company voluntary arrangement.
The proposals must be set out in the prescribed form and this must be accompanied by
a statement of the administrator that contains details of his appointment and the
purposes of the administration order. The statement must also include names of the
directors and the secretary of the company; a brief history of the company leading to
the administration order; the statement of affairs or details of the company's financial
position at the latest practicable date; a statement of the manner in which the company
was run since the administration order and the manner in which it will be run in the
future; and such other information as the administrator considers necessary to enable
the company's creditors to decide whether or not to vote for the adoption of the
administrator's proposals.!"
312 Insolvency Act 1986, s 23.
313 Pennington Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 380.
314 This is also known as the hiving down of companies. Belcher Corproate Rescue 27.
31S Insolvency Act 1986, s 23(1); Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.16(1). See also Brown Corporate Rescue
318-319.
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The practice of administrators has evolved whereby the administrators will seek the
approval of creditors to their proposals in general terms only. The creditors might find
themselves asked to approve proposals that simply authorise the administrator to:316
continue to manage the affairs of the company in order to achieve one or more
of the purposes set out in the administration order;
to sell all or any of the assets of the company, as and when offers that are
suitable are received, for the benefit of creditors in general;
to refer to the creditors' committee on a regular basis and to ask for their
approval for significant disposals where the administrator considers it
appropriate; and
upon achieving one or more of the stated purposes of the administration order
to apply to the court for its discharge on the basis that either a voluntary
arrangement under part I of the Insolvency Act will be implemented or a
creditors' voluntary winding-up or a compulsory winding-up order will follow
the discharge.
Once the proposals are prepared the administrator must call a meeting of the creditors
of the company to consider the proposals. He should give at least 14 days' notice to
creditors'" and to the directors and officers of the company who must attend the
meeting."!
The Insolvency Rules deal with such aspects as creditors eligible to attend and to
vote; the chairperson's right to accept and reject claims; the procedures to resolve
disputes by application to court; the nullifying of resolutions taken; and, the ordering
of other meetings?" The Insolvency Rules also provide that creditors may appoint
316 This is different from the expectations at the time when the Insolvency Act was enacted. Some then
thought that the proposals should be set out in great detail. However, given the nature of business a
detailed proposal might soon need modifications because of economic developments. See Fletcher,
Higman, Trower The Law and Practice a/Corporate Administrations (1994) 44.
317 Those identified in the statement of affairs or known to the administrator to have claims against the
company at the date of administration. See the Insolvency Act 1986, s 23(1) and s 24(1); Insolvency
Rules 1986, r 2.18(1).
318 The rules also deal with the situation where no one attends and give the chairman, normally the
administrator himself, the power to adjourn the meeting for not more than 14 days. Insolvency Rules
1986,r2.19.
319 Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.22 and r 2.23.
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proxies to vote on their behalf and that the notice of the meeting must make provision
for thiS.320
There are two requirements for calculating the majority of creditors who must
approve the plan.321 First a majority in value of the creditors present and voting in
person or by proxy must approve the proposals. Secondly, this majority should be
achieved by not taking into account the claims of creditors who are persons connected
to the company. Persons connected to the company include directors or shadow
directors and persons associated with them or the company?" The value of the debts
is the nominal value, that is the value without allowing for discounting due to the
debts only being due and payable in the future. The value of the debts is the sum of
the nominal value at the date of the administration order plus interest capitalised to
that date less any subsequent payments.i"
The creditors' meeting may approve the proposals of the administrator as they stand
or with modificatlons.I" The modifications will however be subject to the approval of
the administrator. If he finds them unacceptable the court can discharge the
administration order or make an interim order to enable the administrator to convene
another meeting and to present revised proposals.?" The court has no power to make
or to consent to any modifications as a substitute for the consent of the administrator
or creditors. If the administrator consents to the modifications, each modification
320 Insolvency Rules 1986, r 19(5).
321 In general on the voting of creditors see Brown Corporate Rescue 321 - 325.
322 Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.28 and I(A).
323 Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.22(4); Pennington Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 385.
324 This includes for example the seller of goods who retained title on the goods sold till the purchase
price is paid.
325 Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.24.
326 Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.27( 1) and (2).
327 The creditors should not be able to force modifications upon the administrator, which he may not
view, as desirable, workable or compatible with the original proposals, given that the administrator is
under a duty to act in accordance with the proposals. Brown Corporate Rescue 325.
328 Insolvency Act 1986, s 24(2) and (5).
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needs to be consented to by the meeting and in the end a resolution approving of the
modified proposals in their entirety needs to be taken.
The administrator must report to the court setting out the result of the creditors'
meeting and must also notify the Registrar of Companies and each creditor who
received notice of the meeting or of whom the administrator afterwards became
aware. This notice to the relevant parties should include the details of the proposals
and of any revisions or modifications that were approved by the meeting.329
3 522 Effect of the approval of the proposals
The approval of the proposals by the creditors' meeting signifies a further step in the
administration process and the approved proposals lay down the rules which the
administrator must follow in the future whilst conducting the affairs of the company.
The acceptance does not bring administration to an end. In this respect it differs from
the Australian procedure where voluntary administration ends once the deed of
company arrangement is executed.33o
3 5 2 3 Variation and termination
Once the proposals are approved, the administrator should conduct the administration
in accordance with the approved proposals. If the approved proposals need
modification due to a change in circumstances or merely because the provisions of the
proposals turn out to be impractical, the administrator may make changes unilaterally
if these modifications are not substantial. If the changes are substantial the
administrator must have them approved by a creditors' meeting convened and
conducted much in the same way as the original meeting for approving the proposals
was convened and conducted.?'
However, when the administrator for some reason would like to alter the purpose for
which the administration order was made, he should apply to court. When the court
approves this new purpose or purposes the administrator should put new proposals to
329 Insolvency Act 1986, s 24 and Insolvency Rule 2.30. Apparently the court has no further role in
giving legal effect to the proposals. Once the proposals of the administrator are approved by the
meeting of creditors they have legal effect. See also Fletcher & Grabb Insolvency Act J 98645-48.
330 See 3 4 3 2 infra.
331 Insolvency Act 1986, s 25(1) and (2); Insolvency Rules 1986, Sch 4, Form 2.22.
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a creditors' meeting for their approval.?" In such a case the original proposals will
cease to have any effect?"
Administration proceedings may be brought to an end by a successful appeal against
the making of the order, the rescission of the order by the COurt334or its discharge by
the court. The order may be discharged by the court on the application of the
administrator. The administrator has a duty to apply if it appears to him that the
purposes set out in the administration order have been achieved or are incapable of
achievement, in which case he can also apply for the variation of the order.!" The
administrator also has a duty to apply if required by a meeting of the company's
creditors summoned for this purpose in accordance with the rules.!"
3 5 2 4 The role of creditors and members during administration
The administrator is responsible for conducting the administration and there is no
provision that he should have regard to the wishes of the creditors. If in doubt as to
the validity of any act he may ask the court for directions.t" The administrator may
however convene meetings of creditors in order to ascertain their wishes. The court
may also direct the administrator to hold a meeting, and the administrator must hold a
meeting of creditors if requested by creditors with claims to the value of one tenth of
the claims.338 It is doubtful if the creditors would make use of this avenue as there is
precious little for them to gain out of a meeting that might further drain the resources
of the company and where they cannot give any directions to the administrator.
However if the creditors' meeting resolves that the administrator should apply to court
for a discharge of the company from administration he is obliged to do SO.339
The creditors may decide to establish a creditors' committee. The decision and
election will take place at the meeting where the original proposals are approved.?"
This committee consists of a minimum of three and a maximum of five creditors.?"
The committee must assist the administrator in carrying out his functions. The
332 Re St Ives Windings Ltd (1987) 3 Bee 634.
333 Pennington Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 389.
334 Cornhill Insurance pic v Cornhill Financial Services Ltd [1992] Bee 818.
335 Insolvency Act 1986, s 18(2)(a).
336 Insolvency Act 1986, s 18(2)(b).
337 Insolvency Act 1986, s 14(3).
338 Brown Corporate Rescue 320.
339 Insolvency Act 1986, s 18(2)(b).
340 Insolvency Act 1986, s 26(1).
341 Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.32(1).
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administrator and the creditors' committee must establish the scope of the committee's
activities by agreement.?" The creditors' committee may require the presence of the
administrator at any of their meetings, where he must provide the committee with
such information as it may reasonably require on matters relating to his carrying out
of his functions as administrator.r"
The Insolvency Rules also regulate the notice periods of creditors' committee
meetings, filling of vacancies, quorums, voting, proxies and written consent outside a
formal meeting.?"
The administrator must also provide the members of the creditors' committee with a
report of receipts and payments of the company. The reports are six-monthly and must
be made within two months after the ending of each six-month period from the date of
his appointment. 345
The administrator has the power to call meetings of members of the company.ï'" The
need will not however arise often unless the administration leads to a voluntary
arrangement under Part I of the Insolvency Act or a scheme of arrangement under
section 425 of the Companies Act_347In these circumstances a meeting of creditors
will need to sanction the arrangement or the scheme.
3 5 2 5 Liabilities incurred by the administrator
The administrator in exercising his functions is deemed to act as the agent of the
company.I'" Thus he does not incur any personal liability for any new contracts that
he enters into on behalf of the company, nor for any old contracts of the company that
he continues with.349
Furthermore, the claims of creditors under contracts concluded after the
administration order was granted, and contracts of employees that he adopted, are a
first charge on the company's property in the custody or control of the administrator.
342Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.34(1).
343Insolvency Act 1986, s 26(2); Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.44(1).
344Insolvency Rules 1986, IT 2.34-2.43.
345Insolvency Rules 1986, r 252(1) and (3) and Sch 4, Form 2.15.
346Insolvency Act 1986, s 14(2)(b).
3471985.
348Insolvency Act 1986, s 14(5). See also Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 314.
349Brown Corporate Rescue 267.
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This charge even ranks ahead of the administrator's own remuneration and
expenses.P"
3 5 3 Voluntary administration (Australia)
The Australian procedure is similar to the English procedure in that the approval of a
plan of future conduct, referred to in the legislation as the deed of company
arrangement is very much the focal point of the procedure.f" Its importance can
hardly be exaggerated. There are three possible normal outcomes of the Australian
administration. First, a deed of company arrangement may be executed; secondly the
company's creditors may resolve that the administration should end and thirdly the
company's creditors may resolve that the company be wound Up.352The anticipated
outcome is the execution of a deed of company arrangement.F"
3 5 3 1Execution ofthe deed of company arrangement
The aim of voluntary administration is to lead to a deed of company arrangement that
will govern the way in which the affairs of the company will be run in the future.
However from a survey conducted among insolvency practitioners it is evident that
voluntary administration is often used instead to put the company into liquidation.?"
Nevertheless, the rest of the discussion will focus on the position where a deed of
company arrangement is executed.
The specific contents of the deed will vary greatly depending on the circumstances of
each administration. To provide the required flexibility, the Act does not in any way
limit the scope for the company and its creditors to reach an agreement nor does it
limit the use of voluntary administration to certain purposes.355
350 Insolvency Act 1986, s 19(4), (5). See also Brown Corporate Rescue 466.
351 See Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 para 444; Tomasic
Australian Corporate Law 137.
352 Corporations Law, s 435C(2). See also s 435C(3) for other ways in which the administration may
end.
353 Corporations Law, s 439C(a). See also Tomasic Australian Corporate Insolvency Law 154.
354 Lessing and Corkey Corporate Insolvency Law 70. The authors did a survey in which 56% of the
respondents saw the administration procedure as a suitable way of placing a company into liquidation.
They feIt it was quicker and easier than the normal creditors' voluntary winding-up or court process,
and it enabled quicker, more effective protection of the assets.
Those who opposed this view cited possible abuse of the intention of the administration procedure; the
fact that nothing was wrong with the present liquidation procedures and the fact that the director's
nominee usually gets appointed as liquidator as reasons for their dissent.
See also 36.
355 Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Corporate Law Reform Act para 577. See also Tomasic
Australian Corporate Insolvency Law 154.
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As soon as practical after the administration of the company begins, the administrator
must investigate the business, property, affairs and financial circumstances of the
company.I'" This investigation should enable the administrator to determine the true
position of the company and assist him in forming an opinion, as he must, whether it
would be in the interests of the company's creditors to execute a deed of company
arrangement or whether the administration should end or whether the company should
be wound Up.357
After having done his investigation and formed his opinion on the action that should
be taken regarding the company's future the administrator must convene a meeting of
creditors to decide upon the future of the company. This must be convened within
either 21 or 28 days from the beginning of administration and five business days'
notice of the meeting must be given."" If the administrator is of the opinion that it is
in the interests of the company's creditors that the company should execute a deed of
company arrangement the notice of the meeting should include a statement setting out
details of the proposed deed.!" If the meeting of creditors resolves that a deed of
company arrangement should be executed by the company the administrator of the
deed360must prepare an instrument setting out the terms of the deed. The company'"
must execute this instrument prepared by the administrator of the deed within 21 days
after the end of the meeting of creditors'? and the administrator of the deed must
execute the instrument before the company does or as soon as practicable thereafter. 363
356 Corporations Law, s 438A.
357 Corporations Law, s 438A(b). To assist the administrator in his investigations to ascertain the true
position of the company, he has certain powers to compel persons to make certain statements of affairs
and to make relevant books and documents available to him.-See Corporations Law, s 438 and also 4 3
3 3.
358 Corporations Law 439A. As elsewhere business in Australia is also affected by summer and taking
of decisions slows down. According to s 439A(5) if the administration starts on a day in December or a
day that is less than 28 days before Good Friday the convening period shall be 28 days. At other times
the convening period is 21 days.
359 Corporations Law, s 439A(4)(c). In practice many administrations provide complete details of the
proposal before the second meeting and increasingly provided a draft of the proposed deed of company
arrangement itself. Lessing & Corkery Corporate Insolvency Law 97.
360 This is the term used by the Corporations Law s 444A(3) to distinguish the administrator appointed
to administer the company under the deed of company arrangement from the administrator appointed
on administration. Normally the administrator of the deed will be the same person as the administrator
appointed on administration, unless the creditors resolve to appoint someone else as administrator of
the deed. See the Corporations Law s 444A(2).
361 A resolution of the board of directors is required. See the Corporations Law s 444B(3).
362 If the company fails to execute the deed or decides not to, the administration order will be
transformed into a creditors' voluntary winding-up and the administrator will become the liquidator.
See the Corporations Law, s 446A(2)(b).
363 Corporations Law, s 444B.
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When the instrument is executed by both the company and the administrator of the
deed the instrument becomes a deed of company arrangement. 364
Although the specific contents of the deed will vary greatly depending on the
circumstances the terms of the deed must be specified in the instrument prepared for
execution by the administrator of the deed. This requirement is imposed in
recognition of the importance of the arrangement.l'"
The instrument must also specify the administrator of the deed of company
arrangement; the property available to pay the claims of the creditors; the nature and
duration of any moratorium provided for by the deed; the extent to which the
company will be relieved from its debts; the conditions which may be set for the deed
to come into and to continue in operation; the circumstances in which the deed is to
terminate; the order in which the proceeds of the property of the company are to
distributed amongst creditors; and the date by which claims must have arisen if they
are to be admissible under the deed?" This date may not be later than the day on
which administration began."?
The creditors are however generally more interested in the details of the
reorganisation of the company affairs such as: the amounts of the dividends to be paid
and the timing of the payments; how the necessary funds to keep the business going
will be obtained and whether there will be a sale of assets or loans from related
parties; whether related parties will refrain from participating in the deed of company
arrangement dividends and whether related parties will give extra security to secured
creditors or to the administrator to secure dividend payments; and the extent of the
administrator of the deed's exercise of day to day control during the period of the
moratorium.368
The administrator of the deed must at once notify all creditors and the ASe of the
execution of the deed of company arrangement and must lodge a copy with the
ASC.369
364 Corporations Law s 444B(6).
365 Corporations aw s 444A(3). Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Corporate Law Reform Act para
577. See also Tomasic Australian Corporate Insolvency Law 154.
366 Corporations Law, s 444A(4).
367 Corporations Law, s 444A(4)(i).
368 Lessing & Corkery Corporate Insolvency Law 98.
369 Corporations Law, s 450B.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
110
3 5 32 Effect of the deed of company arrangement
Administration comes to an end upon the execution of the deed of company
arrangement. This also means that the moratorium imposed by the administration on
enforcement procedures is lifted."? This does not result in a return to the pre-
administration position. The relationship between creditors'" (even dissenting
creditors) and the company is now governed by the deed of company arrangement.
The deed of company arrangement may include a postponement of payment or a
release of debts or a continued moratorium.V'
Secured creditors and owners or lessors of property occupied, used or in possession of
the company may again freely exercise their rights except in so far as the secured
creditor, owner or lessor voted in favour of the deed and the deed provides
otherwise?" If the deed does not provide for the restriction of the enforcement of their
rights by the secured creditors, owners or lessors, mentioned above, the court may
nevertheless make an order restricting them in their actions towards the company.?"
The company is also protected during the 21 day period it has to consider the
execution of the deed. No one is allowed to act in a way he would not have been able
to act if the deed had already been executed, unless the court directs otherwise?"
Furthermore, no one bound by the deed may, until its termination, make or continue
with an application for winding-up or begin or continue with proceedings against the
company or an enforcement procedure against its property. The court however may
give permission to begin or continue with proceedings against the company or an
enforcement process against its property on such terms as the court may impose.?"
370 Supra 34 1 3.
371 To the extent that their claims arose on or before the date specified in the deed of company
arrangement (Corporations Law, s 444D(1)).
372 Corporations Law, s 444A(4)(c) and (d).
373 Corporations Law, s 444D. See also the discussion at 34 1 32 supra.
374 The court is however limited in the exercise of this power by the Corporations Law, s 444F.
375 Corporations Law, s 444C.
376 Corporations Law, s 444E. See also Hannan "Shutting the door: Voluntary administration and
contingent liabilities." 1995 Law Institute Journal I007 on the effects of the acceptance of a deed of
company arrangement on contingent creditors who might not even be aware of their possible claims at
the date of approval of the deed.
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The deed of company arrangement binds the company, its officers and members and
the deed's administrator as well as the creditors of the company with claims arising on
or before the date specified in the deed."?
Whilst under administration a company IS required to set out in every public
document'" and negotiable instrument behind its name where it first appears "under
administration" and until the deed of company arrangement terminates "subject to
deed of company arrangement" .379
3 5 3 3 Variation and termination ofthe deed of company arrangement
The creditors have certain rights to require the convening of a creditors' meeting and
may resolve to vary the deed at such a meeting but only if the variation does not differ
materially from that proposed in the notice of the meeting.?" The court on application
by a creditor of the company may cancel the variation or confirm it wholly or in part
and may add conditions to the order."!
The deed will terminate when the court so orders.'" if the company's creditors so
resolve at a meeting specially convened for the purpose; or if the conditions or
circumstances specified in the deed for its termination are fulfilled or come into
existence.383
3 5 3 4 The role of creditors and members
Creditors have an important role to play during the administration and subsequent
deed of company arrangement phase. The first time creditors are called into action is
at the first creditors' meeting. This should take place within five business days from
the commencement of administration, on at least two business days' notice to
creditors. This first meeting will decide whether a committee of creditors will be
377 Corporations Law, s 444G and 444D(l).
378 A public document in this sense refers to documents that will be seen and read by the public and it
includes business letters, invoices, receipts, orders for goods and the like. Corporations Law, s 88A.
379 Corporations Law, s 450E.
380 Corporations Law, s 445A and F. See the text at n 389 infra as to the required majority.
381 Corporations Law, s 445B.
382 The court may terminate the deed if it is satisfied that the deed was executed on false or misleading
information, or if a material contravention of the deed took place, or if the deed will lead to injustice or
undue delay, or if would be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to a creditor, or if the deed should be
terminated for some other reason (see the Corporations Law, s 445D).
383 Corporations Law, s 445C.
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formed. The meeting may also resolve to remove the administrator and to replace him
with another.384
The committee of creditors cannot give directions to the administrator, but it may
require the administrator to report to the committee about matters relating to the
administration.t"
At the second meeting of creditors the future of the company is decided. At this
meeting the creditors may decide that the company should execute a deed of
arrangement or that administration should end or that the company should be wound
up. The meeting can also potpone taking a decision as more time is needed to prepare
for a proper decision. The meeting may then be adjourned from time to time but not
for more than 60 days from the first day on which the meeting was held.!" If no
resolution has been passed by the sixtieth day then administration ceases
.J
automatically."?
The creditors of the company are in a strong position whilst the company is governed
by the deed of company arrangement. They may call a creditors' meeting either to
vary the deed or to end it and place the company in a voluntary creditors' winding-
Up.388Resolutions at a creditors' meeting are carried when the majority in number
(present and voting in person or by proxy) and in value of claims against the company
(present and voting in person or by proxy) vote in favour of the resolution.?" The dual
requirement does give the smaller creditors some protection against complete
domination by a few large creditors, without the necessity of seeking protection from
the court. It is submitted that a higher majority by value should be required to ensure
that adequate weight is given to the wishes of major creditors.
The members have to adhere to the deed of company arrangement and assist in the
operation of the company to the point where it is a successful concern once more.
Only when the deed of company arrangement is terminated and the administrator no
longer holds office will the members control the company again. It is however
384 Corporations law, s 436E.
385 Corporations Law, s 436E and F.
386 Corporations Law, s 4398(2).
387 Corporations Law, s 435(c).
388 Corporations Law, s 445A and s 445C(b).
389 Regulations to the Corporations Law 5.6.11 to 5.6.36A.
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conceivable that the administrator will delegate his powers to the directors and
officers of the company and leave most of the day to day decisions to them.390
Any transfer of shares or an alteration of the status of members made during the
administration of the company is void unless the court orders otherwise?"
3 5 3 5 Liabilities incurred by the administrator
In general the Australian administrator is made liable for the debts that he incurs in
the exercise or performance of his functions as administrator. This includes liabilities
for services rendered or goods bought or property hired, leased, used or occupied.392
He is also personally liable for the continued use or occupancy or possession of
property of which someone else is the owner or lessor. This liability starts on the
eighth day after administration began.393 The logic behind this provision is that the
administrator has seven days in which to make a preliminary assessment of the
financial position of the company and to decide whether administration will continue
and also whether to continue with the lease of the property.
The administrator is indemnified for his liabilities from the assets of the company and
this is indemnification has priority over all unsecured debts of the company and in
certain instances over debts secured by a floating charge.394
The position of post-deed creditors is not all that certain. If the deed of company
arrangement does not make provision for the preferential treatment of post-deed
creditors a distinction is drawn between post-deed creditors whose claims arose from
transactions with the administrator and those whose claims arose from transactions
with the directors. The latter will have less protection than the former?"
390 Lessing & Corkery Corporate Insolvency Law 98.
391 Corporations Law, s 437F.
392 Corporations Law, s 443A.
393 Corporations Law, s 443B.
394 Corporations Law, s 443D and E.
395 O'Donovan "Which claims are Admissible under Deeds of Company Arrangement" The Australian
Law Journal (1995) 905. O'Donovan maintains that because of an oversight in the legislation the post-
deed creditors whose claims arose from transactions with the directors will have no preference over
creditors who are bound by the deed. On the other hand the creditors who dealt directly with the
administrator will have a preferential claim in the case of a subsequent winding-up. He fmds support
for his view in an unreported case Re Crawford House Press Pty Ltd [13 June 1995 No 1801/1995
Supreme Court of New South Wales]. This oversight needs attention, otherwise creditors may not
extend any credit to companies under a deed of arrangement and thus jeopardise the business rescue.
O'Donovan also suggests that the deed of company arrangement should be allowed to specify the date
of approval thereof as the admissible claim date, thus it would also be binding on creditors whose
claims arose after the date of administration. It is submitted that this approach would be beneficial to
the rescue process.
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3 5 4 Evaluation and proposals
The formulation of a plan to lead the company from its financial woes to a successful
concern is an important part of the recovery of the company. This is recognised by the
Australian and English procedures.?" However, it is not an express feature of judicial
management prescribed by the Companies Act in South Africa. It is submitted that
this gives the impression that judicial management supports the view that if you can
only identify the mistakes made and who was at fault, this achievement by itself
would lead the company back to being a successful concern. Such a view contrasts
sharply with a view that a successful rescue needs investigating, planning and hard
work. Nevertheless it is acknowledged that the provisional judicial manager in
practice has to formulate a plan of future conduct in order to convince the court and
the creditors of the desirability of a final judicial management order.
It is submitted that the judicial management procedure should be amended to include
provisions for the formulation and acceptance of such a plan. This would make it
possible to eliminate the involvement of the court altogether if the commencement
procedure proposed in this thesis is accepted."? Even if the alternative procedure is
followed the involvement of the court is reduced to a single occasion as opposed to
the two hearings presently required.i'" This will lead to a saving of costs. It is
recognised that it is controversial to alter the contractual rights of creditors without
their consent without the intervention of the COurt.399
3 5 4 1Acceptance of a plan offuture conduct
The judicial manager should compile the plan and essentially the creditors of the
company should accept it. Upon acceptance by the required majority of creditors it
should bind all creditors whether they voted in favour of the plan or not. The ideal
would be for the judicial manager to formulate such a plan with the help of the
396 It is also a feature of most of the other corporate rescue regimes including the USA Chapter Il
procedure, the Hong Kong procedure and the procedure adopted recently by the Belgium legislature (as
described in Wetsontwerp betreffende gerechtelijk akkoord (1998».
397 If the proposal is accepted that the directors may appoint ajudicial manager without the intervention
of the court it would have the result that the court is not approached at all. See s 1(2)(a)(i) of proposed
legislation 3 3 5 supra.
398 Currently a provisional order is made with a return day when the court will decide whether to make
a final order. If the proposal is accepted to incorporate the plan of future conduct as part of judicial
management a second appearance would be avoided in the case where the company was placed under
judicial management in accordance with s I(2)(a)(ii) of the proposed legislation in 335 supra.
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directors and members as well as the creditors of the company. This retains the
whole-hearted support of the shareholders and directors for the judicial management
process and improves the likelihood of eventual acceptance by the creditors.t'" Any
existing or previous significant association of the judicial manager with the directors
and members might lead the creditors to perceive the judicial manager as too close to
the directors and shareholders of the company. The creditors might then have less
confidence in the judicial manager conducting his investigation into the failure of the
company in an impartial and diligent manner.i'"
A possible solution to this problem would be to entrust another person to investigate
the prior conduct of directors. The logical choice is Master. One of his officials would
have to be appointed to do the investigation in the case of a company, which has gone
into judicial management. Considering the fact that only a few companies make use of
judicial management at present it would not be impossible to implement this proposal.
Alternatively, creditors could be given the option, to be exercised at the meeting
where the proposals of the judicial manager regarding the future conduct of the
business are considered, whether they want someone other than the judicial manager
to investigate the prior conduct of directors.
The judicial manager must lay his proposals regarding the plan of future conduct
before a meeting of creditors convened to approve the plan. If any amendments to the
plan are made it should be with the consent of the judicial manager.
The majority needed to accept the proposal for a plan of future conduct should at least
be a majority in number and in value of the creditors present in person or proxy and
voting. Secured creditors should only have a vote in value equal to the amount of their
claims exceeding their security. The plan of future conduct should not vary the extent
of the security of secured creditors without their consent. The principle of equality
should also be adhered to.402 Dissenting creditors of the same class should not be
unfairly discriminated against without the opportunity to apply to the court to
399 "It is, of course , difficult to envisage a system in terms of which a creditor is barred from the
enforcement of a fundamental commercial right which does not depend for its validity on the sanction
ofa court order." Rajak "Business Rescue/or SA" 8; Rajak & Henning 1999 SALJ269.
400 Brown Corporate Rescue 319.
401 See in general the discussion on the position of the administrator in Australian voluntary
administration and the creditors' concern that he might not be sufficiently independent. Keay 1997
Company and Security Law Journal 155 et seq.
402 See 1 74 supra n 77.
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intervene. Furthermore, the creditors voting should not include either directors who
are creditors or creditors connected to the directors of the company.i'"
Irrespective of whether the members participate in the formulation of the plan of
future conduct, they should have the opportunity to express their approval or
disapproval of the plan as accepted by the creditors. After all, such a plan might
involve the further financial commitment of the members. Thus once the creditors
have accepted the plan of future conduct, the shareholders should ideally decide
whether to accept the plan as well. Nevertheless, to require the consent of the
shareholders may only be feasible where the company does not have many
shareholders or members. However, where the company has a large number of
shareholders the necessary approval might take a lot of time and may also be very
costly. It is therefore submitted that the Australian requirement of a resolution from
the board of directors should suffice. The directors should be able to give an
indication to the creditors whether the board of directors will accept the plan at the
meeting where the creditors are to decide on the plan put forward by the judicial
manager. In the event of the plan as approved by the creditors differing substantially
from the plan proposed by the judicial manager, the board of directors should give
their consent to the amended plan within seven days of the creditors' meeting. If the
directors decide not to give their consent the company should immediately be placed
in liquidation.r'"
3 5 4 2 The effect ofthe acceptance of the plan {or future conduct
The Australian procedure makes provision for the end of administration and the
operation of the company in terms of the deed of company arrangement under the
supervision of the administrator. The company is thus once again part of the economy
without the protection of a moratorium on all enforcement procedures, except insofar
as the enforcement of debts are governed by the deed of company arrangement.
The English procedure does not make provision to end administration upon the
acceptance of the administrator's proposals. The company remains under the
protection of the order until it has become a successful concern or the purpose for
403 Creditors connected to the directors should include the director or his or her spouse or any juristic
person in which the director or his spouse holds a controlling interest, whether alone or jointly, a
partnership of which the director or his or her spouse is a partner or a trust of which the director or his
or her spouse is a trustee or a major beneficiary, or a person declared a creditor connected to the
director by the court.
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which the administration order was given is achieved or the administration order is
discharged because it is clear that the intended purposes will not be achieved.
Both approaches have merit. The Australian approach will lead to more confidence
from future trade creditors in that they would be able to enforce their rights against
the company without impediment. The English system on the other hand keeps the
company under protection ofthe court order.
It is ~aL-it-woulcLbe better for South Africa to follow the Australian
example. Once the company has had a breathing space and come to an agreement
with its creditors, it should be subjected to full participation in the commercial world.
The confidence of the future trade creditors is important for the survival and future
success of the company. It would also help to quell fears that judicial management
would be abused to avoid payment to present and future creditors. Thus once the plan
of future conduct is accepted by the creditors, members and the judicial manager, it
should govern the running of the company henceforth much in the same manner as the
Australian deed of company arrangement.
The future role of the judicial manager should be defined by the plan of future
conduct, but this should at least involve some degree of supervision by him of those
undertaking the day to day management. Full control of the company should only
revert to the members and the directors of the company once the goals set by the plan
of future conduct have been achieved.
In appropriate circumstances the judicial manager could permit the management of
the company to implement the reconstruction of the company according to the plan of
future conduct while the judicial manager takes a back seat. Where the creditors
however have more serious misgivings about the directors' competence and good
faith the judicial manager may have greater involvement in the management of the
company.r"
3 5 4 3 Variation and termination ofthe plan offuture conduct
The plan should not be required to be excessively detailed, because that would only
lead to frustration in having to amend minor details because of changed or unforeseen
404 For a discussion of the procedure to be followed in these circumstances see 36 infra.
405 Keay 1997 Company and Securities lawJournalI45 160.
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circumstances even though the alteration would not be a departure from the substance
of the original plan.
Variations to the plan of future conduct that are not substantial should be within the
power of the judicial manager. When the judicial manager wants to make a substantial
change to the plan he should ask the approval of a creditors' meeting.
If the purpose of judicial management can no longer be met or it is clear that the goals
set by the plan of future conduct can no longer be achieved, any of the creditors
should be able to require the judicial manager to convene a meeting of creditors. The
creditors' meeting may then resolve to terminate the plan of future conduct and to put
the company into liquidation.
3 5 4 4 The role of members and creditors
. ,I As already discussed the creditors and members should approve the plan of future
conduct. The creditors should not only be able to approve the plan, but should have
the right to request a meeting to consider the variation or the termination of the plan.
The establishment of committees of creditors to oversee the judicial management
merits consideration. Their powers should be limited to requesting information from
the judicial manager on aspects of the judicial management, similar to the position in
the English law.
The extent of creditors' power depends on the acceptance of the proposal that they
should have the ultimate decision about the future of the company when they meet to
decide whether to accept the plan of future conduct. Furthermore they should have the
power to decide on who the judicial manager of the company will be for the purposes
of implementing the plan of future conduct.
3 5 4 5 The liability ofthe judicial manager
The liability of the judicial manager will be discussed in greater detail below.406 It is
be sufficient for present purposes to say that it would be better to deal with the
preference of company liabilities incurred by the judicial manager in legislation rather
than to leave it to the creditors to decide whether or not to grant a preference, as is the
case at present.
406 For a discussion see 4 2 4 4 infra.
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3 5 5 Draft legislation to give effect to the proposals
Section 4
(1) The judicial manager must within 60 days of appointment (or such longer period
as the court may allow):
(a) send to the Master and to creditors proposals for a plan of future conduct
for the company for achieving the purpose or purposes of judicial
management; and
(b) submit the proposals for a plan of future conduct to a meeting of the
company's creditors convened for the purpose on not less than 10 days' notice.
(2)(a) The meeting of creditors referred to in subsection (l)(b) above may resolve, by
a majority in number and a majority of sixty percent in value of claims:
(i) to accept the proposals for a plan of future conduct with or without
modifications, but must not do so unless the judicial manager consents to each
modification; or
(ii) that judicial management should end; or
(iii) that the company be wound up.
2(b) (i) Creditors eligible to vote at the meeting referred to in subsection (l)(b) are
creditors with proven claims against the company and such creditors allowed
to vote by the judicial manager, but excluding all creditors who are also
directors of the company or any creditor who are persons connected to such
directors.
(ii) A secured creditor is allowed to vote at the meeting to the value of the
unsecured portion of his or her claim against the company or to the full value
of his or her claim if the creditor agree to forfeit his or her security.
(3)(a) If the proposals for a plan of future conduct are accepted in accordance with
subsection (2)(a)(i) the directors of the company must within 7 days approve the
proposals for a plan of future conduct in writing.
(b) In the event of the directors failing to accept the proposals within the period
referred to in paragraph (a) the company is automatically under a creditors' voluntary
winding-up, on the expiry of that period.
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(c) Once the plan of future conduct becomes operative it binds the company and all
creditors of the company whose claims against the company arose before or on the
date agreed upon in the plan of future conduct, which date must not be later than the
date on which the company was placed under judicial management.
(d) Secured creditors are bound by the plan of future conduct to the extent that they
participated in the vote for its approval.
(e) The plan of future conduct has no effect in so far as it discriminates unfairly
against a dissenting creditor or future creditor.
(4) Once the proposals for a plan of future conduct have been approved by the
creditors and directors the judicial manager must forthwith file a copy of the accepted
plan of future conduct with the Master and the Registrar of Companies and send a
notice setting out the details of the plan of future conduct to all the creditors of the
company.
(5) Upon the filing of the plan of future conduct with the Master the company is
released from judicial management and the affairs of the company must be conducted
according to the plan of future conduct.
(6) The judicial manager is responsible for the execution of the plan of future conduct
according to the role assigned to him or her in the plan of future conduct, provided
that the plan of future conduct must not restrict any of the statutory powers of the
judicial manager.
(7) The judicial manager may and must, if required by any creditor or creditors who
alone or together hold ten percent or more of the value of the proven claims against
the company, convene a meeting of creditors and at the meeting the creditors may
resolve, with a majority in number and a majority of seventy-five percent in value to
amend the plan of future conduct or to terminate the plan of future conduct and that
the company be wound up.
(8) The judicial manager must apply to the court for the termination of the plan of
future conduct where the judicial manager is of the opinion that it is no longer
possible to achieve the goals of the plan of future conduct and that because of the
urgency of the matter or otherwise it is not appropriate to convene a meeting under
subsection (7) above. He or she may at the same time apply for the winding-up of the
company.
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(9) If the judicial manager is of the opinion that it is necessary to amend the plan of
future conduct he may amend it by giving notice of the amendment to the Master
where the amendment is not substantial, but if the amendment or amendments are
substantial the administrator must obtain the approval of the creditors at a meeting of
creditors convened for the purpose in accordance with subsection (7).
3 6 Transition to voluntary winding-up
The possibility that a business rescue procedure will not lead to the eventual
restoration of the company to a successful concern is a risk inherent to the business
rescue procedure from its outset. It is thus necessary to provide for a smooth transition
from the business rescue procedure to the winding-up of the company in
circumstances where this is required.
3 6 I Judicial management (South Africa)
The present statutory provisions on judicial management do not provide measures for
an automatic transition from judicial management to the liquidation of the company.
The provisional judicial management or final judicial management order must first be
discharged by the court. Once this is done a separate application should be made for
the winding-up of the company.
"To discharge [a judicial management order] is one thing. To replace it with
an order for liquidation is quite another. The two are separate steps, and no
less so because the second is often the purpose of the first, because the first is
frequently taken so that the second may in turn ensue. The second need not
follow, after all, and it does not always do so. "407
The court which granted the provisional judicial management order may discharge it
at any time on application of the original applicant.?" a creditor, a member, the
provisional judicial manager or the Master.?" The court on application from the
judicial manager may cancel a final judicial management order. The judicial manager
should bring this application if at any time the judicial manager is of the opinion that
the continuation of judicial management will not enable the company to become a
407 In re Hlobane Bui/ding and Mining Supplies (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 270 (N) 273A.
408 Turner v VL Brink Ltd 1959 ( SA 328 (C).
409 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 428(3).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
122
successful concem.410 The judicial manager may at the same time bring an application
for the winding-up of the company."!
3 6 2 Administration (England)
The discharge of an administration order restores the status of the company to the
position immediately before the order was made. The restrictions on creditors are
lifted and they can pursue their normal legal remedies against the company.
Administration orders are most frequently discharged in order to wind-up the
company. This may be because either the proposals of the administrator are
impracticable or the creditors of the company are in any event not prepared to approve
the proposals or because the purposes of the administration could not be achieved.
The court cannot make a winding-up order on the discharge of the administration
order. A winding-up petition must be presented in separate proceedings.?" The court
may however give directions to the administrator to present a petition for the winding-
up of the company. If the administrator is directed by the court to petition for the
winding-up of the company it may also direct that he shall be the liquidator of the
company. In this way continuity in terms of the possession and control of the assets
will be achieved.413
English and South African law are similar in that the discharge of the business rescue
procedure and the winding-up of the company are separate issues that need different
applications to the court.
3 6 3 Voluntary administration (Australia)
The Australian position differs from that in South Africa and England in that it
provides measures for a direct transition to the winding-up of the company. The
company under administration converts from being in administration to a voluntary
winding-up in three situations.?" These are where the creditors at the meeting to
decide upon the future of the company resolve that the company should be wound up;
where the company has failed to execute the deed of arrangement within 21 days of
410 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 433(1).
411 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 433(1).
412 Insolvency Act 1986, 18(3), see also Pennington Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 401, Brown
Corporate Rescue 448 and also re Brook Marine Ltd [1988] BCLC 546.
413 Brown Corporate Rescue 448.
414 Corporations Law, s 446A(l).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
123
the deed being agreed upon by the creditors; and where the creditors terminate the
deed of company arrangement and resolve that the company should be wound up.
The company will also pass from administration to a voluntary winding up where the
court makes an order to terminate the deed of company arrangement pursuant to
section 445D of the Corporations Law415 or if the deed specifies circumstances when
the deed will terminate and the company will pass into voluntary liquidation and those
circumstances have arisen.!"
The company will in these circumstances be in a creditors' voluntary winding up and
the necessary special resolution needed to put the company in a creditors' voluntary
winding-up will be deemed to have been passed.417 In these situations the
administrator is also deemed to be appointed as the Iiquidator.Y''
3 5 4 Evaluation
It is submitted that the Australian procedure offers the best solution regarding the
transition from judicial management to the winding-up of the company. This may
partially explain why this procedure is used more frequently than its English
counterpart.i'" It may also partly explain why the dividend yield is higher where
winding-up follows directly on administration in comparison to the winding-up of a
company that follows the traditional procedure.f"
It is submitted that judicial management should lead automatically to a creditors'
voluntary winding-up where the creditors so resolve at the meeting to decide whether
to accept the proposals of the judicial manager for a plan of future conduct; where the
directors do not accept the proposals for a plan of future conduct of the company
approved by the creditors and where the creditors resolve to terminate the operation of
the plan of future conduct and to liquidate the company. In normal circumstances a
415This section gives the court the power to terminate a deed of company arrangement where the deed
was agreed to by creditors on false and misleading information about the company's business, property,
affairs or fmancial circumstances.
416Corporations Law, s 446B, see also Australian Corporations and Securities Law Reporter par l38-
040.
417Corporations Law, division 12 and s 446A.
418Corporations Law, s 446A.
419FromJune 1993 to March 1995 the number of Australian companies entering into administration has
shown a steady growth rate with a resulting fall in the number of creditors' voluntary liquidations. In
1994 there were 901 administrations compared to 393 creditors' voluntary liquidations. In England
there were 196 administrations and 7875 creditors' voluntary liquidations in 1997. See Lessing &
Corkey Corporate Insolvency Law 50-51; Insolvency Service (England) "Insolvency General Annual
Report" (1997).
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creditors' voluntary winding-up must be initiated by a special resolution of the
company in general meeting.Y' The proposal gives the required majority of creditors
the power to iniate even if this is opposed by the members. Where the proposals for
future conduct envisage the eventual liquidation of the company in certain
circumstances and those circumstances occur the judicial manager should also apply
to court for the liquidation of the company.
It is a bit more contentious who the liquidator should be in such circumstances. On the
one hand, it would be logical to suggest that the judicial manager should be the
liquidator. This will facilitate winding-up as he would be well acquainted with the
affairs of the company. On the other hand if it has to be a person other than the
judicial manager it would encourage the judicial manager to make a success of
judicial management. Olver also recommends that the judicial manager should not be
.r the liquidator if the company is subsequently wound up. Nor should the partner,
business associate, employer or employee of the judicial manager be the liquidator in
these circumstances. He also recommends that the same restriction should apply to
any other company within a group of companies that is under judicial management.V''
Appointing the judicial manager as liquidator could also lead to abuse of the
procedure by the directors of the company in order to achieve the appointment of a
friendly liquidator. This problem could be rectified by giving the creditors the option
to change the judicial manager or the liquidator at different stages of the process.
3 6 5 Draft legislation to give effect to the proposals
Section 5423 (Transition to voluntary winding-up)
(l) The company is deemed passed a special resolution that the company be wound up
voluntarily if:
(a) the directors of the company do not approve the proposals for future
conduct within seven days after the creditors approved them at a creditors'
meeting; or
(b) the creditors of a company under judicial management resolve that the
company be wound up in terms of section 4(2)(a)(iii); or
420 See 3 3 2, n 74.
421 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 349.
422 Olver 1986 THRHR 87. He is also supported by Lessing & Corkery Corporate Insolvency Law 105.
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(c) the creditors of a company governed by a plan of future conduct resolve to
terminate the plan of future conduct and to put the company into liquidation in
terms of section 4(7); or
(d) if the plan of future conduct specifies circumstances in which the plan of
future conduct is to terminate and the company is to be wound up and those
circumstances have arisen.
(2) The judicial manager, his or her partner, business associate, employer or employee
is disqualified from being appointed as liquidator of a company of which he or her
was the judicial manager.
423 Based on Corporations Law, s 446A.
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CHAPTER4
The judicial manager: powers and duties and appointment
4 1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined the mechanism of the business rescue procedure. This
chapter discusses the position of the judicial manager. The judicial manager has a
vital role. The eventual success of a business rescue will be determined by the way in
which the judicial manager manages the process. This applies not only to the success
of any individual business rescue but also to the successful establishment of a culture
of business rescues in South Africa.
Before the decision can be made as to who is the most appropriate person for
appointment as judicial manager, it is necessary to look at the precise role that he is to
play in the judicial management process. Therefore this chapter first examines the
powers and duties of the judicial manager and then considers the necessary qualities
for appointment as judicial manager. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the
remuneration of the judicial manager and the circumstances in which he can be
removed from office.
4 2 The role of the judicial manager
It can be safely assumed that the task awaiting the judicial manager in a modem
business rescue procedure in South Africa will be very similar to the role of the
administrator in English law.
The administrator in English law is faced with a two-fold task, namely, the
formulation of a plan of future conduct acceptable to the creditors and the successful
management of the company while this plan is drawn up and approved. Successful
management in the interim will preserve the company and protect the interests of
creditors.I
The first step of the administrator will be to acquire as much information as possible
on the financial, trading and market position of the company. The financial
information, however, will seldom reflect the current position precisely, because it
will normally be at least a few weeks old. He will need to know which of the current
I See generally Fletcher et al Law and Practice of Corporate Administrations (1994) 152 et seq.
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liabilities need to be paid for the company to stay viable. He will need to identify
goods bought under reservation of title and goods on lease.
The administrator also needs to look at contracts that may terminate because of the
company being under administration such as leases of land and buildings, ship
charters, licenses to use patented processes or trade marks, franchise agreements,
permission to use copyright material, and insurance. His negotiating skills will be
tested in making arrangements with the parties concerned in order to continue to
utilise these rights.
The administrator then needs to decide how to provide an adequate cash flow to keep
the company's business going. Often this will come from outstanding debt receivable,
but not where it has already been factored. The book debts may also be part of the
security of a secured creditor, so that it will not be possible for the administrator to
utilise payment of these debts to fund the business.
After considering these matters, the administrator needs to draw up a cash-flow
projection for the next few months. This will enable him to establish the amount that
is needed to finance any shortfall in cash flow. These financial projections will enable
him to make a decision on whether it is financially possible to continue the business.
This is an important decision. Even in cases where the administrator hopes to sell the
assets more advantageously (as a going concern) the business needs to continue.
The administrator also needs to determine the causes of past losses. The reasons may
not always be easy to identify. Few failures will be caused by a sudden and unique
trading disaster? More common causes of losses are through diversifying into fields
where the management of the company lacks expertise, or a premature or ill-
conceived introduction of a new product line by the company, or the stubborn
clinging to an unprofitable product line by the company, or attempts by the company
to make extraordinary profits through deals which have not gone as expected.
Sometimes detailed research will be necessary to establish the causes of poor
performance.
The administrator will however have to contend with more than financial matters. The
administrator will need to make other strategic decisions. He will have to decide
2 Such as the PanAm Flight 103 that exploded above the Scottish town of Lockerbie in 1988 or the
decision by Sanmed, the operator of a medical scheme, who installed a new computer programme
which created such administrative chaos that the medical scheme found itself in deep trouble.
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whether the production line should be made more efficient; whether the company has
the right staff to continue the business and whether the company will be able to keep
them. If the administrator decides to make staff redundant he will have to do this in
accordance with the relevant provisions of labour law.' But the administrator will
need to play more roles than those of investigator and business strategist, he should
also be a motivator and skilled negotiator. The administrator will have to assure the
staff of the future of the company and secure the supply of raw materials.
The administrator also becomes the one responsible for the operating procedures of
the company and must take care that safety and other regulations are adhered to.
The day to day affairs of the company may be run by the administrator himself as he
may often elect to oust the directors from control of the company's business and to
work directly with the senior staff. On the other hand, he may prefer to leave the
general management structure in place subject to his general supervision. In addition
to changes to the management structure, he may find it necessary to change the
management information systems of the company.
Having done all of the above, the administrator still needs to formulate his plan for the
future conduct of the business for the approval by the creditors. Besides taking these
steps to restore the business to success, the judicial manager will also have to
investigate and report on the past conduct of the directors.
4 3 Powers and duties of judicial manager
From the above description of the practical steps that the judicial manager needs to
take, it is quite clear that he will need wide-ranging powers. The judicial manager will
at least need general management powers, certain specific powers such as the power
to dismiss directors and the power to investigate the affairs of the company. The
powers of the judicial manager must also be sufficiently wide to enable the judicial
manager to perform the duties entrusted to him by the legislature. It is therefore
appropriate to consider the judicial manager's powers and duties together.
3 In South Africa, the most important provisions are contained in the Labour Relations Act s 185 - s
197.
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4 3 1 Judicial management (South Africa)
4 3 1 1 General powers and duties
On his appointment the provisional judicial manager has the duty to assume the
management of the company and to recover and reduce into possession all the assets
of the company." Thus the provisional judicial manager has all the powers necessary
to manage the company until an order is made to discharge the provisional judicial
management order or to make a final judicial management order. These powers would
include the powers necessary to keep the business going and to raise the necessary
funds to do so. The Companies Act does not however expressly confer any general
powers on the provisional judicial manager for this purpose.
The final judicial manager on his appointment takes over from the provisional judicial
manager and assumes the management of the company. He must manage the
company, subject to the orders of the court, in such a manner as he deems most
economic and most promotive of the interests of the members and creditors of the
company.' This implies that if some plan of future conduct was in fact laid before the
court the court may have given directions based on it. The management task of the
judicial manager differs from that of the directors to the extent that the judicial
manager is expressly required to take into consideration the interests of the creditors
as wel1.6 This is to be expected in the light of the financial situation that led to judicial
management.
In exercising this management task, both the provisional and final judicial manager
are subject to the supervision of the court.' The judicial manager is appointed by the
Master.! his remuneration is determined by the Master9 and he may be removed by
the court.l" In exercising his powers and executing his duties the judicial manager,
whether provisional or final, is not an officer of the company, but an officer of the
court. II
4 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 430(a).
5 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 433(a) and (b).
6 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 433(b). see also Meskin Henochsberg I 944 and Cilliers & Benade et al
Corporate Law 483.
7 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 428(2)(a) and s 432(3)(a).
8 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 429(b)(i) and s 431(4).
9 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 434A. See also Cilliers & Benade et al Corporate Law 482.
10 The court has an inherent power to remove a judicial manager. See The Master of the Supreme Court
v Bell 1954 2 PH E21 (T) and The Master v Bell 1955 3 SA 100 (T). See also LA WSA IV part 3 477.
IIRennie NO v Holzman and Others 19874 SA 938 (C); 19893 SA 706 (A).
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4 3 1 2 Specific powers and duties
The Companies Act does not expressly provide any specific powers for the
provisional and final judicial managers. Such powers must be deduced from the
statutory duties assigned to the provisional and final judicial manager respectively.
The judicial manager has the specific duty to convene general meetings of the
company, including the annual general meeting, and meetings of creditors.V The
judicial manager has the duty to apply to court for the cancellation of the judicial
management order, if at any time he is of the opinion that the continuation of the
judicial management will not enable the company to become a successful concem.t'
The judicial manager does not have the power to sell or otherwise dispose of any of
the assets of the company save in the ordinary course of business." Therefore, if the
.r need arises to sell assets in order to restructure the business or to save costs or for any
other reason to dispose of them in a manner inconsistent with how a business of that
kind would normally be conducted, the permission of the court should be sought."
The judicial manager also has the power to ask the court to set aside transactions that
amount to voidable or undue preferences under the applicable provisions of
insolvency law.16
4 3 1 3 Power and duty to investigate affairs
The provisional judicial manager has the implied power to investigate the affairs of
the company in order to comply with the statutory duty to report to the meetings of
creditors, members and debenture-holders convened by the Master. The investigation
should provide the judicial manager with enough information to prepare and lay
before the meetings a report on the general state of the affairs of the company, the
reasons why the company is unable to pay its debts and why it is unsuccessful, a list
of the creditors, particulars as to the possible sources of income and a considered
opinion as to the prospects of the company becoming a successful concern."
12 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 433(g). See also LA WSA IV part 3 par 378.
13 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 433 (I). See also Meskin Henochsberg 1946.
14 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 434(1).
15 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 434(1).
16 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 436(1). Meskin Henochsberg I 954 submits that a provisional judicial
manager cannot exercise the powers under this section unless empowered accordingly by the court.
17 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 430(c).
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The provisional judicial manager in investigating the company should rely on the
cooperation of the directors and other people involved with the company to obtain the
necessary information. It could also be argued that the fact that the Companies Act
assigns these duties to a provisional judicial manager implies that he at least has the
power to ask for the necessary information and demand that it should be handed to
him. He, however, does not appear to be in the same position as the final judicial
manager who may be given certain investigative powers by the court and can be
assisted in the inquiry by the court and the Master exercising their own powers of
investigation in terms of section 417 of the Companies Act. 18
The judicial manager has more investigative duties than the provisional judicial
manager. The judicial manager must examine the affairs and transactions of the
company prior to the judicial management order in order to form an opinion whether
any director (past or present) or officer (past or present) of the company has
contravened any provision of the Companies Act or committed an offence. His
findings should be in the form of a report to the Master."
As stated above the judicial manager has the support of the court and the Master in
that they may use their powers in terms of section 417 of the Companies Act to
conduct an investigation and to force persons to cooperate.i" The court, in the judicial
management order, may also direct that certain provisions concerning the winding-up
of a company apply. Such provisions would give the judicial manager powers to
examine any persons relevant to the judicial management and the judicial manager
would thus have the same powers of summoning and examination as the Master or
court who appointed him."
4 3 I 4 Liability ofthe judicial manager
Once the judicial management order is made any moneys of the company becoming
available to the judicial manager shall be applied by him in paying the costs of the
judicial management and in the conduct of the company's business in accordance with
the judicial management order." The costs in the conduct of the company's business
18 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 439(2) and 417.
19 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 4330).
20 For the constitutionality of s 417 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 see Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 1
SA 984 (CC); 1996 1 BCLR 1 (CC) and Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 2 SA 751 (CC), 1996 4 BCLR
449 (CC).
21 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 439(2), read with ss 414, 415, 416, 417 and 418(2).
22 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 434(2).
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include the expenditure incurred to continue the operations of the company, such as
salaries and wages, water and electricity, licensing fees, insurance premiums, raw
materials, tent and instalments under instalment sale transactions." Thus the costs
involved in keeping the company's business going are given preference over the pre-
judicial management debts. This preference however lasts only for the duration of
judicial management. Should judicial management end in liquidation debts incurred
during judicial management will only have preference in the liquidation if the
creditors adopted a resolution to this effect in terms of section 435(1) of the
Companies Act. 24
The judicial manager thus has a real dilemma in terms of the costs of conduct of the
business during judicial management. If he fails to obtain a resolution of the creditors
resulting in the preference for the judicial management debts, he may in effect be
incurring debts which will fall with all the other unsecured debts and which could
yield very little if the company is subsequently liquidated.
The result is that the judicial manager might find himself in a situation similar to that
of the liquidator in Kerbels Flooring and Carpeting (Pty) Ltd v Shorsbee," In this
case the liquidator was held personally liable for negligence. The liquidator elected to
continue with a contract in terms of which Kerbels as subcontractor would complete
the tiling of school premises that were being built by the liquidated company. His
negligence arose from his failure to ensure that the liquidated company had enough
money to pay the resultant obligation. The judicial manager may become similarly
liable when he incurs costs in the conduct of the company's business during judicial
management and in the end finds that those creditors remain unpaid because they
have no preference in a subsequent liquidation.
Even if the circumstances are different and negligence may be more difficult to prove,
the judicial manager will nevertheless have a moral dilemma whether to continue with
business in the face of a possibility that the creditors may only have a concurrent
claim with the expectation of a very small dividend. It could tarnish his integrity and
reputation in such a way that his professional future may be adversely affected.
23 Meskin Henochsberg I 950.
24 See further Meskin Henochsberg I 953.
25 1994 (1) SA 655 (SE).
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4 3 2 Administration (England)
4 3 2 1 General powers
The general powers of the administrator include the power to "do all things necessary
for the management of the affairs, business and property of the company" .26 These
powers are necessary to enable the administrator to take control of and manage the
company and its business effectively.
On his appointment the administrator takes all the property of the company, or to
which the company appears to be entitled, into his custody. The primary functions of
the administrator are to manage the affairs, business and property of the company and
to prepare proposals to achieve the purpose or purposes set out in the administration
order. The administrator must manage the affairs of the company and he has the
power to do so until his proposals are approved. In exercising these powers the
administrator is deemed to act as the company's agent."
Contracts entered into before administration do not terminate except where the
contract in question so provides." Such provisions are often encountered in practicer"
In the time between the granting of the administration order and the approval of the
administrator's proposals, the administrator manages the business on his own
initiative. Although there are as yet no guidelines from the still to be accepted
proposals to regulate the administrator's actions, he does not need the approval of the
court for each transaction.i" At this point he must be guided by the purposes set out in
the administration order as those which his administration is intended to achieve."
The administrator may however refer for guidance to the independent report on the
financial position of the company." These sources provide only broad and vague
26 Insolvency Act 1986, s 14(1)(a).
27 Insolvency Act 1986, s 14(5).
28 Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 317.
29 The common practice of inserting into contracts provisions terminating the contract or rendering it
terminable upon the company going into administration is a cause for concern, see Goode Principles of
Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 323.
30 See the text at n 35 infra as to when the administrator in his discretion may nevertheless approach the
court for guidance.
31 As the administrator acts as agent of the company it is clear that he cannot enter into any transactions
which the company, as his principal, cannot enter into. Thus he cannot enter into transactions ultra
vires the company. Such transactions would be a breach of duty. The company would however still be
bound because of the provisions of the Companies Act 1985. See Fletcher et al Law and Practice of
Corporate Administrators (1994) 68 and also Brown Corporate Rescue 279.
32 This report was filed with the petition for the administration order and was accepted by the court.
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guidelines. Nevertheless they guide the administrator in his decisions on whether or
not to dispose of assets, enter into new contracts, and terminate, renew or continue
with existing contracts.
The administrator should not do anything that would seriously and adversely affect
the achievement of the proposals which he intends to submit to the company's
creditors, or anything that will prevent any such proposals being prepared."
Once the administrator's proposals have been prepared and accepted, in accordance
with the purposes set out in the administration order, the administrator must manage
the affairs of the company in accordance with those proposals. These proposals may
be revised from time to time by the administrator with the approval of meetings of
creditors."
The administrator may apply to the court for directions in relation to a particular
matter arising in connection with the carrying out of his functions.f This the
administrator may do regardless of whether it relates to the period before his
proposals were accepted or thereafter.
4 3 2 2 Specific powers
Added to the general powers of the administrator is a long and comprehensive list of
specific powers described in Schedule 1 to the Insolvency Act, 1986. It corresponds
quite closely to the list of common powers of a company contained in schedule 2 to
the South African Companies Act, 61 of 1973.36
Over and above his general and specific management powers the administrator also
has certain other powers." The administrator has the power to remove a director from
office. He also has the power to appoint a person to be a director of the company,
whether to fill a vacancy or otherwise. He may also call any meeting of members or
creditors."
As explained above,39 the directors of the company may still exercise certain powers.
However, any power conferred on the company or its officers, by the Act or the
33 Re Charnley Davies Ltd [1988] BCLC 243.
34 Insolvency Act 1986, s l7(2)(b) read with s 25.
35 Insolvency Act 1986, s 14(3).
36 See the discussion in Brown Corporate Rescue 294 - 303.
37 Insolvency Act 1986, s 14(2).
38 See also 43 2 Ysupra and Brown Corporate Rescue 303 - 305.
39 See 3 4 2 2 supra.
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company's constitution, which could interfere with the functions of the administrator
and the exercise of his powers may not be exercised except with the permission of the
administrator. The administrator can give this permission in either general terms or in
a specific instance."
Similar to the position in Australia, the administrator has the power to deal with
property subject to a floating charge even though the floating charge may have
become operative." In fact, he may even dispose of such property. The administrator
may also, with the leave of the court, dispose of property subject to a fixed charge or
to a hire-purchase agreement (reserving title to the seller). The proceeds of all such
disposals are however earmarked for the purposes of paying those secured creditors'
debts.42
The administrator also has the power to ensure the continuation of supplies of gas,
water, electricity and telecommunication services, the so-called essential supplies by
utilities. When the administrator makes a request for the continuation of the supply of
essential utilities, the relevant supplier is prevented from threatening to cut off
supplies to compel preferential payment of outstanding arrears. Prior to the
Insolvency Act of 1986 this practice was permissible. The supplier may, however,
make it a condition of supply that the administrator personally guarantees the payment
of the charges for further supplies."
The administrator may also apply to the court to set aside "under value" transactions
to which the company was a party. 44
4 3 2 3 Powers o{investigation
The administrator has to investigate the affairs of the company for different purposes.
In the first place he needs to have the best possible information to enable him to
prepare his proposals to effect a business rescue. He also needs to establish what led
the company to its present problems. On the other hand he has a duty to report on the
conduct of the directors. The administrator thus needs various powers to solicit
information from people connected with the company and its operations as well as
40 Insolvency Act 1986, s 14(4).
41 Insolvency Act 1986, s 15.
42 Insolvency Act 1986, s 15.
43 Insolvency Act 1986, s 233. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the public utilities are not
able to exploit the advantage resulting from the essential nature of the services which they are legally
obliged to provide, Fletcher Law of Insolvency 460.
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powers to obtain control or possession of property or records belonging to the
company.
In order to obtain the necessary information to establish the state of the affairs of the
company the administrator has the power and the duty to require certain persons to
furnish him with a statement of affairs of the company.Y This statement of affairs
must be verified by an affidavit from the person making the statement. The
administrator may also require concurring affidavits from others to verify the
statement of affairs. The concurring affidavit should indicate where the person
making it disagrees with the statement of affairs."
.• r
The statement of affairs should include particulars of the assets of the company, its
debts and liabilities, names and addresses of creditors, securities held by creditors and
the date on which they were created, the preferential debts and liabilities in the case of
a winding-up and the estimated shortfall or excess of company assets after satisfying
its debts."
This statement of affairs and accompanying affidavits should then be filed in court,
where they are open to inspection by the public." If the administrator considers this to
be undesirable in the context of the administration he may apply to court for
permission not to file the statement at all or to file different sections separately and to
allow access thereto only with leave of the COurt.49
Further to the statement of affairs the administrator also has powers similar to those of
a liquidator in a winding-up to require any persons to deliver to him any property,
books, papers or records of the company in his possession or under his control. The
administrator may apply summarily to the court for an order to compel anyone to
comply with his request to deliver these items. 50 The court also has certain powers of
examination, similar to those in a liquidation, which it may use to help the
44 Insolvency Act 1986, s 238. This is the equivalent of an undue preference in South African Law.
45 Insolvency Act 1986, s 22(1). The persons referred to are those who are or have been officers of the
company; those who have taken part in the company's formation at any time within one year before the
date of the administration order; those who are in the company's employment or have been in its
employment within that year and are in the administrator's opinion capable of giving the information
required; and those who are or have been within that year officers or employees of a company which is,
or within that year was, an officer of the company under administration. (See the Insolvency Act 1986,
s 22(3).)
46Insolvency Act 1986, s 22(2); Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.12 and Sch 4, form 2.9.
47Insolvency Act 1986, s 22(2); Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.12 and Sch 4 form 2.9.
48 Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.12(6).
49 Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.13.
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administrator to ascertain the company's assets and liabilities, the nature and effect of
the transactions entered into by the company and the possibility of invalidating them,
and to enable the administrator to decide whether to litigate in the company's name or
to make any relevant applications in the administration proceedinga."
If it appears to the administrator that the conduct of a director or former director of the
company makes him unfit to be concerned with the management of a company the
administrator must report this to the Secretary of State. Moreover the Secretary of
State has certain powers to require the administrator to furnish him with information
with respect to any person's conduct as a director of the company."
4 3 2 4 Duties of the administrator
The duties of the administrator include taking custody or control of the property of the
company, including property to which it appears to be entitled" and the carrying on of
the business of the company. 54 The administrator must also convene a meeting of
creditors ifhe is requested to do SO.55 He is obliged to make an application to the court
for the administration order to be discharged if each of the purposes in the
administration order has been achieved or has become impossible, or if he is required
by a creditors' meeting to do SO.56
The administrator under English law needs to give notification of his appointment.
Notice should be given to the company, any person who has appointed or is entitled to
appoint an administrative receiver of the company, the administrative receiver of the
company, any petitioner of a pending petition for winding-up of the company, other
creditors whose addresses are known and to the Registrar of Companies. 57 These
notices have to be followed by an advertisement in the Gazette, and once in such
newspaper as the administrator thinks would be appropriate for bringing the
administration to the attention of the creditors of the company.
50 Insolvency Act 1986, s 234( 1) and (2).
51 Insolvency Act, 1986, s 236.
52 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 7(3). The duty of the administrator to report on the
prior conduct of the directors is criticised as one of the reasons for the lack of popularity of the
administration order procedure. Fletcher Law of Insolvency 479 and Grier & Floyd Corporate Recovery
214.
53 Insolvency Act 1986, s 17(1).
54 Insolvency Act 1986, s 17 (2).
55 Insolvency Act 1986, s 17(3).
56 Insolvency Act 1986, Insolvency Act 1986, s 18.
57 Insolvency Act 1986, s 21, read with Insolvency Rules 2.10.
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4 3 2 5 Liability of the administrator
Unlike the position in Australian law, the administrator incurs no personal
responsibility on any new contracts entered into on behalf of the company. The only
exception is where he agrees to such personal liability. However any sums of money
payable because of contracts entered into by him or a predecessor are charged on the
property of the company in his possession or under his control and he has a duty to
see that these get paid in priority to his own remuneration and expenses."
4 3 3 Voluntary administration (Australia)
Once the administrator is appointed he has to give the necessary notices to the ASe,
to the creditors and in the prescribed newspapers." He then has to convene the first
meeting of the creditors, manage and investigate the company's affairs, make reports
to the ASe where necessary, prepare proposals for the eventual deed of company
arrangement, convene and conduct the creditors' meeting to decide on the future of
the company, and in his capacity as administrator of the deed of company
arrangement execute the deed and conduct the company's affairs in accordance with
the deed.
4 3 3 1 General powers
As one would expect and similar to the position in South Africa and England, the
administrator must take control of the business, property and affairs of the company
upon the commencement of administration.
He may carry on the business and manage the property of the company; terminate or
dispose of all or part of the company's business or property; and perform any function
and exercise any power that the corporation or any of its officers could perform or
exercise if it were not under administration."
The powers of all the company's officers are suspended for the duration of the
administration and the administrator is able to exercise all the powers previously held
by the officers. Similar to the position in English law the administrator is taken to be
•
58 Insolvency Act 1986, s 19(5).
59 Corporations Law s 450A.
60 Corporations Law, s 437A.
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acting as the agent of the company when he performs a function or exercises a power
as administrator of the company under administration.61
4 3 3 2 Specific powers
In addition to the general powers described above, the administrator also has a
number of specific powers. These are to ensure II that the administrator has sufficient
powers to adequately control the company during the administration and to put
forward recommendations to the meeting of creditors at the end of administration
based on a full understanding of the company's financial position."? The powers are
as drastic as those under English law in that the administrator has the power to
remove from office and appoint directors of the company." The exercise of this power
to remove directors that are perceived as being part of the cause of the company's
problems may help the administrator to gain the trust of the creditors."
He also has the power to execute documents on behalf of the company, to bring and
defend legal proceedings or to do anything else in the name of or on behalf of the
company. Leaving nothing to chance the Australian legislature also added a catch-all
power, the power to do anything else that is necessary for the purposes of
administration."
Similar to the English position, the administrator in Australia also has the power to
deal with property that is the subject of a floating charge even though the floating
charge has become operative when the company was placed in administration. It gives
the administrator the right to treat that property as if the floating charge has not come
into operation yet. This power is important otherwise the administrator would be
virtually powerless to deal with virtually any of the assets of the company, as the vast
majority of the assets may be subject to the floating charge."
4 3 3 3 Powers o{investigation
The administrator in his attempt to get a full understanding of the financial and other
affairs of the company must investigate the affairs of the company. In order for him to
61 Corporations Law, s 437B.
62 Explanatory Paper to the Corporate Law reform Bill 1992. See also Crutchfield Corporate Voluntary
Administration Law 137-145.
63 Corporations Law, s 442A.
64 Keay 1997 Company and Securities Law Journal 150.
65 Corporations Law, s 442A.
66 Corporations Law, s 442B, s 442C, s 442D.
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do so effectively the law requires directors to hand over any books relating to the
company, to notify the administrator of the whereabouts of any books and to give to
the administrator a statement about the company's business, property, affairs and
financial circumstances." The administrator also has the right to require other persons
to hand over the books of the company or to make the books available for
inspection."
The administrator is obliged to lodge a report with the Ase when it appears to him in
the course of the administration of the company that a past or present officer or a
member of the company may have been guilty of an offence against the company.
This duty to report to the ASe also extends to the case where a person who took part
in the formation, promotion, administration, management or winding-up of the
company may have misapplied, retained, or became accountable for money or
property of the company, or may have been guilty of negligence, default, breach of
duty or breach of trust in relation to the company. 69 Even if the administrator does not
lodge a report the court may require him to do so if circumstances exist from which it
appears that he is under a duty to lodge a report."
When investigating or making these reports the administrator is protected by a
qualified privilege from claims in respect of all statements made during the course of
performing any of his functions and powers as administrator." This is to ensure that
the administrator can be frank and direct in his investigations and reports.
4 3 3 4 Liability o{the administrator
The liability of the administrator in Australia is one of the aspects that a person should
seriously consider before accepting an appointment as administrator. Investigation of
this aspect indicates that some do consider this as a deterrent, but more often than not
it does not deter them from accepting office."
The administrator of a company under administration is liable for all the debts that he
incurs during administration. Moreover the administrator cannot by contract relieve
67 Corporations Law, s 438B. See also Tomasic Australian Corporate Insolvency Law 145.
68 Corporations Law, s 438C. An example of such a person is someone who has possession of the
books by virtue of a lien.
69 Corporations Law, s 438D(1) and (2).
70 Corporations Law, s 438D(3).
7l Corporations Law, s 442E.
72 Lessing & Corkery Corporate Insolvency Law 53,69.
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himself of this liability. 73 If at the time when administration commences the company
- is the lessee of property, the administrator has seven days to inform himself of the
financial position of the company and to decide whether or not to give notice to the
lessor that the company will no longer exercise its rights in terms of the existing
agreement. If the administrator does not give such notice the administrator will also
become liable for the rental payments." The administrator is however entitled to be
indemnified out of the property of the company for such debts and Iiabilities.f The
administrator is of course also liable for the payment of taxes,"
4 3 4 Evaluation
4 3 4 1Duties ofthe judicial manager
It is clear from the discussion above that a judicial manager in a corporate rescue
regime should at least have the following duties:
He should accept his appointment, take control of the property, management and
affairs of the company and notify the appropriate people.
He should assess the financial and market position of the company.
He should decide whether any of the purposes of judicial management can be attained
and form an opinion on the future course of the company.
He should formulate his proposals for a plan of future conduct to achieve the purpose
or purposes of judicial management.
He should submit his proposals and his opinion to a meeting of creditors who must
decide upon the future of the company.
He should implement the decision of the company's creditors, whether that decision
be for the winding-up of the company, the discharge of judicial management or the
acceptance of a plan of future conduct.
In the interim he should also protect the assets and manage the affairs of the company,
including the appointment and dismissal of officers and the decisions on whether or
not to continue with existing contracts.
73 Corporations Law, s 443A. See generally Crutchfield Corporate Voluntary Administration Law 148-
149.
74 Corporations Law, s 443B.
75 Corporations Law, s 443D.
76 Corporations Law, s 443BA.
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He should do all this in the best interests of the company and its creditors.
Lastly, he should make the necessary reports on the conduct of the directors.
4 3 4 2 General powers
It is clear that the judicial manager has to do a lot of work within tight time
constraints. His responsibilities on two fronts should be considered. One the one hand
there is his responsibility to formulate some plan or proposal for the future conduct of
the affairs of the company. On the other hand the level of his control over the
company and his involvement with the day to day running of the business operations
should be considered.
Concentrating on the formulation of a plan for future conduct whilst leaving the
administration in the hands of the existing management presents certain dangers. The
.r judicial manager in such circumstances may fail to win the trust of the creditors, both
generally in terms of the business culture of insolvency in South Africa, being a
country with a pro-creditor insolvency regime, and in actual circumstances of a
particular case. In the business rescue procedure of Ireland, these two functions are
split between the examiner (judicial manager) and the incumbent management. The
examiner has to formulate a plan of future conduct while the incumbent management
manages the company. 77 It has however been said of this approach that it is
impossible for the judicial manager to sit removed from the action busy formulating
his proposals when elsewhere creditors demand their goods back or refuse to supply
further goods no matter what legal priority they are offered."
A further danger through the lack of control by the judicial manager is the possibility
of assets being dissipated by unscrupulous directors. This might result in the whole
procedure being perceived as a way of avoiding legal obligations and an avenue to
dissipate assets.
It is thus not advisable to leave the control of the assets in the hands of the
management. This has clearly been recognised by all three jurisdictions discussed
above. It is important for the creditors to know that in return for a stay of their rights
of enforcement, the judicial manager and not the directors will have full control of the .
assets.
77 For a brief overview of the Irish law see Rajak et al European Corporate Insolvency 311 - 322.
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There will, however, be a price to be paid for such a provision. The judicial manager
may need to bring in his own staff to run the company, which could be such a costly
exercise that it would in effect be a dissipating of assets by the judicial manager.
There therefore needs to be a balance between handing full control to the judicial
manager and the continued involvement of the present management. After all, it is the
incumbent management who may stand to benefit the most if the business is
preserved. The involvement of a party with a considerable personal stake may
strengthen the judicial management process.Ï"
4 3 4 3 Specific powers
The specific powers of the administrators provided for in the English and Australian
law cover all possibilities and end with a catch-all provision.t" Most notably and
necessary is the power to dismiss and appoint directors.t! This should be
complemented by the power to adjust the remuneration of existing directors who
remain in office, although this might not be feasible within the provisions of labour
law."
The specific powers of the judicial manager could easily be dealt with in legislation. It
is also submitted that the general powers of the judicial manager should be included in
the relevant legislation. This would remove the necessity to deduce the extent of the
powers of the judicial manager indirectly by examining the duties assigned to him.
Nevertheless it does not appear that the present position in South Africa has led to any
serious problems.
4 3 4 4 Power ofinvestigation
The investigation of the company's affairs is of the outmost importance. Any of the
decisions and proposals made by the judicial manager will only be as good as the
information they are based on. In this regard it is important for the judicial manager to
have the power to oblige certain persons to provide him with a statement of affairs.
The directors should always give a statement of affairs to the judicial manager. After
78 Report on Corporate rescue and insolvent trading (1996) Law reform Commission of Hong Kong
52.
79 For a discussion of the relationship between the judicial manager and the directors see 3 4 2 4 supra.
80 See the English Insolvency Act sch 1 par 23 and also Brown Corporate Rescue 320; see also the
Australian Corporations Law s 437A(l)(d) and (2).
81 Whether the director can be dismissed depends on the de facto situation. The director can be
dismissed from office without regard to labour law. If however the director is dismissed as employee
the labour law applies. Oakland Industries (SA) (Pty) Ltd v John NO and another 1987 4 SA 702 (N).
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all they are responsible for the management of the company and its is to be presumed
that they would have access to the best information. Furthermore the judicial manager
should be able to call for information from all officers of the company,83 and where
the secretary of the company is a body corporate, the directors and officers of that
body corporate, any person who may have taken part in the formation of the company
if such involvement was less than a year before the company was placed under
judicial management and current company employees or anyone who was an
employee within the year before the company was placed under judicial
management. 84
The statement of affairs should include: particulars of the company's assets, debts and
liabilities (provisional and contingent); names and addresses of creditors; details of
security held by creditors and the date that the security was given; the reasons in the
opinion of the person making the statement why the company is in its present state of
affairs; and, any other information that the judicial manager may reasonably require.
It is submitted that it is quite obvious that the judicial manager should be empowered
to solicit information from officers of the company. They would or at least should
have an intimate knowledge of the property, business and affairs of the company. The
same justification applies to certain employees of the company. It is also conceivable
that former employees of the company would be in possession of valuable
information and insight into the business and affairs of the company.
The statement made by the directors should be verified by an affidavit. This should
ensure information of better quality. In would also benefit subsequent investigations
by the judicial manager into the prior conduct of directors. In the event of false
information being submitted on affidavit it may lead to the perpetrator's
disqualification as a director."
Preferably the process of assessing the company's present state should start even
before the commencement of judicial management, and it is conceivable that directors
82 For a discussion about the remuneration of the judicial manager see 45.
83 The Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 1 defines a officer as the managing director, manager or secretary
of the company but excludes a secretary which is a body corporate.
84 See 4 3 2 3 supra for the position in the English law and 4 3 3 3 supra for the position in the
Australian law.
85 A person who at any time has been convicted of perjury and has been sentenced to imprisonment
without the option of a fine or to a fine exceeding one hunderd rand shall be disqualified from being
appointed or acting as a director of the company unless the court gives permission. (Companies Act 61
of 1973 s 218(l)(d)(iii).
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would be in contact with potential judicial managers for some time before their
appointment, especially if, as seems logical, the judicial managers' consent to their
appointment is required.
To facilitate this process and to guard against the abuse of judicial management by
directors wishing to free their company or themselves from their lawful liabilities it
should be made a requirement that judicial management will only commence if the
directors also file supporting affidavits with their decision to place the company in
judicial management. These affidavits would need to confirm the reasons for the
decision and the purpose of judicial management.
These proposals would need an amendment to the current legislation in South Africa
where the powers of the judicial manager to investigate are derived from the
possibility of the court or the Master sumrnonning persons to appear before them.86
The judicial manager only has the power to compel certain persons to attend meetings
or to summon them to appear before him if the court makes that part of the judicial
management order. 87 This approach is clumsy and should be streamlined by giving
the judicial manager the power to demand information supported by affidavit (if the
judicial manager so requires) in addition to those powers that he already has in terms
of the Companies Act.
4 3 4 5 Liability ofthe judicial manager
With reference to the liability of judicial managers, it is a difficult question whether
the judicial manager should be liable for any debts of the company during the judicial
management. English law addresses this problem by designating the administrator as
the agent of the company under administration. He thus never incurs personal liability
for debts contracted on behalf of the company unless he agrees to it. The Australian
law makes the administrator personally liable for debts incurred during the period of
administration with a corresponding indemnity for those debts out of the property of
the company under administration as a first charge even before the remuneration of
the administrator. This is a way of circumventing the existing problem in judicial
management in South Africa where the meeting of creditors can decide whether or not
preference should be given to all new debts incurred while the company is under
judicial management.
86 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 417 read with s 439(2).
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An attorney with experience of judicial management indicated that this is a major
obstacle in the present judicial management process/" The creditors often refuse to
consent to such a proposal. The English answer to the problem is that an automatic
statutory preference is given even above the remuneration of the administrator. The
Australian method of making the administrator personally liable in effect results in
such an automatic statutory preference being given. It should be noted that both the
English and Australian approaches also go a step further than the possible South
African preference in that the new debts are preferred even above the remuneration of
the administrator. In South African law the preference consented to by the creditors
would not affect the payment of the costs of judicial management which includes the
remuneration of the judicial manager/"
The current dilemma of the South African judicial manager in not knowing whether
the creditors will consent to a preference for new debts, with the resultant danger of
personal liability in certain circumstances was discussed above.Ï" It is clear that this
situation should be resolved by removing the power to consent to the preference for
new debts from the creditors and by making statutory provision for it.
It has never been the intention that the judicial manager should be personally liable
for the debts of the company and the Australian position is a rather artificial
arrangement. There is no reason why there should not be a statutory preference for the
payment debts and liabilities incurred by the judicial manager out of the assets of the
company, especially where the creditors playa far more active role in the business
rescue, as proposed in this thesis." A judicial manager should only be liable for
damages due to his negligence in relation to the performance of his functions and the
exercise of his powers.
The question that remains is whether the judicial manager should have the power to
terminate existing contracts. The election that the Australian administrator has in
terms of lease agreements is a case in point.
87 See 4 3 1 3 supra.
88 Interview with attorney Robert Brieout of Hofmeyers, Cape Town in May 1998.
89 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 435(1).
90 See 4 3 I 4 supra.
91 Such a statutory preference facilitates the possibility of the company being rescued. It ensures
suppliers that they will be paid for supplies to the company in judicial management whilst the judicial
manager is formulating a plan of future conduct.
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Unless the judicial manager has the statutory power to cancel existing and continuing
contracts, a purported cancellation would more often than not be a breach of contract.
Moreover, the creditor cannot lightly be denied his contractual rights or the
contractual remedies that flow from a breach of contract. If that were allowed to
happen, judicial management may develop into an easy way to escape unwanted
contractual obligations.
What is certain however is that such a claim for breach of contract should not be
regarded as a liability incurred by the judicial manager in the course of judicial
management with the resultant statutory preference. It is submitted that it would be
pointless giving the judicial manager the opportunity to cancel the agreement and then
to treat the damages arising from the cancellation as preferent debts arising after the
commencement of the judicial management.
The suggested solution is to give the judicial manager an election whether to continue
with certain contracts or not and then to treat any damages resulting from premature
termination as debts arising before the commencement of judicial management"
Where the judicial manager decides to continue with the contract the resultant
liabilities arising after the commencement of judicial management would qualify for
the statutory preference. It should be kept in mind that it would only be those
contracts that are onerous to the company that would be cancelled. The whole idea of
judicial management is that the company should become a successful concern again.
In that sense ordinary business agreements would normally not be affected at all. The
kind of contract that springs to mind is the long term lease of property.
4 3 5 Draft legislation to give effect to the proposals
Section 693(Duties of the judicial manager)
(1) A judicial manager must:
Ca)on appointment forthwith assume the management of the affairs, business
and property of the company and recover and take possession of all the assets
of the company;
92 See also the election given to the judicial manager discussed in 3 4 1 4 1 supra and the proposed
legislation s 2 (4) in 3 4 1 5 supra.
93 Based on Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 430 and s 433.
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(b) conduct such management, subject to the supervision of the Master, in
such a manner as he or she may deem most economic and most promotive of
the interests of the members and creditors of the company;
(c) lodge with the Registrar of Companies
(i) within 7 days after his or her appointment a copy of the letter of
appointment as judicial manager;
(ii) in the event of the judicial management or the operation of the plan
of future conduct being terminated, a notice of such termination;
(d) prepare and lay before the meeting convened in terms of section 4(2) a
report containing
(i) an account of the business, property, affairs and financial
circumstances of the company;
(ii) a statement of the reasons why the company is unable to pay its
debts or is probably unable to meet its obligations;
(iii) a complete list of creditors of the company (including contingent
and prospective creditors), specifying the amount and nature of the
claim of each creditor;
(iv) the considered opinion of the judicial manager whether it would be
in the interests of the creditors to accept the plan of future conduct; or
for judicial management to end; or for the company to be wound up;
and
(v) proposals for the plan of future conduct;
(e) convene and conduct all meetings of members and creditors required by
this Act or requested in terms of this Act;
(f) keep such accounting records and prepare such annual financial statements
as the company or its directors would have been obliged to keep or prepare if
the company was not placed under judicial management;
(g) lodge with the Master copies of all such documents as prescribed or
requested;
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(h) examme the affairs of the company before the commencement of the
judicial management order in order to ascertain whether any director, or past
director, officer or past officer of the company has contravened or appears to
have contravened any provision of this Act or has committed any other
offence, and submit to the Master such reports as are in terms of section 400 of
the Companies Act required to be submitted by a liquidator;
(i) examine the affairs of the company before the commencement of the
judicial management order in order to ascertain whether any director, or past
director, officer or past officer of the company is or appears to be personally
liable to the company for damages or compensation to the company or for any
debts or liabilities of the company, and to report to the Master and to the
members and creditors the full particulars of any such liability;
CD apply to the court for any order in terms of section 4(8).
Section 794 (General powers)
(1) The judicial manager of a company:
(a) may do all such things as may be necessary for the management of the
affairs, business and property of the company, and
(b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a) has the powers
specified in the Schedule.
(2) The judicial manager also has power to call a meeting of the members or creditors
of the company.
(3) The judicial manager has the power to cancel onerous contracts provided that the
cancellation thereof will be deemed to have occurred before the company was placed
in judicial management.
(4) The judicial manager may apply to the court for directions in relation to any
particular matter arising in connection with the carrying out of his or her functions.
(5) In exercising his or her powers the judicial manager is deemed to act as the
company's agent.
Section 895 (Powers of investigation)
94 Based on the English Insolvency Act 1986, s 14.
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(1) Within 5 days of the company being placed in judicial management the directors
must give a statement about the company's business, property, affairs and financial
circumstances to the judicial manager.
(2) A director of a company under judicial management must attend on the judicial
manager at such times; and give the judicial manager such information about the
company's business, property, affairs and financial circumstances as the judicial
manager may reasonably require.
(3) When a company is placed in judicial management the judicial manager may
forthwith require some or all of the persons referred to in subsection (4) to furnish a
statement of affairs of the company within such a period as the judicial manager
reasonably requires.
(4) The persons for purposes of subsection (3) are:
(a) those who are or who have been officers of the company;
(b) directors and officers of an officer referred to in subsection (4)(a) who is a
juristic person;
(c) those who at any time within one year before the company was placed
under judicial management have taken part in the formation of the company;
and
(d) company employees or anyone who was a company employee within one
year before the company was placed in judicial management;
(5) The judicial manager may require any person to support any of the information
given in terms of this section with an affidavit.
Section 996 (preference to post-judicial management creditors)
(1) All liabilities incurred by the judicial manager in the conduct of the company's
business must be paid in preference to all other liabilities not already discharged
exclusive of the costs of judicial management, and thereupon all claims based upon
such first-mentioned liabilities have preference in the order in which they were
95 Section 7 should not replace the existing avenues and powers of investigation that the judicial
manager has in terms of Companies Act 61 of 1973 ss 439,417,414,415,416 and 418(2), but should
complement those powers. Section 7 is based on the Australian Corporations Law, s 438B(2) and (3)
and the English Insolvency Act 1986, s 22.
96 Based on the Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 435(1).
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incurred over all unsecured claims against the company except claims relating to the
costs of the judicial management.
(2) If the judicial management is superseded by a winding-up of the company the
preference conferred to in subsection (1) shall remain in force except in so far as
claims relating to the costs of the winding-up are concerned.
Schedule to the Acë7
Specific powers of the judicial manager referred to in section 7.
The judicial manager has the power:
(a) to appoint and dismiss professionally qualified legal representatives and
accountants to assist the judicial manager in the performance of his or her duties;
(b) to appoint and dismiss an agent or to employ a person to do any business which he
or she is unable to do;
(c) to do all acts and execute documents in the name of the company;
(d) to make payments incidental to the performance of his or her functions;
(e) to draw, accept, make and endorse negotiable instruments in the name of and on
behalf of the company;
(f) to raise loans or borrow money and grant security therefor over the property of the
company;
(g) to make any arrangement or compromise on behalf of the company;
(h) to call meetings of the members or creditors of the company;
(i) to form a committee of creditors;
(j) to do all other things incidental to his or her functions."
4 4 Who should be the judicial manager?
If a viable business rescue procedure is to be implemented in South Africa, its success
will largely depend on to the calibre and competence of the judicial managers. In the
words of the Cork Report:"
97 Based on sch 1 to the English Insolvency Act 1986.
98 The customary catch-all.
99175.
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"The success of any insolvency system, however, is very largely dependent upon
those who administer it."
The best-designed system would still fail if those responsible for its successful
implementation fail or are unable to do so. In a system such as judicial management
this is of crucial concern. The drafters of any insolvency regime should carefully
consider the identity of those who will be allowed to become the managers of its
business rescue procedures.
The practical steps that the judicial manager has to take and his powers and duties
were discussed above. From this discussion it is obvious that the judicial manager
needs a wide variety of knowledge and skills.
The Cork Report concluded that the administrator would need knowledge and
experience in the fields of :
"the law regulating the relations of debtor and creditor; the organisation of
courts dealing with insolvency matters and the proceedings in connection
therewith; the investigation of the business dealings and transactions of an
insolvent debtor; the pursuit and recovery of assets fraudulently disposed of in
order to defeat creditors; the rescission of voluntary conveyances and other
transactions amounting to voidable preferences; and the rules relating to the
distribution of the insolvent debtor's assets among his creditors. In addition, he
must be capable of taking complete control of a business, sometimes of
enormous size or complexity, or even both, and of carrying it on with a view
either to selling it as a going concern or to making some other proposals for its
continuance as an economic unit."
This knowledge and experience must be complemented by independence, impartiality
and a sense of good judgment and a commitment to work towards the rescue of the
business in judicial management. In many instances it may be easier just to accept
business failure and appoint a liquidator to dispose of the business or the assets in the
easiest possible way. The skills required of a successfuljudicial manager are therefore
arguably of a higher degree and greater variety than those required of a liquidator.
In light of the above considerations, the requirements for judicial managers and
administrators in the different jurisdictions are somewhat surprising.
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4 4 1 Judicial management (South Africa)
The Companies Act does not give a positive direction regarding the determination of
who should be appointed as judicial manager, whether provisional or final. There is
no requirement that a judicial manager should be an insolvency practitioner or should
belong to a profession as is provided in English and Australian law. The Companies
Act merely provides for the Master to appoint a provisional or a final judicial manager
and then disqualifies certain persons from being a judicial manager. 100
"Nobody should be appointed as a judicial manager, provisional or otherwise,
unless he is disinterested and free to act independently and impartially."!"
South African law makes provision for a neutral third party to take control of the
company in judicial management. This is not surprising considering the pro-creditor
orientation of South African insolvency law. Apart from the disqualification in terms
of the Companies Act the court has ruled that
Subject to these limitations the position is thus that the Master may appoint any
person that he deems to be fit to act as a judicial manager, provisional or final. In the
appointment of the final judicial manager the Master will usually appoint the
nominee(s) of creditors and members agreed to at their meetings.'?' This clearly shows
the legislature's appreciation that judicial management will have a better chance of
approval if the creditors have some faith in the person administering the process.
The provisional judicial manager may be required by the Master to give such security
for the proper performance of his duties as provisional judicial manager as the Master
may determine.I03
4 4 2 Administration (England)
Unlike the position in South Africa, English statutory law prescribes certain positive
requirements before a person may act as an administrator. An administrator of a
100 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 429(b )(i) and s 431 (2)(b). The persons disqualified are the auditors of
the company or any person disqualified from being appointed as liquidator in a winding-up. Regarding
persons disqualified for appointment as liquidator see Companies Act 61 of 1973 ss 372 and 373.
100 Theron v Natal Markagente (Edms) Bpk 1978 4 SA 898 (N) 900D, where the court also held that the
attorney of the applicant for a judicial management order should be disqualified from acting as the
judicial manager at least on his own (at 900H - 901A).
101 Theron v Natal Markagente (Edms) Bpk 1978 4 SA 898 (N) 900D, where the court also held that the
attorney of the applicant for a judicial management order should be disqualified from acting as the
judicial manager at least on his own (at 900H - 90IA).
102 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 431 (2)(b).
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company ID administration must be an insolvency practitioner.l'" The term
"insolvency practitioner" is used by the Insolvency Act to describe all those persons
that may be appointed as administrators, liquidators, provisional liquidators or
administrative receivers.
There are general requirements to qualify as an insolvency practitioner. lOS In general,
to qualify as an insolvency practitioner a person needs to belong to a recognised
professional body and should be permitted by the rules of that body so to act; or the
person should be specifically authorised to act as an insolvency practitioner.i'"
The recognised professional bodies include those for charted accountants, certified
accountants, insolvency practitioners and the Law Society. Membership of one of
these bodies will not in itself be sufficient, the rules of the body must also specifically
permit the person to act as an insolvency practitioner.l'" This gives the body room to
prescribe examinations and experience as further criteria.
Further requirements to be met are that he should be a natural person.'?" that he must
have given adequate security (be adequately bonded)!" and that he must be fit and
proper person'" for his duties as insolvency practitioner.
Reasons why a person would in general be disqualified to act as an insolvency
practitioner would relate to personal insolvency, a disqualification order in terms of
the Company Directors Disqualification Act, III or through being a patient under the
Mental Health Act.112
In a particular case the insolvency practitioner should have no conflict of interest and
should not have been previously involved with the company, for example as its
auditor. 113
103Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 429 (b)(i).
104Insolvency Act 1986, Part XIII, ss 388-398.
105 Insolvency Act 1986, s 390.
106 Insolvency Act 1986, s 390(2)(b).
107Insolvency Act, s 391(1). See also Brown Corporate Rescue 180 n 23.
108Insolvency Act 1986, s 390(1).
109 Insolvency Act 1986, s 390(3).
110Insolvency Act 1986, s 393(2)(a).
1111986.
1121983.
113These provisions stem from the rules of the professional bodies themselves and from the Insolvency
Rules 1986. See also Lange & Hartwig The Law and Practice of Administrative Receivership and
Associated Remedies (1989) 42.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
155
44 3 Voluntary administration (Australia)
To act as an administrator in Australia a person needs to be a registered liquidator.i'"
As the name suggests, such a person must be appropriately registered, he must then
consent to his appointment and must not be disqualified from acting as a liquidator.
The disqualification can be in general or may relate to the particular circumstances.
To obtain registration the applicant must be a natural person and should satisfy further
requirements. He must belong to a specified professional body!" or must have an
accountancy degree from a university or must have other equivalent qualifications and
experience that the Commissioner judges to be sufficient. Furthermore the
Commissioner must be satisfied that the applicant has the necessary experience, is
capable of performing the duties and is a fit and proper person to be registered as a
Iiquidator.!"
A person will be regarded as having the necessary experience for registration as a
liquidator if that person has been:
five years in a public practice;
has worked in a wide range of corporate insolvency administrations under the
direction of an official liquidator for a continuous period of three years; and
has spent at least two continuous years, during the last five years, on the
supervision of corporate insolvency administrations.!"
The general disqualification is that the liquidator should not be an insolvent under
administration.!"
Not surprisingly the Australian law is similar to the other two jurisdictions in its
approach of appointing an impartial third party as the administrator. In relation to the
particular company a person cannot act as a liquidator if he or a body corporate of
which he is a member is either a creditor or a debtor of the relevant company to the
value of at least $5000 (Australian) or more. Also excluded are a person who has any
interest through a mortgage in the company, or who is the auditor or an officer of the
114 Corporations Law, s 448.
115 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, the Australian Society of Certified Practising
Accountants or any other prescribed body. See Corporations Law, s 1282 (2)(a)(I).
116 Corporations Law, s 1282. Various other qualifications such as being a resident in Australia are also
imposed. See Crutchfield Corporate Voluntary Administration Law 218-219.
117 Policy Statement 40 of the ASC, see also Tomasic Australian Corporate Insolvency Law 323.
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company or who has any connections through partnership or employment by the
auditor or officer of the company.'"
4 4 4 Evaluation
It was mentioned in the introduction to this section that the ideal judicial manager
should have a wide knowledge and experience coupled with a firm commitment to
make a success of the business rescue. It is difficult to see how these qualities will
often be present in anyone person. Although the practice in England and Australia
has been to qualify persons on a professional level before they may act in insolvency
related matters it is debatable whether the business rescuer and the liquidator come
from the same mould even though the professional and other statutory qualifications
for both are the same. There is evidence to suggest that the business rescuer and the
liquidator differ fundamentally in their approach. This is so because a liquidator is
best equipped to liquidate and his tendency will be to treat a judicial management in
much the same way.
"One lP (Insolvency Practitioner) put the point very starkly. He said: 'lP's are
the wrong persons to do corporate rescue. They aren't trained to do it. They
only know how to kill companies.' The essential nature of an insolvency
practitioner was counterproductive because even the name emphasised the
ideals of insolvency and undertaking rather than rescue." 120
The judicial manager (business rescuer) needs a different approach. His skill is not
primarily to dissect, but ultimately to revive.!" The qualities required are
fundamentally different from those of the liquidator. The need is to make it possible
for those who possess the requisite qualities to become judicial managers.
Traditionally professional liquidators were appointed as judicial managers of
companies in spite of the opposing objectives and duties of the two categories of
persons. This resulted from the inclusion of judicial management at the end of the
chapter on winding-up in the 192 Companies Act. It was only in the 1973
~~-~ (' L
118 This administration refers to a process concerned with individual insolvency.
119 Corporations Law, s 532(2).
120 Flood, Abbey, Skordaki & Aber The Professional Restructuring of Corporate Rescue: Company
Voluntary Arrangements and the London Approach (1995) Research Report no 45 17.
121 "The insolvency profession is more familiar with burial rites than with rescue procedures. Rescue
always implies risk and courage." Mark Goldstein as reported in Flood et al Research Report 45 17.
See also the criticism of Olver 1986 THRHR 88 who describes the essential qualification of the judicial
manager as a "good on-going business manager".
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Companies Act that judicial management was placed in a separate chapter on its
own.I22
The type of business rescuer needed could be drawn from the ranks of experienced
business people either retired from or tired of their present employment, who would
respond to the challenge of rescuing businesses in financial trouble. To regulate their
conduct may need detailed legislation or regulations, but a licensing scheme by the
Master could accommodate this possibility. At present judicial managers, like
liquidators only need the approval of the Master.
It is envisaged that the South African liquidators will have to belong to a professional
body in the future, thus coming in line with the position in Australia and England.!"
If the South African legislature were to go the way of its Australian and English
counterparts then only those belonging to a profession will be eligible as judicial
managers. In this case an exception should be considered. Take for example the case
where someone was a successful manager of a company, but subsequently retired or
left the company and the company now goes into judicial management. If the former
successful manager still possess the necessary health and energy, it is probable that he
will be the most appropriate business rescuer.
It is thus submitted that the South African legislation at least as far as judicial
management is concerned should leave the possibility open, as is currently the case,
that a suitable person within the discretion of the Master can be appointed as judicial
manager.
It should also be possible to appoint jointly as judicial managers someone with
professional qualifications together with someone with entrepreneurial skill and
relevant business experience. Indeed in view of the wide range of skills and
experience required, joint appointments should be encouraged.
Other possible solutions would be to change the rules of the professional bodies
regarding fee sharing to allow, in the case of fees earned through judicial
management, the sharing of those fees with a joint judicial manager who is not a
qualified professional in that field. If the rules of professional bodies are not changed
122 Olver 1986 THRHR 86.
123 South African Law Commission Review of the Law of Insolvency Discussion Paper 66 162.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
158
some other way should be found to make it possible to use persons with special skills
in the context of judicial management.
Accounting firms who expect to generate some work in this field, as the Australian
experience indicates is possible, could then form separate companies much on the
lines of their existing consulting companies, to enable them to share the fees
generated with non-professionals.
Creditors are concerned whether the judicial manager is sufficiently independent from
the directors and management of the company and that he is adequately skilled in the
areas of insolvency and company rescue. This concern will be even greater where, as
is proposed, the directors have a role to play in the appointment of the judicial
manager or where the judicial manager is a former manager.
Independence in the mind of the creditors will probably be achieved by appointing
judicial managers from one of the traditional professions, that is the legal and
accounting professions. As already explained those with the credentials to manage a
business and the insight to draw up proposals to rescue it will most likely not come
from the traditional professions, nor from the traditional liquidators. The advantage of
using those that belong to professions is that their conduct and independence can be
regulated by their different professional bodies.
The suggestions above of either licensing specific individuals by the Master or the
development of business rescue consultants used by professionals appointed as
judicial managers will hopefully convince creditors that even those that do not belong
to traditional professions will be sufficiently independent. After all the creditors are
interested in competence and above all a judicial manager that they can trust.
"To some creditors money isn't important. I've seen them turn down 90p in the
pound because they did not like the directors. Personalities are important." 124
The question as to who should qualify for appointment as judicial managers is of
fundamental importance if South Africa is to implement a successful business rescue
procedure. Therefore sufficient flexibility to develop a culture and profession of
corporate rescuers is necessary in order to resuscitate judicial management from its
present moribund state.
124 Flood et al Research Report no 45 20 illustrate the difficulty of establishing trust as reported by an
insolvency practitioner.
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At present the number of companies under judicial management is small and the
number of people skilled in corporate or business rescue is even smaller. However if
the issue of qualifications of judicial managers is managed carefully by the Master
during the implementation of an improved judicial management regime it should be
possible to foster a new business rescue culture. At the same time the qualifications
for judicial managers may likewise be developed as the culture grows and more
persons develop as judicial managers. Thus it would be possible to have a new
standard of qualifications applying especially to judicial managers after a number of
years. This could be achieved by giving the Minister after consultation with interested
parties, the power to make regulations on qualifications and experience required for
appointment to the position of judicial manager.
4 4 5 Draft legislation to give effect to the proposals
Section 10125 (Appointment of the judicial manager)
(1) Upon the company being placed under judicial management
(a) all the property of the company concerned shall be deemed to be in the
custody of the Master until a judicial manager has been appointed and has
assumed office;
(b) the Master shall without delay appoint a natural person whom the Master
regards as having the necessary qualifications, experience and skill as a
judicial manager (who shall not be the auditor of the company or any person
disqualified by the Companies Act from being appointed as liquidator in a
winding-up) who shall give such security for the proper performance of the
duties of judicial manager, as the Master may direct.
(c) the Master may appoint two or more persons jointly as judicial manager in
terms of subsection (1)(b).
(2) The Master shall from time to time issue rules with regard to the qualifications and
experience for judicial managers which the Master considers appropriate.
(3) Where a judicial manager is appointed in terms of subsection (1), the court may,
on the application of a judicial manager or member or creditor or officer of the
company, review the appointment of the judicial manager.
125 Based on Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 429.
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4 5 Remuneration of the judicial manager
The issue of the remuneration of the judicial manager IS contentious. His
remuneration is undoubtedly a drain on the assets of the company and high
professional fees can be detrimental to the whole cause of judicial management,
especially where the judicial manager needs to appoint other persons to help him in
his tasks. Although this may seem a minor issue in the context of the whole business
rescue procedure it plays an important role, because of its potential to motivate or
demotivate the judicial manager. The judicial manager will have to put considerable
time, effort and emotional energy into a business rescue in order to make it work. The
financial resources to reward him adequately are however scarce. It is therefore
necessary to examine critically the approaches of the different jurisdictions to this
important issue.
.• r
4 5 1 Judicial management (South Africa)
The remuneration of the judicial manager and provisional judicial manager is
governed by a special section of the Companies ACt.126 It is provided that the judicial
manager and the provisional judicial manager shall be entitled to such remuneration
for their services as may be fixed from time to time by the Master.127 In fixing the
remuneration the Master must take into account the manner in which the judicial
manager has performed his functions and any recommendation by the members or
creditors of the company relating to such remuneration.!"
This is a change from the situation that existed before 1980 where the court had the
authority to fix the remuneration of the judicial manager!" and gave directions in this
regard to the Master. The Master now determines the remuneration on his own,
subject to review by the court.130
In practice the Master has certain tables of tariffs which he uses.BI These are detailed
tariffs based on tariff scales of government pay. The judicial manager is required to
keep detailed timesheets of work done and time spent by everybody in his employ
who did any work in relation to the judicial management. When the Master receives
126 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 434A. See Meskin Henochsberg I 951-952.
127 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 434A(I).
128 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 434A(2).
129 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 428(2)(b); now deleted.
130 Meskin Henochsberg I 952.
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the time sheets of all the work done he calculates the remuneration according to the
timesheets and the classification of the persons involved and the time spent by them.
Thus he would apply different tariffs for different employees making such distinctions
as professional, secretarial and clerical at different levels.
Apparently this system involves long delays in payments to the judicial manager and
the remuneration is low in comparison with the earnings of a liquidator for the same
amount of work.
The remuneration of the judicial manager is payable from the assets of the company
and enjoys preference over other debts.132
4 5 2 Administration (England)
In England the remuneration of the administrator is determined either as a percentage
of the value of the property which he administers or on the basis of a tariff for the
time spent on the administration. The decision as to which of these methods should
apply is made by the creditors' committee or where there is no creditors' committee,
by a meeting of the creditors.!"
In fixing the fee of the administrator the creditors' committee should have regard to
the complexity of the case, any exceptional responsibilities that may fall on the
administrator, the effectiveness with which he carries out his duties and the value and
the nature of the property he has to deal with.!"
The Insolvency Rules also make provision for an application to the court or a request
to the creditors' committee by the administrator to increase his fee, or for the creditors
to apply to the court for the reduction of the administrator's fee on the grounds that it
is excessive.!"
The administrator's remuneration and expenses are payable out of the assets of the
company. This payment has priority over any sums secured at the time of payment by
a security which when it was originally created, was a floating charge.!" However the
131 This information was supplied by Eileen Fey a charted accountant who is an experienced judicial
manager.
132 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 435(1) and (2).
133 Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.47.
134 Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.47(4).
135 Insolvency Rules 1986, IT 2.48 - 2.50.
136 Insolvency Act 1986, s 19(4).
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payment ranks after debts or liabilities incurred by the administrator and arising from
the administration.!"
4 5 3 Voluntary administration (Australia)
Similar to the position in English law and contrary to the position in South African
law, it is the creditors that determine and fix the remuneration of the Australian
administrator. The company's creditors determine the remuneration of the
administrator, by way of resolution passed at a creditors' meeting. If the creditors fail
to fix the remuneration, the court will determine the remuneration on application by
the administrator. 138
Where the creditors decided upon the remuneration, the administrator, an officer, a
member or a creditor of the company may apply to the court to have the remuneration
reviewed. The court may then confirm, increase or reduce the remuneration.P"
The remuneration of the administrator is payable from the assets of the company
under administration. However, similar to English law, but in contrast to the position
in South Africa, the other liabilities incurred by the administrator have preference in
payment from those assets. The payment of the administrator's remuneration has
preference over unsecured debts and secured debts resulting from a floating charge
has not yet been activated.!"
4 5 4 Evaluation
The judicial manager is appointed by the Master and manages the company. By
reason of the fact that he administers the company under judicial management his
remuneration cannot be determined by the company. It is submitted that in general the
remuneration of the judicial manager should be agreed to between the judicial
manager and the Master taking into account the opinion of the creditors.
The present position in South Africa does not provide enough encouragement to
judicial managers to make a success of judicial management and to restore the
company to successful trading. Whereas a judicial manager is remunerated by a tariff
137 Insolvency Act 1986, s 19(5).
138 Corporations Law, s 449E(1).
139 Corporations Law, s 449E(2).
140 Corporations Law, s 443D-F.
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system, a liquidator is remunerated by a percentage of the assets and income of the
company in liquidation.I"
The alternative fee structure of English law may add more flexibility and may leave
more room for a remuneration structure that would be able to motivate the judicial
manager to make a success of the judicial management.
The example of the Australian and English law should not be followed in allowing the
judicial manager to go to court on the matter of remuneration. The established
practice of the South African experience of letting the Master decide the fees in the
first instance the fees, with only a review jurisdiction for the courts, should be adhered
to. The Master has enough experience to hear the appeal of the judicial manager or the
creditors in this matter. The court would ask for his opinion anyway.
The costs of a judicial management might mean the difference between a successful
rescue and an inevitable liquidation.Y The suggestions put forward in this thesis are
also aimed at keeping the costs of judicial management down. In this regard, it is
especially medium-sized companies that will suffer because of costly procedures.
Small businesses should in any event have a different and even less cumbersome
business rescue procedure.Y Large companies however will have enough assets to
relegate the costs of judicial management to a small percentage of the available assets.
The costs of judicial management including the remuneration of the judicial manager
discriminate against smaller companies as they may not have enough assets to
accommodate the fees of the judicial manager and the cash flow for recovery. The
discrimination in the commercial world against such smaller companies is further
highlighted by the fact that big lending institutions would often be much more
supportive of big companies in such circumstances than of smaller companies. This is
because they often stand to lose much more when big companies are liquidated.
141 Liquidations are thus more lucrative than judicial managements for those professionals involved in
insolvency.
142 The direct cost of voluntary administration is a decreasing function of company size. Routledge
1998 Company and Securities Law Journal 10, Il shows that the average cost as a percentage of total
assets differs from 21,5% for small companies to between 4% and 8% for bigger companies. See also
Olver 1986 THRHR 87 who argues that the burden of a judicial manager's fees on a small company is
such that the costs might exceed the value of the assets by quite some margin ..
143 Cfthe discussion at 3 3 4 supra.
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This is illustrated by the existence of an informal rescue procedure that is used for big
companies in England, the so-called London approach.!" It is an informal procedure
for multi-bank support for big companies with financial problems and looming
insolvency. These big companies would almost always be in debt at various banks.
One of these creditor banks takes the lead in getting all the creditor banks together
with the debtor company and then the banks work together to reach a collective view
on whether and how the company should be given financial support. Often the Bank
of England will play a role in convincing all the creditor banks to accept the rescue
plan.
When the banks learn about the financial troubles of the company they refrain from
taking immediate steps to act upon their security and call in their loans. They maintain
their support pending further examination. This amounts to a voluntary moratorium.
The banks amongst themselves appoint a lead bank with sufficient staff and
experience to manage relationships between the creditor group and the company and
to ensure a proper flow of information to facilitate the process.
The banks share the relevant financial information of the debtor company freely
between themselves and use it to make their decisions about the future of the
company. A precondition is that the information shared must be reliable.
During the voluntary moratorium the banks and other creditors work together to reach
a collective view on whether and how the company should be given financial support.
The success of the approach is that loss is shared on an equitable basis between the
banks and with the view to ensuring the maximum value for creditors.
In terms of the London approach the whole rescue is done without the costs of an
administrator being borne by the company being rescued. It does not seem likely that
the banks would go to the same lengths to rescue even medium sized businesses as the
incentive to do so is much less.
This raises the possibility of an incentive-based remuneration, something that none of
the three jurisdictions under consideration apparently utilise at present. The possibility
of having an incentive-based remuneration should not however be summarily
discarded. The work involved in restoring a company to successful trading differs
144 Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 338; Flood, Abbey, Skordaki, Aber The
Professional Restructuring of Corporate Rescue: Company Voluntary Arrangements and the London
Approach.
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considerably from that involved in the liquidation of a company. Employees have to
be motivated, deals have to be negotiated and creditors must be convinced of the
possible success and plans formulated must be implemented successfully. It is thus
submitted that it should be possible, with the approval of the creditors, that the
judicial manager should receive some form of equity payment. The provision of an
option to buy shares in the future at the price of the shares at the commencement of
judicial management is one possibility.
This possibility would encourage the judicial manager to put in more work than he
would be prepared to in the existing circumstances. It would also assist in obtaining
access to new sources of funding for the ailing company. This possibility could
conceivably bring venture capital and judicial managers together and greatly improve
the chances of successful judicial management and the fostering of a business rescue
culture.
However, the remuneration of the judicial manager should always be subject to full
and timely disclosure and should not become an opportunity for the practitioners to
benefit unreasonably to the detriment of creditors.
4 5 5 Draft Legislation to give effect to the proposals
Section 11145 (Remuneration of the judicial manager)
(1) The judicial manager is entitled to such remuneration for his or her services as
may be fixed by the Master from time to time.
(2) The remuneration must be fixed either
(a) as a percentage of the value of the property with which the judicial
manager has to deal, or
(b) by reference to the time properly given by the judicial manager and his or
her staff in attending to matters arising in the judicial management, or
(c) based on an incentive scheme agreed to by the members and creditors, or
(d) any combination of the above, and
in fixing the remuneration the Master shall take into account the manner in
which the judicial manager has performed his or her functions and any
145 Based Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 434A and s 384(2) and Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.47.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
166
recommendation by the members or creditors of the company relating to such
remuneration.
(3) The Master may reduce or increase the such remuneration if the Master is of the
opinion that there is good cause for doing so, and may disallow such remuneration
either wholly or in part on account of any failure or delay by the judicial manager in
the discharge of his or her duties.
(4) Where remuneration of the judicial manager is fixed by the Master in terms of this
section, the court may, on the application of the judicial manager or of an officer,
member or creditor of the company, review the remuneration and confirm, increase or
reduce the remuneration.
4 6 Removal of the judicial manager
•• 1 The possibility to remove a judicial manager should always exist. The twists and turns
of commercial life can always be more than what may be foreseen by any person,
however imaginative he may be. Therefore a mechanism should exist to remove a
judicial manager. At the same time the mechanism should be such that it does not turn
the judicial manager into a lame duck. The mechanisms for the removal of a judicial
manager will also depend to some extent on the mechanisms for his appointment.
4 6 1 Judicial management (South Africa)
In South African law, the provisional judicial manager and final judicial manager are
appointed by the Master.l'" Although there is no specific statutory provision for the
removal of the judicial manager,147 the court has an inherent power to remove a
judicial manager.!" Thus any party with an interest may apply to court for the removal
of the judicial manager. The Master presumably has the authority to appoint a judicial
manager to fill the resulting vacancy.
4 6 2 Administration (England)
In English law the administrator is appointed by the COurt149and as one would expect
his removal and the filling of the vacancy also lie with the court. The administrator
146Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 429(b) and s 431(4) respectively.
147 Cf Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 379 regarding the statutory powers of the master and the court to
remove a liquidator.
148 The Master of the Supreme Court v Bell 1954 2 PH E21 (T); The Master v Bell1955 3 SA 100 (T);
LAWSA IV part 3477.
149Insolvency Act 1986, s 13.
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may be removed from office by an order of court or he may resign. He must vacate
the office if he ceases to be qualified as an insolvency practitioner in relation to the
company or upon the discharge of the administration order. 150
The court will fill the vacancy on application of any joint administrator or where there
is no such joint administrator on application of the creditors' committee. Where there
is neither a joint administrator nor a creditors' committee, the application should be
made by the company, its directors or any creditor or creditors. lSI
4 6 3 Voluntary administration (Australia)
Unlike the position under South African and English law, the Australian administrator
is appointed by the directors, liquidators or chargee of the company. 152Once the
administrator is appointed the appointment cannot be revoked.!" This removes the
possibility that the administrator may be manipulated by those who appointed him.154
The court may, however, remove the administrator from his position on the
application of the Ase or of a creditor and appoint a new administrator. 155
The administrator's office will become vacant on the administrator's death,
disqualification or resignation. In such a case a new administrator may be appointed
by those who were originally responsible for the appointment of the administrator. 156
However, the danger of the appointment of an administrator who is too friendly
towards the directors is counterbalanced by the provision that such a new appointee
has five business days in which to convene a meeting of the company's creditors so
that they may determine whether to remove the appointee from his position and
appoint someone else as the administrator of the company.157
4 6 4 Evaluation
It is desirable that a judicial manager should have the assurance that he will not be
easily removed from his position. This is important in terms of his independence to
investigate the necessary matters freely and in terms of the commitment needed to be
successful as a judicial manager. Itmight however happen that if the judicial manager
150 Insolvency Act 1986, s 19(1) and (2).
lSI Insolvency Act 1986, s 13.
152 Corporations Law, s 436A, Band C.
153 Corporations Law, s 449A.
154 Keay 1997 Company and Securities Law Journal 153.
155 Corporations Law, s 449B.
156 Corporations Law, s 449C(1).
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is appointed by the directors of the company or its shareholders, then the creditors
will have no trust in the judicial manager.i " Itmay also lead to situations where only
favourably disposed judicial managers are appointed to ensure that the investigation
into the prior conduct of the company officials is less thorough.
It is submitted that the answer to these problems is to leave the power of appointment
to the Master, who is preferred to the court with a view to saving time and costs. This
is the option adopted in this thesis. 159The Master would in all circumstances take into
consideration the person nominated by those that placed the company under judicial
management. If the Master is obliged to follow the recommendation of those that
initiated judicial management it would be prudent to follow the Australian example of
giving the creditors the chance to remove such a judicial manager and replace him
with someone else.
It will always be healthy from a policy perspective if the Master has a strong
beneficial influence on the conduct of the judicial managers. This influence will be
strengthened, if he has the power to fix the remuneration of the judicial manager and
the same power of removal which he has in the case of a liquidator.l'"
The inherent power of the court to remove a judicial manager should not be tampered
with.
The office of judicial manager will also become vacant upon the death or resignation
of the judicial manager and the Master should have the same powers to fill a vacancy,
however it occurred.
4 4 5 Draft legislation to give effect to the proposals
Section 12161 (Vacation of office)
(1) The judicial manager of a company may at any time be removed from office by
order of court and may in prescribed circumstances resign his or her office by giving
notice of such resignation to the Master.
157 Corporations Law, s 449C(4).
158 See also the argument in favour of a system of appointing administrators from a panel on a roster
basis to ensure independence. Such a measure was not adopted in Australia as it was thought that this
would detract from the voluntary nature of the voluntary administration procedure from the company's
perspective. Keay 1997 Company and Securities Law Journal 156.
159 See proposed legislation section 10 (1)(b).
160 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 379.
161 Based on the Insolvency Act 1986, s 19 and the Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 379 and s 381.
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(2) Sections 379 and 381 of the Companies Act relating to the removal of the
liquidator by the Master and the control of the Master over liquidators apply to
judicial managers, with the changes required by the context.
(3) The Master may remove a judicial manager of a company and replace him or her
by another person if so requested by a meeting of creditors.
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CHAPTERS
Other statutory provisions that have an influence on judicial management
S 1 Introduction
In this chapter the other statutory provisions outside the chapter of the Companies Act
on judicial management that have a significant influence on the use of judicial
management as a corporate rescue measure in practice will be discussed. There are
different ills that afflict a society because of insolvency. To cure those ills it is not
enough merely to add to the list of remedies. Achieving the right balance through the
effective interaction between those remedies is also important.
As far as judicial management as a corporate or business rescue procedure is
concerned, there are various other statutory provisions that will have a substantial
impact on its use. Of these the provisions on insolvent trading, the disqualification of
directors, the current use of section 311 of the Companies Act and the treatment of
possible assessed tax losses of the company in judicial management will be discussed.
5 2 Insolvent trading provisions
The so-called insolvent trading provisions are a convenient label for the category of
statutory provisions that provide for the personal liability of a director of a company
in certain circumstances where creditors did not receive full payment for the debts
that the company owed them. The liability may be criminal or civil or possibility both.
In the South African context such liability is imposed by section 424 of the
Companies Act, 61 of 1973.
The insolvency of companies often has for those directors and shareholders who ran
the business far less serious financial consequences than for an individual who has
been declared insolvent. Instead, the burden of the adverse financial effects of failure
is transferred to the unsecured or concurrent creditors of the company. This is of
course one of the intended consequences of juristic personality. However it was also
intended that those who obtain the privilege of juristic personality use it in a
responsible manner and should not unscrupulously abuse this privilege to defraud
creditors or other members of the community. However, if limited liability for
directors and shareholders is not available, then it is not worth using a business entity
withjuristic personality.
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The community has always taken an interest in insolvency. In this context, insolvency
is not merely a private matter between the company and its creditors. The community
is interested in whether the conduct of the insolvent was blameworthy. In the case of
an insolvent company the community is interested in the conduct of those who
conducted the affairs of the insolvent company. The community is also interested to
know whether the conduct of the individual insolvent or of the managers of an
insolvent company merits suitable punishment and whether the individual's or
managers' opportunity to repeat such conduct in the .future should be curtailed
altogether or at least be restricted to protect the community. 1
ICork Report 390 para 1734 - 1735.
These questions need to be addressed not only where the company is finally
liquidated, but also in the circumstances where the company is rescued and allowed to
recover through a process of judicial management.
The provisions of insolvent trading are also important for two altogether different
reasons. If there is a sufficient risk that the company director could lose his protection
against personal financial consequences in the case of business failure he should be
much more circumspect in the way he conducts the affairs of the company. One of the
more prudent things that he may do is to put the company into judicial management in
order to run an open and participatory process of rescuing the company, rather than
letting it trade in insolvent circumstances. In such a way he may possibly escape the
consequences of falling foul of insolvent trading provisions. In this regard insolvent
trading provisions act as encouragement for the use of judicial management.
However, encouragement alone would not be enough to render the use of judicial
management attractive if a much easier "private" method to rescue the business is at
hand. If insolvent trading provisions did not exist, it would be far easier for the
director of the company to liquidate a company at any sign of trouble, form a new
company and carry on with a clean slate having rid the business of outstanding debts,
unwanted contractual obligations and other liabilities.'
The insolvent trading provisions of South Africa, England and Australia will now be
briefly discussed without any attempt being made to provide exhaustive evaluation.
Each of these jurisdictions would merit a discussion on insolvent trading provisions
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far beyond the scope of this thesis. However an attempt will be made to get a basic
understanding of the provisions and how they should effectively interact with the
provisions on judicial management to encourage its use.
5 2 1 South African insolvent trading provisions
The South African insolvent trading provisions are found in section 424 of the
Companies Act. This section purports to discourage fraudulent behaviour as well as
reckless behaviour in the conduct of the company's business.
5 2 1 1 Establishing liability
Under section 424 a person can incur personal responsibility, without any limitation
of liability, for all or any of the debts or other liabilities of the company as the court
may direct. This may happen if that person was knowingly a party to the carrying on
.. I of the business of the company in a reckless manner, or with the intent to defraud
creditors of the company or creditors of any other person, or for any fraudulent
purpose.'
To establish liability in terms of this provision it is necessary to prove that the person
or persons, who would often be a director or the directors of the company, were
reckless or fraudulent in carrying on the business of the company.'
To prove recklessness is easier than to prove a fraudulent intent. In order to prove
someone was reckless in terms of this provision it is necessary to prove that the
person's action was less than a certain standard of behaviour. This standard is that of a
reasonable businessperson belonging to the same group or class as the person whose
behaviour is judged and moving in the same spheres and having the same knowledge
or means to knowledge as the relevant person.' As this is a civil remedy the standard
of proof is on a balance of probabilities.
2 For a vivid description see 2 2 3 supra n 14 regarding the submission by a Divisional Consumer
Protection Officer of the South Yorkshire County Council. There is no reason to believe that the
situation in South Africa differs to any extent from the remarks made in the submission.
3 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 424(1).
4 The legislative intention of including recklessness in this provision was to broaden the scope of the
earlier provision, which did not include recklessness, to provide a remedy which could serve as a
restraining influence on "over-sanguine directors". See Gordon NO and Rennie NO v Standard
Merchant Bank Ltd and Others 1984 2 SA 519 (C) 527A-B; Phi/otex (Pty) Ltd and Others v Snyman
and Others 19982 SA 138 (A) 142G-H. See also Fourie "Limited liability and insolvent trading" 1994
Stellenbosch Law Review 148.
5 Phi/otex (Pty) Ltd and Others v Snyman and Others supra 143G-H.
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The proof of recklessness thus involves an objective test, the test of the reasonable
businessperson, and a subjective test, the knowledge and circumstances of the person
in question. It is not enough to disprove recklessness by showing that a director
honestly believed that the company would be able to pay its debts when they fall due."
Such a defence would clearly be sufficient against a claim based on fraudulent trading
where it will be necessary to prove intent on the part of the director.'
Phi/otex (Pty) Ltd and Others v Snyman and Others brought clarity to the application
of section 424 after the uncertainty left by the "silver lining'" test of Ex Parte De
Villiers and Another NNO: In re Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidationr'
Phi/otex explains the standard of conduct which would make a person liable for
reckless trading in terms of section 424 of the Companies Act. Ex Parte De Villiers
dealt with the requirements for fraudulent trading and did not discuss the requirements
for reckless trading."
Phi/otex clearly explains when liability will be established in terms of section 424:11
"Participation in business necessarily involves taking entrepeneurial risks but s
424 only penalises the subjection of third parties to risk where (apart from the
case of fraudulent trading) it is grossly unreasonable. If, therefore, in a given
case there is some ground for thinking that creditors will be paid but a
reasonable businessman would nonetheless, because of circumstances creating
a material but not high risk of non-payment, refrain from running that risk, the
director who does run that risk by incurring credit, and thus falls short of the
standard of conduct of the reasonable businessman, trades unreasonably and
therefore negligently vis-a-vis creditors. That departure from the reasonable
standard could not fairly be described as gross, however, and the director
concerned would not be hit by the section. By contrast, an instance that
manifestly would fall foul of the section is where the reasonable businessman
6 Phi/otex (Pty) Ltd and Others v Snyman and Others supra 147D-E.
7 Ex Parte De Villiers and Another NNO: In re Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) 1993 1
SA 493 (A) 504.
8 See Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law 457.
9 Supra 504 A-B. See 5 2 2 1 n 20 supra. Criticism is also directed to earlier statement of the silver
lining test to the effect that it is too widely stated. Phi/otex (Pty) Ltd and Others v Snyman and Others
supra 148A.
10 It is noteworthy that the "silver lining test" endorsed in Ex Parte De Villiers was not followed even
for fraudulent trading in its country of origin. See Phi/otex (Pty) Ltd and Others v Snyman and Others
19982 SA 138 (A) 147G-148D.
II 19982 SA 138 146H-147C.
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would realise that in all the circumstances payment would not be made when
due. To incur credit in that situation would, as a matter of degree, be so plainly
more serious a departure from the required standard than the conduct in the
first example that one has no difficulty categorising it as grossly unreasonable
and therefore grossly negligent. This second example, one must emphasise, is
an extreme one and it would, in my view, impose an unduly heavy burden on a
plaintiff in s 424 proceedings to require proof of circumstances in which a
reasonable businessman would assess non-payment as a virtual certainty. So,
if a plaintiff were to present evidence warranting the conclusion that when
credit was incurred there was, objectively regarded, a very strong chance,
falling short of a virtual certainty, that creditors would not be paid, that case
would, I think, also involve the mischief which the section was intended to
combat. It is not possible to attempt to draw the line between negligence and
recklessness more exactly. Each case must turn on its own facts and involve a
value judgment on those facts."
The liability in terms of section 424 is not limited to instances where the company is
wound up. Section 424 will be applicable when it appears, whether in a winding-up,
judicial management or otherwise that the business of the company was carried on in
contravention of section 424.
5 2 1 2 Extent ofliability
The person who falls foul of the provision can be held personally responsible, without
any limitation of liability, for all or any of the debts of the company as the court may
direct.
This is a very extensive liability and may well be a deterrent to insolvent trading,
particularly since the Phi/otex ruling. It is not only the directors that are at risk of a
section 424 ruling. It applies to any person who was knowingly a party to carrying on
business in the prohibited manner.V This at least includes senior management and in
appropriate circumstances the auditor of the company. A "shadow director" can also
clearly fall foul of the provisions. A shadow director is a person who is not actually a
director but the one on whose instructions one or more of the directors are accustomed
to act. It would thus not be possible for a person to escape liability by organising the
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affairs of the company so that his or her spouse is the director, but the former is the
actual driving force behind the scenes. Such a person would satisfy the requirement of
being knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business of the company.
A creditor may claim the damages that he suffered directly from the person who
carried on the business of the company recklessly or with an intent to defraud the
creditors.l''
5 2 1 3 Escaping ofliability
Possible defences available to the defendants in a section 424 claim would be to
establish either that they acted reasonably or that their conduct was not negligent to
the extent of being reckless.
It may also be useful to a director subject to a claim under section 424 to be able to
show that he proposed that the company should be put in judicial management, but
was outvoted by the majority of directors. The strength of this argument would
however depend on the circumstances of the relevant case.
5 2 2 English insolvent trading provisions
The Insolvency Act" distinguishes between fraudulent trading" and wrongful
trading." The former determines criminal and civil liability whilst the latter only
determines civil liability. The Cork Report considered the former legislation in this
part of the law inadequate and it was as a result of the Cork Report that the current
division between the criminal and civil liability was introduced. Fraudulent trading
deals with criminal liability , while civil liability is dealt with as wrongful trading.
5 2 2 1 Establishing liability {or fraudulent trading
As far as fraudulent trading is concerned, the court on application of the liquidator
may declare any persons who were knowingly party to carrying on of fraudulent
12 Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act I 912. See also Goode Principles of Corporate
Insolvency Law (1997) 456 on similar wording in the English Companies Act 1985, s 425.
13 Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 1915-916. This is contrary to the position in the English
law where only the liquidator may apply to court in similar circumstances. See 5 2 2 4 infra.
141986.
15 Insolvency Act 1986, s 213. See generally Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997)
456-458.
16 Insolvency Act 1986, s 214. See generally Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997)
458-473.
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trading by the company to be liable to make such contributions to the company's
assets as the court thinks proper. 17
This will happen when it appears in the course of the winding-up of the company that
any business of the company was carried on with the intent to defraud creditors of the
company (or any other person), or for any fraudulent purpose. 18
To establish fraudulent trading there has to be actual dishonesty, involving real moral
blame. It is not enough to show that the company continued to run up debts even
though they knew that the company was insolvent." What is wrong is to allow a
company to incur debts when it was clear that it would never be able to satisfy its
creditors. It has been decided that directors would not be guilty of fraudulent trading
if they incurred credit while they:"
"genuinely believe that the clouds will role away and the sunshine of
prosperity will shine upon them again and disperse the fog of their
depression" .
This test was, however, subsequently disapproved of in R v Grantham." The court
held that the test was not whether the directors thought that the company would be
able to pay its way at some indeterminate time in the future but whether they thought
that the company, in incurring further credit, could pay its debts as they fall due or
shortly thereafter. If they realised that the company would not be able to do so they
would be guilty of fraudulent trading even if they had some expectation that some day
all debts will be paid.
This provision for criminal and civil liability, however, applies only in a winding-up
of the company and it is only the liquidator that may apply to the court. Furthermore,
it is clear that any contributions to be made should only be made to the company's
assets and will thus benefit the body of creditors as a whole. This limitation is
reasonable where it is the liquidator that brings the application and thus exposes the
assets of the company to an order for costs.
17 Insolvency Act 1986, s 213(2).
18 Insolvency Act 1986, s 213( 1).
19 Sealy & Milman Annotated Guide to the Insolvency Legislation 251 and also Goode Principles of
Corporate Insolvency (1997) 457.
20 Re White & Osmond (Parkstone) Ltd unreported but referred to in R v Grantham [1984] 2 All E R
166. See also Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 457.
21 [1984] 2 All E R 166.
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Before the present provisions were enacted it was still possible for an individual
creditor to invoke the corresponding section and the court could then order a payment
in favour of the creditor. In this way the general body of creditors received no benefit
at all.
5 2 2 2 Extent ofthe liability offraudulent trading.
The court is permitted to declare the wrongdoers liable to make such contributions to
the company's assets as the court deems fit. The wording is so wide that the court
would be able to include a punitive amount if it deems fit. In addition to the payment
of compensation a person who is guilty of fraudulent trading may also be subject to
criminal sanctions and possible disqualification as director."
5 2 2 3 Establishing liability for wrongful trading
Wrongful trading is aimed at compensation for the benefit of the company creditors in
the case of mismanagement of the company.
To hold a person liable for wrongful trading the company must have gone into
insolvent liquidation. The person, at some time before the commencement of the
winding-up, must have known or ought to have concluded that there was no
reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation.
And the person should have been a director at the time. If these requirements are to be
met the court must also be satisfied that the person did not take every step with a view
to minimising the potential loss to creditors he ought to have taken."
The requirement of an insolvent liquidation illustrates the interaction between
wrongful trading and administration. If administration is successful insolvent
liquidation would be avoided and so too liability for wrongful trading.
Goode" makes an important point when he shows that the liability for wrongful
trading does not follow on mismanagement that takes the company to the brink of
insolvency. It is what happens from that point onwards that is decisive. The director
must then take steps to minimise the potential loss to creditors. A cessation of trading
activities is not an automatic escape as that would not by itself necessarily minimise
the loss to creditors. The director will have to analyse the company's situation and
22 See s 458 of the English Companies Act 1985 and the Company Directors Disqualifications Act
1986, s 4 and slO.
23 Insolvency Act 1986, s 214(2) and (3).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
178
carefully decide what steps to take. This may involve the help of outside
professionals.
For the purposes of this provision the term "director" also includes a shadow director.
A shadow director means a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions
the directors of the company are accustomed to act, but not if the advice was given in
a professional capacity." Practically speaking this could include, depending on the
particular circumstances, a controlling shareholder, even a parent company, "company
doctors'v" and in some instances also a lending bank exercising control for the
protection of its loan and security. Examples of professional advisers who are
excluded as shadow directors are solicitors, bankers or accountants, an administrative
receiver and administrator.
The requirement that the director must have known or ought to have known that there
was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation includes both an
objective and a subjective element. The director will be measured against a
reasonably diligent person having both the general knowledge, skill and experience
that may be reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions as are
carried out by that director in relation to the company and the general knowledge and
experience that the relevant director has.
In this English law corresponds closely to Australian law and the recent developments
in South African law."
However, it is not enough to establish wrongful trading where the director knew that
the company will not be able to pay its debts as they fall due. His knowledge should
also extend to the fact the company's assets when sold would not meet the liabilities.
Thus knowledge or deemed knowledge of commercial insolvency is not enough to
trigger the wrongful trading provisions. It should be established that the director knew
or ought to have known that the company was factually insolvent.i''
24 Principles of Corporate Insolvency (1997) 465-466.
25 Insolvency Act 1986, s 214(7) and s 251.
26 See Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 466.
27 South African law, however, uses this test in connection with recklessness, which requires worse
behaviour than the English law's wrongful trading where the standard of behaviour is even higher than
is required to avoid liability for mere negligence, because of the subjective element.
28 Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 469 and Fletcher The Law of Insolvency 662.
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5 2 2 4 Extent ofthe liability {or wrongful trading
The court may declare that the person liable for wrongful trading must make such
contribution to the assets of the company as the court thinks fit.
Again it is noticeable that the contribution should go to the company's assets and that
the liquidator is the only person who can apply for the imposition of liability for
wrongful trading.
5 2 2 5 Escaping liability {or wrongful trading
Once the liquidator has proved the necessary requirements to trigger liability for
wrongful trading the director can defend himself by proving that he took every
reasonable step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the creditors. "Every
step he ought to have taken" refers to those which would be known or ascertained or
reached or taken by a reasonably diligent person. The reasonably diligent person is
one having both the general knowledge, skill and experience reasonably expected of a
person in the same role as the director and the actual general knowledge, skill and
experience that the relevant director has.
Goode" gives some practical advice to directors on how to avoid liability for
wrongful trading. He lists twelve points which can be summarised as follows:
Do not assume that to stop trading is the easiest way out, it might not minimise the
potential loss to creditors. Consider the viability of the business carefully, insisting on
a programme to reduce expenditure, increase income and improve cash flow. Ensure
proper books are kept; hold frequent board meetings; evaluate performance against
budgets; get appropriate outside help; keep major creditors informed and ensure that
you are properly informed. Consider the appointment of an administrator or
administrative receiver and if your contributions are regularly rejected, resign and
record your reasons in a letter.
5 2 3 Australian insolvent trading provisions
5 2 3 1 Establishing liability
The provisions in the Australian legislation" establish a duty on the director of a
company to prevent a company from incurring debts while insolvent. It also sets forth
the liability if this duty is breached and the defences available to the director.
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Most importantly it is only directors which may fall foul of these provisions.
However, "director" is defined to include a person occupying the position of director,
irrespective of his actual designation and whether or not he has been validly appointed
or duly authorised to act in that capacity and a person in accordance with whose
directions or instructions the directors are accustomed to act. 31 The latter is also
known as the "shadow director" provision.
This would leave consultants and auditors outside the ambit of the insolvent trading
provisions especially when they only give advice in their professional capacity.
The second part of the insolvent trading provision is the insolvency requirement. For
the purposes of this provision insolvency may be proved with the help of certain
presumptions. If a company is being wound up because of insolvency and it can be
proved that it was insolvent on any date in the twelve months preceding the
presentation of the petition, then it will be presumed that it was insolvent from that
date to the date of presentation of the petition of its winding-up." A company will be
insolvent if it is not able to pay its debts as they fall due."
The liquidator wishing to claim from the director in terms of the insolvent trading
provisions does not have to prove that the company was insolvent on the day that the
relevant debts were incurred, but may make use of the presumption of insolvency for
this purpose. It will then be up to the director to prove that the company was not
insolvent at the relevant time.
Before any duty or liability of the company director can arise the company must have
incurred a debt. It is thus important to establish the precise moment that the debt was
incurred. This moment is determined by focusing on the circumstances of each case."
For the insolvent trading provision to become operative against the director of the
company there must also be "reasonable grounds" for suspecting that the company is
insolvent or by incurring the debt and other debts at the same time as the debt in
question, the company will become insolvent. The use of the words "reasonable
grounds" introduces an objective test and it would not be possible for the director to
29 Principles of Corporate Insolvency (1997) 472.
30 Corporations Law s 588G and H.
31 Corporations Law, s 60.
32 Corporations Law, s 588E(3).
33 Corporations Law, s 95A.
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claim that he did not actually know." However it has also been held that to determine
whether reasonable grounds existed the court should not only look to the facts that the
director ought to have known, but the court should also consider the facts that he
indeed knew." This extends the ambit of reasonableness to the circumstances where
the director was, whether by chance or otherwise, better informed than he ought to
have been.
This approach IS sensible and in keeping with the trend to require greater
responsibility from directors. It is no longer possible to escape liability where a
passive director was so inactive as not to have taken part in the business of the
company at all. In this way enough pressure is put on directors not to close their eyes
to reality and so be able to escape any responsibility.
In the case of a director the standard to judge reasonableness is by the standard
appropriate to a director or manager of ordinary competence."
5 2 3 2 Extent o{liability
A breach of his duty in terms of the insolvent trading provisions exposes a director to
an order for the payment of compensation to the company and the possibility of
payment towards a creditor. Furthermore the statute also refers to the possibility of a
civil or a criminal penalty. 38
5 2 3 3 Escaping liability
The director who finds himself subjected to a claim in terms of the insolvent trading
provisions has some statutory defences." The director will escape liability if he can
prove that at the time of the company incurring the debt, he had reasonable grounds to
expect and did expect the company to be solvent at the time and that it would remain
34 For a full discussion on when a debt will be incurred see Australian Corporations & Securities
Reporter par 166-500.
35 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich & Others (1991) 9 ACLC'946; Group Four Industries
Pty Ltd v Brosnan & Anor (1991) 9 ACLC 1 181 see also Australian Corporations & Securities
Reporter par 166-265.
36 Standard Charted Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico & Ors (1995) 13 ACLC 1 381; see also Australian
Corporations & Securities Reporter par 166-265.
373M Australia Pty Ltd v Kemish (1986) 4 ACLC 185, Rema Industries and Services Pty Ltd v Coal
5&Ors (1992) 10 ACLC 530, see also Australian Corporations & Securities Reporter par 166-500.
38 Crutchfield Corporate Voluntary Administration Law 24-25.
39 Corporations Law, s 588H.
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solvent even if it incurred that debt and any other contemplated debts at the same
time."
Another possible defence is if the director can successfully prove that he relied on the
information of a reliable person. This defence recognises that directors of ordinary
competence who are actively part of the running of the company do rely on the
information supplied to directors by senior and experienced executives and employees
of the company. The director should prove that at the time that the relevant debt was
incurred he had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that a competent and
reliable person (who was responsible to provide adequate information to him about
the solvency of the company) expected the company to be solvent and to remain
solvent. The provision of the information should have been in the fulfilling of the
reliable person's responsibility."
A third defence is for the director to prove that due to illness or some other good
reason the director did not take part in the management of the company at the time."
And lastly, the director will also escape liability if he can prove that he took all
reasonable steps to prevent the company from incurring the debt. 43
In determining whether a director has proved the last defence above, the court should
specifically have regard to the fact whether the director took any action with a view of
appointing an administrator, when that action was taken and the results of that action.
However, the court is in no way limited to looking only at those facts." In providing
this guidance to the court the legislature is clearly indicating that it wants to
encourage the use of administration through the insolvent trading provisions.
5 2 4 Evaluation
The insolvent trading provisions are an answer to one of the major objectives of
corporate insolvency namely the regulation of behaviour of participants in a credit
economy." However, the provisions that exist are not really effective in practice."
Goode" identifies the heavy burden of proof, the complicated financial evidence, the
40 Corporations Law, s 588H(2).
41 Corporations Law, s 588H(3).
42 Corporations Law, s 588H(4).
43 Corporations Law, s 588H(5).
44 Corporations Law, s 588H(6).
45 Cf 1 7 6 supra.
46 See 1 75.
47 Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 28-29.
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time-consuming and expensive preparation and the reluctance of liquidators and
creditors to throw good money after bad as the practical obstacles. These contribute to
the low level of use of the insolvent trading provisions. He contends that there is a
growing use in England of the proceedings leading to the disqualification of directors
instead.
The observations of Goode regarding the practical reasons for the low utilisation of
the insolvent trading provisions are no doubt also applicable to the South African
situation. This is not altogether difficult to understand in the light of the decision of
Ex parte De Villiers. The grounds for taking a director to court and establishing his
liability under section 424 of the Companies Act are difficult to prove. The effects of
Philotex however could be that creditors will now be more inclined to go to the court
in an attempt to hold the directors liable for the debts of the company. And such trend
would encourage directors to put the company in judicial management as a way of
escaping liability under section 424. The directors could then argue that they acted
reasonably in the circumstances by putting the company in judicial management.
When the current provisions are considered it becomes clear that the South African
insolvent trading provisions combine a criminal sanction with a provision for personal
liability in section 424 of the Companies Act.48 It is thus no surprise that fraudulent
trading or recklessness are required before the insolvent trading provisions become
operative.
This contrasts with the position in English law where the criminal sanction and the
sanction for personal liability are separated. The criminal sanction requires fraudulent
behaviour, whilst the standard of behaviour required to avoid civil liability for
wrongful trading is even higher than that needed to avoid liability for negligence.
Hence the wrongful trading provision imposes a positive duty on a director in certain
circumstances to take every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to
creditors as the director ought to have taken."
48 Act 61 of 1973.
49 See 5 2 2 3 supra.
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The provision for personal liability in the Australian law becomes operative in the
case of mere negligence. 50 This contrasts sharply with the South African position
where at least gross negligence is required. 51
It is submitted that the proposal of De Koker should be followed and that the criminal
sanction and the provision for personal liabilty should be separated. Fraudulent
trading should remain as the prerequisite for criminal sanction. The provision for
personal liability for debts incurred while the company is trading in insolvent
circumstances should be based on mere negligence.
In its current form South African law makes a specific provision for shadow directors
unnecessary. Section 424 is formulated widely enough to include the person who acts
as a director, the power behind the throne, without being formally appointed as a
director of the company. 52
In terms of the South African legislation an application for the imposition of personal
liability under section 424 may be brought by the Master, the liquidator, the judicial
manager and any creditor, member or contributor to the company. It is not suggested
that this should be changed to the restrictive English position where the liquidator is
the only person who may institute proceedings for fraudulent or wrongful trading.
It would, however, encourage appropriate use of judicial management if the South
African legislature expressly provides that putting a company into judicial
management will be a relevant factor in an application for the imposition of personal
liability when the court has to decide whether or not the director acted reasonably.
The Australian legislation has such a provision. 53 This would give a clear indication
that the legislature encourages company managers to seek early help.
Another strong encouragement to put a company into judicial management early
enough to rescue the business would be provided if it were to be regarded as prima
facie proof of reckless trading 54 if the company does not produce audited financial
so De Koker "Personal liability and disqualification - sanctioning insolvent trading by companies"
Paper delivered at Symposium on Corporate Insolvency Law Reform 23 October 1998, Pretoria 4
~roposes that criminal liability should only follow fraudulent and reckless trading.
1 Philotex (Pty) Ltd v Snyman 19982 SA 138 (A) 144A and also De Koker "Personal liability and
Disqualification" 4.
52 See 5 2 1 2 supra.
53 See Corporations Law, s 588(6).
54 Or negligence if the proposal of De Koker is accepted to make separate provision for personal
liability on the grounds of negligence. See De Koker "Personal liability and disqualification" 12-16 for
draft legislation of these provisions.
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statements within fifteen months after the end of the financial year. This submission is
linked to the proposal that a company would be deemed probably unable to meet its
obligations when the company has not produced audited financial statements within
fifteen months after the end of its financial year as proposed above. 55
5 2 5 Draft legislation to give effect to the proposals
De Koker's proposal requires amendments to a section of the Companies Act falling
outside the chapter on judicial management. The draft legislation in this thesis is
restricted to provisions on judicial management. However, regardless of whether new
insolvent trading provisions are introduced or not, the two subsections suggested
below should be incorporated into the existed or any revised provisions.
On the assumption that the present legislation is not changed it is suggested that the
following subsections should be added to section 424 of the Companies Act, 61 of
1973.
Subsection (5):
Where the court has to decide whether a person recklessly carried on the
business of the company for the purposes of subsection (1) the court must take
into consideration whether that person endeavoured to place the company in
judicial management, when the person endeavoured to place the company in
judicial management and the result of his or her actions to do so.
Subsection (6):
Where the court has to decide whether a person or persons recklessly carried
on the business of the company for the purposes of subsection (1) the fact that
the company has no audited financial statements within fifteen months after its
year end is prima facie proof of recklessness.
5 3 Disqualification of company directors
The insolvent trading provisions discussed above may and should be an important
incentive to the director to act early on the financial woes of the company and place it
in judicial management. The disqualification of director~ may play a similar role.
Whether this is possible and indeed the case will discussed after a brief explanation of
the relevant disqualification provisions in the three jurisdictions.
55 See 33 5 supra, proposed s 1(5).
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5 3 1 Disqualification of directors (South Africa)
Provisions on the disqualification of directors are to be found in the Companies Act. 56
These provisions in their current form do little to encourage the use of the judicial
management procedure.
The Companies Act57 provides for the automatic disqualification of the following
persons from being directors of a company, namely: a body corporate; a minor or
other person under legal disability; and any person who is the subject of any order
under the Companies Act58 or the repealed Companies Act59 disqualifying him from
being a director. The following are automatically disqualified from the office of
director except with the consent of the court, namely an unrehabilitated insolvent; a
person removed from an office of trust on account of misconduct; and, a person who
has at any time been convicted of one or more of a series of offences" and who has
been sentenced as a result to imprisonment without the option of a fine or to a fine
exceeding 100 rand.61
The Companies Act also provides for disqualification by the COurt62when a person has
been convicted. of an offence in connection with the promotion, formation or
management of any company; or the court has made an order for the winding-up of a
company and the Master has made a report under the Companies Act stating that in
his opinion a fraud has been committed by the person in connection with the
promotion or formation of the company; or by any director or officer of the company
in relation to the company since its formation; or in the course of the winding-up or
judicial management of a company it appears that any such person has been guilty of
an offence referred to in section 424 (whether or not he has been convicted of that
offence); or, has otherwise been guilty while an officer of the company of any fraud in
relation to the company or of any breach of his duty to the company.
56 Companies Act 1973 61 of 1973 s 218 and s 219.
57 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 218.
58 Act 61 of 1973.
59 Act 46 of 1926.
60 Offences including theft, fraud, forgery or uttering a forged document, perjury, an offence under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1985, or any offence involving dishonesty or in connection with
promotion, formation or management of a company. Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 218( d)(iii).
61 See regarding the exercise of the court's discretion Ex parte Barron 1977 3 SA 1099 (C); Von Steen v
Von Steen en 'n ander 1984 2 SA 251 (T); Ex parte Tayob and Another 1989 2 SA 282 (T) and Nusca v
Da Ponte and others 1994 3 SA 251 (B).
62 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 219.
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There is however no reported case of the disqualification of a director by the court in
terms of section 219. It is thus safe to conclude that the latter provision at least does
little to encourage directors to put companies in judicial management.
5 3 2 Disqualification of directors (England)
5 3 2 1 Company Directors Disqualification Acl3
An order for the disqualification of a director in terms of the Act means that the
person concerned may not without the permission of the court be a director, liquidator
or administrator of a company, or be a receiver or manager of a person's property, or
in any way, directly or indirectly, be concerned or take part in the promotion,
formation or management of a company." The disqualification thus effectively
prohibits a person to act as a director or a de facto director or a shadow director for
the period determined by the court.
The disqualification can be directed against any person as the Act only prescribes the
grounds for disqualification and the disqualification from acting as a director. Thus it
does not only apply to persons who have previously acted as directors and are thus
disqualified because of their actions as directors.
The Act provides for grounds for a discretionary, mandatory and automatic
disqualification. The maximum period of disqualification varies between five years
and fifteen years depending on the ground for disqualification.
The grounds upon which the court has a discretion to order disqualification are:
conviction for an indictable offence in connection with the promotion,
formation, management or liquidation of a company, or with the receivership
or the management of a company's property;"
persistent default in relation to provisions of the comparnes legislation
requiring any return, account, notice or other document to be filed with or
delivered to the Registrar of Companies;"
63 See generally Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (1997) 477-493 and Fletcher The Law
of Insolvency 668-670.
64 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 1.
65 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 2.
66 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 3 and s 5. Persistent default will be proved if the
person was found guilty in relation to any of the above offences three or more times in the five years
preceding the application. A disqualification may also be made if the person was summarily convicted
of any of the offences mentioned above.
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fraudulent trading or any other fraud in relation to the company or breach of
duty as officer, liquidator, receiver, or manager; and 67
a finding, following a statutory investigation, that the person is unfit to be
concerned with the management of a company," or has participated in
wrongful trading."
The court has no discretion and must make a mandatory disqualification in the case
where a director is found to be unfit to act as director. This arises in cases where the
person was a director of a company which has become insolvent and the conduct of
the director (including a de facto and shadow director) makes him unfit to be
concerned in the management ofa company."
A person will be automatically disqualified to act as a director, without the leave of
the court, where he is an undischarged bankrupt, or where upon his default in payment
of a county court administration order the court revokes that order."
5322 Curbing the Phoenix syndrome72
The Phoenix syndrome is the phenomenon where a company goes into liquidation and
soon after another company under the same management and with the same or a
similar name appears doing the same business. Although a company goes into
liquidation the name of the company may still have a great deal of goodwill attached
to it or may still have a high market recognition which still leaves the company name
as a valuable asset.
In order to curb this practice the English Insolvency Act provides that a director of a
company that has gone into insolvent liquidation cannot be a director (or a shadow
director) of a second company using the same (or a similar) name to that of the failed
company." This prohibition lasts for five years.
67 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 4.
68 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 8.
69 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, slO.
70 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 6.
71 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s 12.
72 Milman "Curbing the Phoenix syndrome" 1997 The Journal of Business Law 224 used this
expression. See also Coburn "The Phoenix Reexamined" 1998 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
321.
73 Insolvency Act 1986, s 216.
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5 3 3 Disqualification of directors (Australia)
The Insolvency Rules provides for three exceptions." The first is where the successor
company buys the whole or substantially the whole business from the insolvency
practitioner acting in respect of the first liquidated company. Proper notice of this
must however be given to the creditors of the first company. Secondly, leave from the
court may be sought to act as director provided that the application was brought
within seven days after the liquidation of the first company." The court when
considering whether to give leave under this exception will often make use of its
power to require the liquidator to furnish a report on the conduct of the director. The
third exception applies when the company was known by the relevant name for the
whole of the twelve months prior to the liquidation of the first company and it was not
dormant for any portion of those twelve months.
This section is very helpful in curbing the undesirable practice of unscrupulous
businesspersons reinventing themselves while leaving a mass of unpaid debts in their
wake. This prohibition applies automatically and independently of guilt or
blameworthy conduct on the part of the director.
If a person falls foul of this provision in the Act he is liable to a fine or imprisonment
or both."
Unlike the situation in England, but similar to the position in South Africa there is not
a separate statute to deal with the disqualification of directors. The relevant provisions
are found in the Corporations Law.
An insolvent under administration is prohibited from managing a corporation without
the leave of the COurt.77The rationale for this prohibition is to prevent a person who
has a history of insolvency from taking part in commercial activities in a managerial
capacity in connection with a company."
If a person has repeatedly breached the Corporations Law, failed to prevent the
company from repeatedly breaching the Corporations Law, or has acted dishonestly or
74 Insolvency Rules 1986, rr 4.228-4.230.
75 Insolvency Act 1986, s 216(3), Insolvency Rules 1986, r 4.229.
76 Insolvency Act 1986, s 216(4).
77 Corporations Law, s 229(1).
78 Re A/tim Pty Ltd [1968] 2 NSWR 762, see also Cassidy "Disqualification of Directors Under the
Corporations Law" 1995 Company and Securities Law Journa/ Vol 13 221.
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failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care and diligence, the prescribed applicants
may apply to the court to make a disqualification order against that person."
The ASe may also apply to the court for the disqualification of a person where the
person was part of the management of a corporation and the management was wholly
or partly responsibly for the failure of the corporation, resulting in its insolvent
winding-up, its official management, insolvency, its inability to satisfy a levy of
execution, or the appointment of a receiver, or where the management entered into a
compromise or arrangement with the corporation's creditors."
.r
The ASe moreover has the power, without the intervention of the court, to disqualify
a person from taking part in the management of the company." The ASe can exercise
this power where the person was a director of two or more companies during the
twelve months prior to the winding-up of those companies; those companies were
wound up within seven years of each other; the liquidator has lodged a report
regarding the conduct of persons involved in the management of the company; and
the liquidation dividend was less than 50 cents in the dollar.
Persons disqualified from management of a company may not be a director, a
promoter, or in any way be concerned in or take part in the management of a
corporation whether directly or indirectly.
The Australian law does not seem to attach much importance to the disqualification of
directors. The grounds for disqualification are not as numerous as one would expect,
but there has nevertheless been a slight increase in the number of disqualifications in
recent years." It is thus clear that official encouragement to make use of
administration stems from other sources and not from the statutory provisions for
disqualification of directors. 83
5 3 4 Evaluation
The disqualification procedures are important in any insolvency regime. However
they will not easily encourage the incumbent management to put a company into
judicial management, unless they are vigorously enforced. Enforcement should not
79 Corporations Law, s 230.
80 Corporations Law, s 599.
81 Corporations Law, s 600.
82 Cassidy Disqualification of directors [1995] 239.
83 See insolvent trading provisions and taxation.
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5 4 The use of section 311 of the Companies Act as a corporate rescue measure
depend on the eager participation of the company's creditors. By the time that a
liquidation procedure is in full swing, creditors are often reluctant to put a lot of
energy into such procedures.
De Koker proposes that South African law should add personal liability for insolvent
and fraudulent trading to the grounds for the disqualification of a director in terms of
section 218 of the Companies Act. 84
The South African law is however also lacking in not having provisions similar to
those in England to curb the phoenix syndrome." These provisions would not only put
a stop to undesireable phoenix companies, but would encourage a director rather to
put a company into judicial management in order to save the company instead of
liquidating it and losing a valuable asset like the company name.
Coburn, however, warns that voluntary administration may actually assist those
responsible for phoenix company activity. This tendency flows from the possible
appointment of an administrator who is too friendly towards the directors of the
company in a situation where creditors are just interested in writing off their losses
and putting the matter behind them.86
This problem is less of a threat where the judicial manager would be able to recover
assets by the avoidance of antecedent transactions.
In the South African context section 311 of the Companies Act is often employed as a
corporate rescue mechanism. It is submitted that the current use of this provision
undermines the use of judicial management.
Section 311 plays an important role in company law. It provides the machinery
whereby a compromise or arrangement can be made between a company and its
creditors (or any class of them) or between a company and its members (or any class
of them). It is intended that section 311 may be used where a company needs to
negotiate with persons, such as creditors or members, who have claims against it with
a view to altering those claims in the common interest. Claims against a company
often vest in large groups or classes of persons. It might therefore be impossible for
84 De Koker "Personal liability and disqualification." 17.
85 See 6 3 2 2.
86 Coburn 1998 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 325.
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the company to negotiate with these persons individually. The company thus needs a
procedure to negotiate with them collectively. The procedure should also enable the
company to bind all the persons of a group or a class to the agreement reached with
the required maj ority. Section 311 is the legislature's answer to this need.
5 4 1 Scheme of arrangement section 311
The commercial world has enthusiastically utilised section 311 in a slightly different
role, as indicated above. It has become the main tool for rescuing the corporate
cadaver where the company is insolvent or has already gone into liquidation. For this
purpose a "standard scheme", which is briefly explained below was developed to
bring the whole "corporate rescue" within the ambit of section 311.
There is little doubt that the development and continued use of the standard scheme in
terms of section 311 is driven by a desire to gain tax benefits rather than to achieve a
proper business rescue." The whole arrangement and its terms are thus geared to
preserving an assessed loss for taxation purposes and very little or no attempt is made
to incorporate any of the provisions to be found in a proper business rescue.
"What is not always readily appreciated is that the terms of the scheme of
arrangement with which these decisions are overtly concerned are to a
significant extent dictated by a deus ex machina, namely, section 20(1)(a)(ii)
of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962."88
It is clear that the standard scheme in terms of section 311 shows no concern for the
creditors of the company.
"The most expeditious and economic means of acquiring a company in
financial difficulties and, at the same time, ridding a company of its existing
creditors is through the mechanism of section 311 of the Companies Act. 1189
The standard scheme is mostly employed where someone wants to acquire a company
which enjoys an assessed loss for income tax purposes. The target company is nearly
always in provisional or final liquidation."
87 Delport "Die Appélhof en Standaardskemas in die Maatskappyereg" 1996 SA Mere LJ 377 385;
Anonymous "Company Schemes of Arrangement: preserving the Assessed Loss" 1989 The Taxpayer
26; RDJ "Schemes of Arrangement - a new Development" 1989 Income Tax Reporter 7; Getz & Jooste
"Section 311 of the Companies Act: Preserving the Assessed Loss" 1995 Acta Juridica 56.
88Anonymous "Company Schemes of Arrangement: preserving the Assessed Loss" 1989 The Taxpayer
26. Section 20(1)(a)(ii) of the Income Tax Act is the provision which determines that an assessed loss
will be reduced by the amount of a compromise between the taxpayer and any of his creditors.
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In terms of the standard scheme, the would-be acquirer offers to make an amount of
money available. This money is meant to be distributed amongst the creditors of the
target company. Normally, secured and preferent creditors would be paid to the extent
of the value of their security or preference. The concurrent creditors however only
receive a dividend which is a percentage of their claims against the company.
Only creditors who prove their claims in terms of a prescribed procedure, generally at
a creditors' meeting, will be paid. This payment will be done once the scheme is
approved by the court.
On the occurrence of a predetermined event the creditors are deemed to have ceded
their claims against the company to another, normally the would-be acquirer or his
nominee. This predetermined event is mostly the approval of the scheme. The amount
ceded would normally be a fraction less than the full claim against the company. In
most instances the amount deemed to be ceded would be 1% less than the full amount.
On the approval of the scheme the company is released from liquidation.
The advantages of the standard scheme to the acquirer are that the tax loss of the
company is preserved and the company has got rid of its creditors. The acquirer can
use the preserved assessed loss to diminish the tax liability of his own profitable
business and furthermore the new acquirer is in a strong position towards the
company in that he is now the major creditor of the company.
This standard scheme raises different issues to be addressed in order to comply with
the law and commercial needs and in the interests of greater commercial morality. It
also points to shortcomings in the present companies and tax legislation.
The different issues that are raised by the standard scheme include whether the
standard scheme really falls within the provisions of section 311 of the Companies
Act; the treatment of creditors of the target company; the overpowering importance of
preserving the assessed loss for taxation purposes; and several issues with regard to
the continued insolvency of the company.
89 RDJ "Schemes of Arrangement - a new Development" 1989 Income Tax Reporter 7.
90 Namex (Edms) Bpk v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1994 2 SA 265 278C-D.
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5 4 1 1 Does the standard scheme [all within the provisions o[ section 311
It is not the object of this thesis to resolve the issue of the legality of the standard
scheme. This has been the subject of numerous court cases and articles." For the
purposes of this thesis it is enough to accept that the standard scheme will be allowed
in terms of section 311 especially since its obiter approval by the former Appelate
Division in Namex (Edms) Bpk v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste,"
5 4 1 2 Treatment ofthe creditors
The treatment of the unsecured creditors in the standard scheme leaves much to be
desired. The issue was addressed in Ex Parte Kaplan & others NNO: In re Robin
Consolidated Industries Ltd. 93 The judge pointed to the shortcomings in the proof of
claims, the acceptance of late claims and related matters. To counter these the courts
developed guidelines to be included in standard schemes to ensure the fair treatment
of creditors.
It is clear that creditors are not part of the future of the company as they are seen as a
mere irritant from which the company should be rid." It is understandable that the
creditors are so treated, because the company is often in such dire financial
circumstances that the creditors have lost hope of recovering much. The company is
most probably in provisional liquidation already and the creditors are not part of any
plan of future conduct for the company. The creditors are merely left with the choice
to accept a dividend now or risk receiving less later.
"In these circumstances the creditors of the company are very likely to be
amenable to an offer of a reduced pay-out to their claims. They will be
persuaded that if liquidation runs its often lengthy course, accompanied by its
91 See Ex Parte Kaplan & others NNO: In re Robin Consolidated Industries Ltd 1987 3 SA 413 (T); Ex
Parte Millman &Others NNO: In re Multi-Bou (Ply) Ltd & others 1987 4 SA 405 (K); Ex Parte
Strydom NO: In re Central Plumbing Works (Natal) (Pty) Ltd; Ex Parte Spendiff NO: In re Candida
Footwear Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd; Ex Parte Spendiff NO: In re Jerseytex (Ply) Ltd 1988 1 SA 616
(D); Sackstein v Bolstone (Free State) (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) & others 1988 4 SA 556 (0) and
Namex (Edms) Bpk v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1994 2 SA 265 (A); see also Delport
"Die Appélhof en Standaardskemas in die Maatskappyereg" 1996 SA Mere LJ 377.
92 1994 2 SA 265 (A).
93 19873 SA 413 (W) 429-434.
94 RDJ "Schemes of Arrangement - a new Development" 1989 Income Tax Reporter 7 quoted in 5 4 1
supra n 88.
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attendant costs and the merciless ravages of inflation, they will receive even
less than what is offered to them. "95
From a policy point of view it would be much better if the company were to be placed
in judicial management before the stage of provisional liquidation is reached and that
the treatment of creditors were to be regulated by legislation. The problem of the
treatment of creditors can be better understood when one takes into consideration that
the acquirer in the standard scheme "[is] more often than not ... an insider" .96
95 Getz & Jooste ''Section 311 of the Companies Act: Preserving the Assessed Loss" 1995 Acta
Juridica 56.
96 Ex Parte Kap/an & others NNO: In re Robin Consolidated Industries Ltd 1987 3 SA 413 (T) 424.
97 See 5 5 infra.
98 See 5 5 infra.
The creditors cannot be assured treatment equal to that which they would receive in
judicial management or liquidation. The procedure would neither secure future
business relations, business trust, a continuation of the business or parts thereof nor
preserve employment, all of which are some of the positive aspects which a proper
business rescue procedure is intended to achieve.
5 4 1 3 Preserving the assessed loss
As pointed out above, the overwhelming desire driving the standard scheme is the
desire to preserve the assessed tax loss of the company. This indicates that judicial
management should at least leave the company no worse off as regards tax
implications than the standard scheme. The tax implications of judicial management
are discussed below."
Suffice to say is that the preserving of the tax loss in judicial management would do
much for the company's cash flow position once it starts trading profitably again. This
has been recognised in both Australia and England." If judicial management is at a
tax disadvantage, the standard scheme will be preferred to judicial management
regardless of the other benefits associated with a proper business rescue mechanism.
It is a somewhat more complex question as to whether or not the court should be party
to an agreement or scheme of arrangement which intends to circumvent the Receiver
of Revenue. It is a more difficult question, because everybody has the right to arrange
his affairs in order to pay the minimum tax. However, even if the schemes are
legitimate it is not an open door for minimising future tax liabilities. If the parties to
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the standard scheme were to explain in their submissions to the court that their
intention is to acquire an assessed loss the Receiver may disallow the application of
the assessed loss in the post-scheme company in terms of the anti-avoidance
provisions of the Income Tax ACt.99
The court without actually ordering an illegal act may be in the position where it is
used to present a carefully distorted picture to the Receiver. The court is thus in effect
being made a party to misleading the Receiver.
5 4 1 4 The continued insolvency o[the company
The standard scheme upon its implementation often leaves the company still insolvent
despite the fact that the company was released from liquidation. This is due to the
claims of the pre-scheme creditors of the company having been ceded to the acquirer
,I which is now the major creditor of the company. The public policy ramifications of
this and whether the court should approve such schemes have received much
attention?"
In Ex parte Lebowa Development Corporation LtiO) the court was concerned about
the phoenix character of the standard scheme of arrangement. The court eloquently
describes the sequence of events which "has actually occurred so many times in the
past as to be very familiar, and the repetition of which is placed in prospect by the
present proposal" .102
The company, having just been given a new lease on life after the section 311 scheme,
puts on a new face with a name change, new premises, new letterheads and attractive
signwriting. The company appears prosperous and this misleads
"many smaller suppliers of goods and services in the market-place, sometimes
one-man concerns, whose only real knowledge and ability relate to the
particular service or product which they supply, and who have little
knowledge or experience of company law or company financial statements.
99 Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962, s 103.
100 See Ex parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd 1989 3 SA 71 (T); Ex parte De Villiers NO: In
re MSL Publications (Ply) Ltd (In Liquidation) 19904 SA 59 (W); Cooper v A & G Fashions (Ply) Ltd
1991 4 SA 204 (K); Ex parte De Villiers & another NNO: In re Carbon Developments (Ply) Ltd (In
Liquidation) 1993 1 SA 493 (A); Willimse "Het die klokke Gelui vir Skikkings Ingevolge a 311 van
die Maatskappywet?" 1989 De Rebus 205; Getz & Jooste "Section 311 of the Companies Act:
Preserving the Assessed Loss" 1995 Acta Juridica 56.
101 19893 SA 71 (T).
10298C.
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For a variety of reasons such smaller suppliers, when approached on behalf of
an apparently prosperous company to supply goods or services on such usual
terms as payment 30 days after invoice, readily do so without making further
enquiries as to the company's ability to pay."
The court then gives various reasons why the supplier does not make further
enquiries. However it is clear that the court is justly concerned about the unsuspecting
future creditor of the company who does not know that this company was the subject
of a standard scheme in terms of section 311 and rescued from liquidation without
restoring the company to complete solvency.l'"
The court in Ex Parte Strydom NO: In re Central Plumbing Works (Natal) (Pty) Ltd"
answered the concerns raised in Ex Parte Lebowa by saying:
"There are, for example, very many companies that commence business with a
negligible share capital and can purchase the assets necessary for it to carry on
its business only by means of its shareholders lending or advancing to it the
funds required for this purpose. All of this is well known in the commercial
world and persons who supply goods to companies have regard to the realities
of the situation in considering whether or not to grant credit to the company. If
they are not satisfied with the company's creditworthiness they may insist
upon being paid in cash or refuse to supply. That is their prerogative. The
Courts do not make their decision for them. And it is difficult to see why
creditors or rather future creditors should enjoy any greater protection in cases
where companies are released from liquidation following upon the sanction of
a scheme of arrangement."
"It is a common occurrence for a private company to embark on trading with a
nominal paid-up share capital and to finance its business operations by way of
This view was largely endorsed by the former Appellate Division in Ex parte De
Villiers & another NNO: In re Carbon Developments: 105
103 For an understanding of the possible damages done by such a phoenix character of the current
application of section 311, see Coburn Australian Journal of Corporate Law 322 - 323.
104 Ex Parte Strydom NO: In re Central Plumbing Works (Natal) (Pty) Ltd; Ex Parte SpendiffNO: In re
Candida Footwear Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd; Ex Parte Spendiff NO: In re Jerseytex (Pty) Ltd 1988 1
SA 616 (D) 623.
1051993 I SA 493 (A) 503.
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members' loans. Frequently, those loans are treated as if they were part of the
capital of the company."
These remarks of the courts though conflicting show the concerns for creditors and
the danger to creditors especially in a jurisdiction such as South Africa, which does
not prescribe a statutory minimum capital. The remarks of the court in Ex parte De
Villiers are only partly true. It may be a common occurrence for companies to be
undercapitalised and financed by members' loans, but those loans are not treated as
capital in the event of the liquidation of the company. In a liquidation those loans
compete for the available assets with at least the concurrent creditors.
This problem of under-capitalisation of the company upon the approval of the scheme
of arrangement has received attention and it is at present solved by the use of a so-
called "subordination agreement". The subordination agreement purports to
subordinate the claims ceded to the acquirer in the standard scheme to the claims of
new creditors. Although subordination agreements were not always received
enthusiastically, it is now widely accepted that a well-drawn subordination agreement
will satisfy the conscience of the court regarding the need to promote commercial
morality, causing it to sanction the standard scheme.!"
A solution would be to change the order of preference on insolvency by legislation
with the introduction of a statutory subordination of creditor rights of shareholders in
their capacity as creditors to the claims of concurrent creditors.
5 4 2 Changes to legislation
In order to remedy the ailments of the standard scheme in terms of section 311, it is
important not to make section 311 impossible to use as it plays an important role.!"
The following suggestions are made to remedy some aspects of the standard scheme
of arrangement in terms of section 311 without changing either its usefulness or its
essence.
106 Cf Ex parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd 1989 3 SA 71 (T); Cooper v A & G Fashions
(Pty) Ltd 1991 4 SA 204 (K); Ex Parte De Villiers and Another NNO: In re Carbon Developments
(Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) 1993 1 SA 493 (A) 504 and Luiz & Van der Linde "Subordination
Afreements - Are They Worth the Paper They Are Written On?" 1993 SA Mere LJ 100.
10 Namex (Edms) Bpk v Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1994 2 SA 265 (A) 294.
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5 4 2 1 Change of company name
Where a company has undergone a scheme of arrangement whilst in liquidation or
provisional liquidation, the company should upon approval of the scheme and release
from liquidation or provisional liquidation add to its name in brackets the words:
"reorganised in terms of section 311". This could be abbreviated to (reorg sec 311).
This name change should last for at least eighteen months or for such longer period as
the court may determine.
This would warn future creditors of the possible dangers of which they would be
otherwise unaware and which rightly concerned the court in Ex parte Lebowa. It
would give a similar warning to outsiders as is intended by the compulsory use of
"limited" at the end of the name of a company. Itwould moreover alert outsiders that
the company had already experienced severe difficulties in the past and thus carries a
slightly higher risk than even a newly formed company.
It would also alert the Receiver of Revenue to the immediate past of the company and
would enable the Receiver to ask the necessary questions to determine whether to
apply the discretionary power to attack the application of the assessed loss under the
anti-avoidance provisions ofthe Income Tax Act.
5 4 2 2 Introduction of a statutory subordination
The problems of continued insolvency of the company emerging from the standard
scheme in terms of section 311 can be solved by a statutory subordination of the
claims of shareholders of the company who are at the same time shareholders or
directors of the company. This could be done by changing the statutory ranking of
claims of a company that was the subject of a scheme of arrangement in terms of
section 311 of the Companies Act while it was in liquidation or provisional
liquidation. The claims against the target company of shareholders or directors of
such a company in their capacity as creditors would, from the approval of such a
scheme of arrangement and the subsequent release from liquidation or provisional
liquidation, statutorily rank below the claims of other creditors in a subsequent
liquidation.
Such a change in legislation would solve any moral dilemmas of the court regarding
continued insolvency. It would, together with the suggested name change of the
company, be an answer to the issues raised in the Lebowa case and protect
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unsuspecting future creditors. lOS It would not interfere with the long-standing practice
of private companies being under-capitalised and then funded by members' loans. The
other benefits of having a member's loan against the company would be preserved and
at the same time it would correspond with the views of the court in Ex parte de
Villiers that such loans are often treated as capital. 109
lOS See 5 4 2 1supra.
109 See 5 4 1supra.
110 Schulte "Corporate groups and the equitable subordination of claims on insolvency" 1997 The
Company Lawyer vol 18no 12.
In the existing procedure of judicial management there is also a provision for a change
in the statutory ranking of claims. The pre-judicial management creditors may consent
to the preferent payment of claims that arise in judicial management. The
subordination of claims of the shareholders and directors in their capacity as creditors
would correspond with the current consent to preference in judicial management. The
claims as creditors of the shareholders and directors arise from pre-scheme of
arrangement transactions. They are included in the claims ceded to the acquirer under
the standard section 311 scheme.
A similar precedent in the form of equitable subordination exists in the United States
of America."? There the bankruptcy courts, due to their equitable jurisdiction, are able
to subordinate the claims of certain creditors in a winding-up. They used this power to
evolve the practice of equitable subordination in corporate insolvencies.
The doctrine is especially applied in parent subsidiary relations in groups of
corporations. The parent corporation might be ordered to subordinate its claims
against a subsidiary when the subsidiary is liquidated.
The change should be introduced by the legislature and declare the circumstances
where subordination of claims as creditors of shareholders or directors should take
effect.
The changes to legislation proposed above would not significantly affect the
usefulness of section 311 of the Companies Act. Where it is not used to preserve tax
losses they would not make any difference. However, where section 311 is used as a
corporate rescue procedure to preserve effectively the assessed tax loss, the proposed
changes remove the unfavourable aspects of the current standard scheme. If this is
done, the business community may acquire a new enthusiasm for a revitalised judicial
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management procedure. The proposed changes in legislation would only remedy
those aspects of the section 311 standard scheme that cause problems.
5 5 Assessed losses for taxation purposes
The advent of the business rescue procedures and company voluntary arrangements
brought with them certain problems relating to taxation. The solution to these
problems have a significant impact on the decision of creditors in deciding upon the
outcome of administration as well as on the prospects of survival of the company in
administration.
For example, for the plan of future conduct to be accepted it will nearly always result
in a compromise where creditors surrender part of their claims. The creditors may be
faced with tax laws that do not treat such a reduction in a claim against the debtor as a
deductible expense or bad debt. On the other hand the tax laws may treat the release
from debt as a taxable income in the hands of the debtor company or the tax laws may
reduce any assessed loss of the debtor company by the amount of the compromise
agreed to by the creditors. The treatment of the compromise with creditors by the tax
laws affects the future viability of the company undergoing a business rescue.
An important question is whether or not the company undergoing a business rescue
will be able to continue to utilise the full value of an assessed loss accumulated in its
favour. If the company is allowed to utilise the full value of its assessed loss it will
enhance the possibility of a successful business rescue. It will mean that the tax
liability of the company in its first years of recovery is less and that will in turn mean
a much better cash flow.
England and Australia both realised the importance of the treatment of the assessed
loss in a business rescue and both jurisdictions made policy decisions on the matter.
Their policy is to enhance business rescue.
5 5 1 South Africa
The treatment of assessed losses in South Africa has not yet been properly considered
in the context of judicial management. With the current requirement that a judicial
management order will only be made if there is a reasonable probability that the
company will be able to pay all its debts or meet all its obligations, the company will
be allowed to utilise any assessed loss in its entirety.
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If however, the proposals in this thesis are accepted and a company is allowed to enter
judicial management without the purpose of paying all of its debts or meeting all of its
obligations, the treatment of the assessed tax loss will be affected by section 20 of the
Income Tax ACt.111 If the company will not pay all its debts or meet all of its
obligations it will invariably have to enter into a compromise with its creditors. The
result of this compromise with creditors will be that they agree to accept a reduced
amount in full settlement of their claims. The Income Tax Act stipulates that the
assessed loss of the company in such circumstances will be reduced by the amount of
the benefit to the company debtor.
Thus if the assessed tax loss of the company was valued at Rl 000, the company had
debts of R1000 and the company reaches a compromise with its creditors whereby it
will pay them 45 cents in the rand, the assessed tax loss will be reduced by R550 to
I R450.
The position is different under the standard scheme of arrangement in terms of section
311 of the Companies Act. Under the standard scheme the debts owed to the creditors
are ceded and not diminished. The assessed tax loss is thus unaffected by the
compromise provisions of section 20 of the Income Tax Act. This would represent a
significant difference in the result reached through judicial management compared to
that under a section 311 standard scheme of arrangement.
552 England
The problems described in the introduction to this section were also experienced in
England with the introduction of the administration order procedure and company
voluntary arrangements. These problems were clarified by the English Inland
Revenue which made it clear that a deduction will still be allowed to the company
under administration in respect of a debt or part of a debt released by the creditor as
part of a voluntary arrangement or compromise, provided that the release was wholly
and exclusively for the purposes of the debtor's trade, profession or vocation. This
provision applies both for the benefit of debtor and creditor. Thus the deduction for
the debtor company is not diminished by the amount released and at the same time the
III Act no 58 of 1962.
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creditor will be allowed to treat the released part of the debt as bad debts or debts
estimated to be bad.!"
These decisions and clarification were in response to the possible adverse effects of
taxation on administration and as a gesture of support for the culture of business
rescue. II) Another interesting aspect was the clarification of the Inland Revenue's
response as to how it would vote on proposals by the administrator, as the Inland
Revenue would often be a substantial creditor, entitled to vote at meetings of
creditors.
"When deciding how to vote, the Revenue' give consideration to, amongst
other things, the way in which the taxpayer has attended to his tax obligations,
the level of uncertainty over assets and liabilities and whether a voluntary
arrangement is the appropriate course for the Revenue to approve as a creditor.
The Revenue are also very much aware of the interests of other parties and of
the purpose of the voluntary arrangement procedure." 114
As to the liability for tax the administrator will not be personally liable for tax
payments. Tax remains the liability of the company. The administrator can discharge
that liability under his general powers and he is liable to account for the payment of
PAYE and National Insurance Contributions deductions.
The appointment of a administrator does not mean the end of the accounting period of
a company and group relations are not disturbed because of the administration
order. I IS
5 5 3 Australia
There is nothing in the mere act of execution of a deed of company arrangement
which brings about any change in the tax status of the company concerned. 116 This has
the potential benefit that the company can preserve any assessed tax loss that it may
have at that stage which would in turn be very beneficial for the company once it has
completed its operational restructuring and is able to trade again. The cash-flow
112 British Tax Reporter par 171-500.
lIJ See Institute of Charted Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) Technical Release 799, see
also British Tax Reporter par 171-500.
114 Institute of Charted Accountants in England and Wales (lCAEW) Technical Release 799 as reported
in British Tax Reporter par 171-500.
115 Brown Corporate Rescue 354 and 355.
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position of the company would be greatly enhanced if it does not have to make
provision for any tax payments in the first year following the deed of company
arrangement.
As Shtein117 indicates the Commissioner of Taxation indicated that he does not
consider the release of debt as a capital gain assessable in the hands of the debtor.
Neither does such an amount released by the creditor amount to income in the hands
of the debtor according to the ordinary principles and nor may the debtor's accounts
be re-opened to make an adjustment to reduce the previous deductions as a result of
the compromise.
It can however reduce the deductions allowed if the compromise refers to debts in the
current tax year.'" Thus where an Australian company has an assessed loss for
taxation purposes that refers to taxation periods before the taxation period when the
company was put into voluntary administration a compromise with creditors will not
affect the amount of that assessed loss. Where the claims arose in the same taxation
period as the taxattion period when the company was placed under voluntary
administration the compromise will result in a reduced deduction from taxable
income.
5 5 4 Evaluation
In order to promote the use of a revitalised judicial management procedure some
reform of section 20 of the Income Tax Act is necessary. In this respect, England and
Australia are useful examples. The Australian approach allows the assessed tax loss
brought forward from previous years to remain unaffected by a compromise with
creditors reached through voluntary administration. However, the debts of the current
financial year affected by the compromise will only be allowed as a tax deduction to
the extent of their after compromise value. It is submitted that South Africa should
follow this approach. Such an approach would do much to foster a much needed
business rescue culture and would promote the use of a reformed judicial management
procedure. The business rescue culture would benefit even more if a similar
116 Shtein "The acquisition of reconstructed tax loss companies and trusts" 1995 Australian Business
Law Review 411 at 420.
117 Shtein "The acquisition of reconstructed tax loss companies and trusts" 1995 Australian Business
Law Review 411 at 421.
118 A further unknown factor is the effect of the proposed legislation in respect of "commercial debt
forgiveness." It seems unlikely that the introduction of this legislation will alter the position of
companies under administration or deed of company arrangement.
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concession does not apply to the assessed loss in a scheme of arrangement in terms of
section 311.119
If such reform is not undertaken it will have a considerable effect on the use of
judicial management as the section 311 standard scheme procedure will often be
preferred. This will simply be because there would not be tax neutrality between the
two options. As a result all the mechanisms for creditor participation and the rescue of
the business undertaking instead of the corporate shell would be neglected.
119 There is doubt whether the practice of keeping the assessed loss in a s 311 scheme of arrangement
will continue after the decision in The Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Datakor Engineering (Ply)
Ltd 1998 4 SA 1050 A. See Anonymous 1999 The Taxpayer 34 and Anonymous 1999 The Taxpayer
105.
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ANNEXURE
Section 0
(1) In this chapter, unless the context otherwise indicates-
'creditor connected to a director' means a director or his or her spouse or any
juristic person in which a director or his or her spouse holds a controlling interest,
whether alone or together, a partnership of which a director or his or her spouse is a
partner, or a trust of which a director or his or her spouse is a trustee or a major
beneficiary, or a person declared a creditor connected to a director by the court.
'prescribed financial contract' means a currency or interest rate swap agreement; a
basis swap agreemnent; a spot, future, forward or other foreign exchange agreement; a
cap, collar or floor transaction; a commodity swap; a forward rate agreement; a
repurchase or reverse repurchase agreement; a spot, future, forward or other
commodity agreement; an agreement to buy, sell, borrow or lend securities, to clear or
settle securities transactions or to act as a depository for securities; any derivative,
combination or option in respect of, or agreement similar to a currency or interest rate
swap agreement; any master agreement in respect of any of the above agreements or
contracts; a guarantee of the liabilities under any of the above agreements; or any
prescribed agreement.
Section L'(Circumstances III which company may be placed under judicial
management)
(1) When any company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts and there is a
probability that if it is placed under judicial management it would achieve one or
more of the purposes referred to in subsection (3), it may be placed under judicial
management.
(2)(a) The company may be placed under judicial management by:
(i) a special resolution of the company or a resolution of its directors. This
resolution must be lodged by the end of the next business day with the Master,
who must approve the appointment of the judicial manager nominated by the
company, its directors or its members.
I Based on the Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 427; the (English) Insolvency Act 1986, s 8(3) and the
(Australian) Corporations Law, s 436 A.
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(ii) an application to court by a member or a creditor or creditors or any
prospective or contingent creditor or creditors or the provisional liquidator.
2(b) Before an application for judicial management is presented to the Court, a copy
of the application and of every affidavit confirming the facts stated therein shall be
lodged with the Master at the seat of the Court.
2(c) Despite the provisions of section 203(1) of the Companies Act a special
resolution referred to in subsection 2(a)(i) takes effect when it is lodged with the
Master.
(3) The purposes for which a company may be placed under judicial management are:
(a) the survival of the company, and the whole or any part of its undertaking,
as a going concern;
(b) the approval of a plan of future conduct;
(c) the sanctioning under section 311 of the Companies Act of a compromise
or arrangement; and
(d) a more advantageous realisation of the company's assets than would be
effected by a winding-up.
(4) Judicial management commences when the Master approves the appointment of
the judicial manager after the resolution referred to in subsection 2(a)(i) is lodged
with the Master or when the court makes an order for judicial management in terms of
subsection 2(a)(ii).
(5) A company is deemed to be likely to become unable to pay its debts if it fails to
provide audited financial statements as required by s 286 of the Companies Act within
fifteen months after the end of its financial year.
(6) The fact that an application for judicial management is opposed by a creditor
seeking winding-up on one of the grounds in section 344 of the Companies Act will
not by itself justify the refusal of a judicial management order if one or more of the
purposes in subsection (3) are proved.
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Section 22 (Effect of judicial management)
(1) While the company is under judicial management all actions, proceedings the
execution of all writs, summonses and other processes against the company are stayed
and must not be proceeded with without the written consent of the judicial manager,
or without the leave of the Court and on such terms and conditions as the Court may
impose.
(2) Other processes m subsection (1) include the repossession without court
intervention of or other steps by the owner or lessor of property to take control of
property used by, in possession of or occupied by the company.
(3) Nothing in subsection (1) requires the leave of the court for the initial steps to
bring an application for the winding-up of the company or the initial steps to obtain a
,I judgment to enforce a security over the property of the company.
(4) Subject to subsection (5), if a contract to which the company is a party contains a
clause that purports to vary the terms of the contract or to terminate the contract upon
the company being placed under judicial management, such clause has no effect on
the commencement of judicial management.
(5) The judicial manager has an election to continue with a contract referred to in
subsection (4) without the clause becoming operative or to accept the variation or
termination of the contract, provided that if the judicial manager elects to continue
with the contract without the clause becoming operative the further obligations
flowing from that contract must be complied with and must be treated as part of the
costs of judicial management.
(6) Subsection (1) does not apply to prescribed financial contracts.
(7) The Master must issue guidelines to judicial managers how to exercise their
discretion in subsection (1).3
Section 34
(1) While a company is under judicial management, a person (other than the judicial
manager) cannot perform or exercise, and must not purport to perform or exercise, a
2 Based on Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 428 (2) and Corporations Law s 440C.
3 Alternatively basic guidelines could be provided for in statute and the Master must then issue
supplementary guidelines.
4 Based on Insolvency Act 1986, s 14 and Corporations Law, s 437C.
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function or power as an officer or director of the company, except with the written
approval of the judicial manager. 5
(2) Subsection (1) does not remove an officer or director of the company from office.
(3) The judicial manager has the power to remove any director of the company and/or
to appoint any person not disqualified in terms of the Companies Act to be a director
of it, whether to fill a vacancy or otherwise.
(4) A director removed from office in terms of subsection (3) will have not have any
claims against the company or the judicial manager because of his removal.
Section 4
(1) The judicial manager must within 60 days of appointment (or such longer period
as the court may allow):
(a) send to the Master and to creditors proposals for a plan of future conduct
for the company for achieving the purpose or purposes of judicial
management; and
(b) submit the proposals for a plan of future conduct to a meeting of the
company's creditors convened for the purpose on not less than 10 days' notice.
(2)(a) The meeting of creditors referred to in subsection (l)(b) above may resolve, by
a majority in number and a majority of sixty percent in value of claims:
(i) to accept the proposals for a plan of future conduct with or without
modifications, but must not do so unless the judicial manager consents to each
modification; or
(ii) that judicial management should end; or
(iii) that the company be wound up.
5 An alternative to subsection 1 could read:
(1) Any power conferred on the company or its directors, whether by the Companies Act or by
memorandum or articles of association or common law, which could be exercised in such a way as to
interfere with the exercise by the judicial manager of his powers is not exercisable except with the
written consent of the judicial manager, which may be given either generally or in relation to particular
cases.
The alternative subsection leaves less certainty as to the functions and powers of the directors, because
the written consent of the judicial manager will be necessary for only some of the powers and functions
that a director can exercise.
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2(b) (i) Creditors eligible to vote at the meeting referred to in subsection (l)(b) are
creditors with proven claims against the company and such creditors allowed
to vote by the judicial manager, but excluding all creditors who are also
directors of the company or any creditor who are persons connected to such
directors.
(ii) A secured creditor is allowed to vote at the meeting to the value of the
unsecured portion of his or her claim against the company or to the full value
of his or her claim if the creditor agree to forfeit his or her security.
(3)(a) If the proposals for a plan of future conduct are accepted in accordance with
subsection (2)(a)(i) the directors of the company must within 7 days approve the
proposals for a plan of future conduct in writing.
(b) In the event of the directors failing to accept the proposals within the period
referred to in paragraph (a) the company is automatically under a creditors' voluntary
winding-up, on the expiry of that period.
(c) Once the plan of future conduct becomes operative it binds the company and all
creditors of the company whose claims against the company arose before or on the
date agreed upon in the plan. of future conduct, which date must not be later than the
date on which the company was placed under judicial management.
(d) Secured creditors are bound by the plan of future conduct to the extent that they
participated in the vote for the its approval.
(e) The plan of future conduct has no effect in so far as it discriminates unfairly
against a dissenting creditor or future creditor.
(4) Once the proposals for a plan of future conduct have been approved by the
creditors and directors the judicial manager must forthwith file a copy of the accepted
plan of future conduct with the master and the registrar of companies and send a
notice setting out the details of the plan of future conduct to all the creditors of the
company.
(5) Upon the filing of the plan of future conduct with the Master the company is
released from judicial management and the affairs of the company must be conducted
according to the plan of future conduct.
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(6) The judicial manager is responsible for the execution of the plan of future conduct
according to the role assigned to him or her in the plan of future conduct, provided
that the plan of future conduct must not restrict any of the statutory powers of the
judicial manager.
(7) The judicial manager may and must, if required by any creditor or creditors who
alone or together hold ten percent or more of the value of the proven claims against
the company, convene a meeting of creditors and at the meeting the creditors may
resolve, with a majority in number and a majority of seventy-five percent in value to
amend the plan of future conduct or to terminate the plan of future conduct and that
the company be wound up.
(8) The judicial manager must apply to the court for the termination of the plan of
future conduct where the judicial manager is of the opinion that it is no longer
possible to achieve the goals of the plan of future conduct and that because of the
urgency of the matter or otherwise it is not appropriate to convene a meeting under
subsection (7) above. He or she may at the same time apply for the winding-up of the
company.
(9) If the judicial manager is of the opinion that it is necessary to amend the plan of
future conduct he may amend it by giving notice of the amendment to the Master
where the amendment is not substantial, but if the amendment or amendments are
substantial the administrator must obtain the approval of the creditors at a meeting of
creditors convened for the purpose in accordance with subsection (7).
Section 56 (Transition to voluntary winding-up)
(1) The company is deemed to have passed a special resolution that the company be
wound up voluntarily if:
(a) the directors of the company do not approve the proposals for future
conduct within seven days after the creditors approved them at a creditors'
meeting; or
(b) the creditors of a company under judicial management resolve that the
company be wound up in terms of section 4(2)(a)(iii); or
6 Based on Corporations Law, s 446A.
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(c) the creditors of a company governed by a plan of future conduct resolve to
terminate the plan of future conduct and to put the company into liquidation in
terms of section 4(7); or
(d) the circumstances for the winding-up of the company envisaged in the plan
of future conduct have arisen.
(2) The judicial manager, his or her partner, business associate, employer or employee
is disqualified from being appointed as liquidator of a company of which he or her
was the judicial manager.
Section 6\Duties of the judicial manager)
(1) A judicial manager must:
(a) on appointment forthwith assume the management of the affairs, business
and property of the company and recover and take possession of all the assets
of the company;
(b) conduct such management, subject to the supervision of the Master, in
such a manner as he or she may deem most economic and most promotive of
the interests of the members and creditors of the company;
(c) lodge with the Registrar of Companies
(i) within 7 days after his or her appointment a copy of the letter of
appointment as judicial manager;
(ii) in the event of the judicial management or the operation of the plan
of future conduct being terminated, a notice of such termination;
(d) prepare and lay before the meeting convened in terms of section 4(2) a
report containing
(i) an account of the business, property, affairs and financial
circumstances of the company;
(ii) a statement of the reasons why the company is unable to pay its
debts or is probably unable to meet its obligations;
7 Based on Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 430 and s 433.
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(iii) a complete list of creditors of the company (including contingent
and prospective creditors), specifying the amount and nature of the
claim of each creditor;
(iv) the considered opinion of the judicial manager whether it would be
in the interests of the creditors to accept the plan of future conduct; or
for judicial management to end; or for the company to be wound up;
and
(v) proposals for the plan of future conduct;
(e) convene and conduct all meetings of members and creditors required by
this Act or requested in terms of this Act;
(f) keep such accounting records and prepare such annual financial statements
as the company or its directors would have been obliged to keep or prepare if
the company was not placed under judicial management;
(g) lodge with the Master copies of all such documents as prescribed or
requested;
(h) examine the affairs of the company before the commencement of the
judicial management order in order to ascertain whether any director, or past
director, officer or past officer of the company has contravened or appears to
have contravened any provision of this Act or has committed any other
offence, and submit to the Master such reports as are in terms of section 400 of
the Companies Act required to be submitted by a liquidator;
(i) examine the affairs of the company before the commencement of the
judicial management order in order to ascertain whether any director, or past
director, officer or past officer of the company is or appears to be personally
liable to the company for damages or compensation to the company or for any
debts or liabilities of the company, and to report to the Master and to the
members and creditors the full particulars of any such liability;
(j) apply to the court for any order in terms of section 4(8).
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Section 78 (General powers)
(1) The judicial manager of a company:
(a) may do all such things as may be necessary for the management of the
affairs, business and property of the company, and
(b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a) has the powers
specified in the Schedule.
(2) The judicial manager also has power to call a meeting of the members or creditors
of the company.
(3) The judicial manager has the power to cancel onerous contracts provided that the
cancellation thereof will be deemed to have occurred before the company was placed
in judicial management.
(4) The judicial manager may apply to the court for directions in relation to any
particular matter arising in connection with the carrying out of his or her functions.
(5) In exercising his or her powers the judicial manager is deemed to act as the
company's agent.
Section 89 (Powers of investigation)
(1) Within 5 days of the company being placed in judicial management the directors
must give a statement about the company's business, property, affairs and financial
circumstances to the judicial manager.
(2) A director of a company under judicial management must attend on the judicial
manager at such times; and give the judicial manager such information about the
company's business, property, affairs and financial circumstances as the judicial
manager may reasonably require.
(3) When a company is placed in judicial management the judicial manager may
forthwith require some or all of the persons referred to in subsection (4) to furnish a
statement of affairs of the company within such a period as the judicial manager
reasonably requires.
8 Based on the English Insolvency Act 1986, s 14.
9 Section 7 should not replace the existing avenues and powers of investigation that the judicial
manager has in terms of Companies Act 61 of 1973 ss 439, 417, 414, 415, 416 and 418(2), but should
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(4) The persons for purposes of subsection (3) are:
(a) those who are or who have been officers of the company;
(b) directors and officers of an officer referred to in subsection (4)(a) who is a
juristic person;
(c) those who at any time within one year before the company was placed
under judicial management have taken part in the formation of the company;
and
(d) company employees or anyone who was a company employee within one
year before the company was placed in judicial management;
(5) The judicial manager may require any person to support any of the information
given in terms of this section with an affidavit.
Section 910 (Preference to post-judicial management creditors)
(1) All liabilities incurred by the judicial manager in the conduct of the company's
business must be paid in preference to all other liabilities not already discharged
exclusive of the costs of judicial management, and thereupon all claims based upon
such first-mentioned liabilities have preference in the order in which they were
incurred over all unsecured claims against the company except claims relating to the
costs of the judicial management.
(2) If the judicial management is superseded by a winding-up of the company the
preference conferred to in subsection (1) shall remain in force except in so far as
claims relating to the costs of the winding-up are concerned.
Section m" (Appointment of the judicial manager)
(1) Upon the company being placed under judicial management
(a) all the property of the company concerned shall be deemed to be in the
custody of the Master until a judicial manager has been appointed and has
assumed office;
complement those powers. Section 7 is based on the Australian Corporations Law, s 438B(2) and (3)
and the English Insolvency Act 1986, s 22.
10 Based on the Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 43 5( 1).
IIBased on Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 429.
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(b) the Master shall without delay appoint a natural person whom the Master
regards as having the necessary qualifications, experience and skill as a
judicial manager (who shall not be the auditor of the company or any person
disqualified by the Companies Act from being appointed as liquidator in a
winding-up) who shall give such security for the proper performance of the
duties of judicial manager, as the Master may direct.
(c) the Master may appoint two or more persons jointly as judicial manager in
terms of subsection (1)(b).
(2) The Master shall from time to time issue rules with regard to the qualifications and
experience for judicial managers which the Master considers appropriate.
(3) Where a judicial manager is appointed in terms of subsection (1), the court may,
on the application of a judicial manager or member or creditor or officer of the
company, review the appointment of the judicial manager.
Section 1112 (Remuneration of the judicial manager)
(1) The judicial manager is entitled to such remuneration for his or her services as
may be fixed by the Master from time to time.
(2) The remuneration must be fixed either
(a) as a percentage of the value of the property with which the judicial
manager has to deal, or
(b) by reference to the time properly given by the judicial manager and his or
her staff in attending to matters arising in the judicial management, or
(c) based on an incentive scheme agreed to by the members and creditors, or
(d) any combination of the above, and
in fixing the remuneration the Master shall take into account the manner in
which the judicial manager has performed his or her functions and any
recommendation by the members or creditors of the company relating to such
remuneration.
(3) The Master may reduce or increase the such remuneration if the Master is of the
opinion that there is good cause for doing so, and may disallow such remuneration
12 Based Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 434A and s 384(2) and Insolvency Rules 1986, r 2.4 7.
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either wholly or in part on account of any failure or delay by the judicial manager in
the discharge of his or her duties.
(4) Where remuneration of the judicial manager is fixed by the Master in terms of this
section, the court may, on the application of the judicial manager or of an officer,
member or creditor of the company, review the remuneration and confirm, increase or
reduce the remuneration.
Section 1213 (Vacation of office)
(1) The judicial manager of a company may at any time be removed from office by
order of court and may in prescribed circumstances resign his or her office by giving
notice of such resignation to the Master.
(2) Sections 379 and 381 of the Companies Act relating t~ the removal of the
liquidator by the Master and the control of the Master over liquidators apply to
judicial managers, with the changes required by the context.
(3) The Master may remove a judicial manager of a company and replace him or her
by another person if so requested by a meeting of creditors.
Schedule to the Actl4
Specific powers of the judicial manager referred to in section 7.
The judicial manager has the power:
(a) to appoint and dismiss professionally qualified legal representatives and
accountants to assist the judicial manager in the performance of his or her duties;
(b) to appoint and dismiss an agent or to employ a person to do any business which he
or she is unable to do;
(c) to do all acts and execute documents in the name of the company;
(d) to make payments incidental to the performance of his or her functions;
(e) to draw, accept, make and endorse negotiable instruments in the name of and on
behalf of the company;
(f) to raise loans or borrow money and grant security therefor over the property of the
company;
13 Based on the Insolvency Act 1986, s 19'and the Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 379 and s 381.
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(g) to make any arrangement or compromise on behalf of the company;
(h) to call meetings of the members or creditors of the company;
(i) to form a committee of creditors;
G) to do all other things incidental to his or her functions. IS
14 Based on sch 1 to the English Insolvency Act 1986.
15 The customary catch all.
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